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Introduction 
A set of people ‘growing up for our plantations, to fell our forests, to clear the land 
from jungle and wild beasts and to plant and cultivate the luxury of the world—tea.1 
…the penal labour legislation (Contract), the strong feeling of espirit de-corps among 
the planting community, and their intimate social relations with the Government 
officials, all combine to put the coolies at a disadvantage. The ‘unwritten law in this 
district is that once a tea garden coolie, always a tea-garden coolie.2 
The strike of the coolies of the tea gardens of Assam is really a revolt against the age-
old tyranny and exploitations to which they have been the most hapless victims...not 
only men but women and children have the same old story…the helpless coolie passed 
into the gardens it was felt that he was lost to civilization and humanity...But his 
redemption has at last come…he is determined to break the shackles forever or die in 
the attempt.3 
 
 The statements mark three different moments in the history of contract coolies 
in Assam tea plantations of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
first remark made by Robert Bruce—the in charge of the tea “experiment” of 
East India Company in the early nineteenth century—encapsulates a desire for 
“settled” workers for any future “commercial” success of tea enterprise in 
Assam.  Such an aspiration seems to have been realised—in the form of tea 
coolies—as described by a colonial officer of Assam at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The end of this coolie labour system is confidently 
prophesised in the last extract from a nationalist daily at the height of the most 
celebrated “episode” of coolie protest on the Assam plantations in 1921. 
These remark also outlining the limits of this study—suggests an obvious 
chronology and a given process of the idea, realisation and end of coolie-
labour on Assam plantations. 
Coolie, a generic category for the ‘unskilled’ manual worker, offering services 
for hire had various pre-colonial lineages4, was attempted to be recast in the 
                                                 
1 R Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce of the tea 
plantations in Assam (Calcutta, 1839) p.14. 
2 J Johnston, DC Cachar to Secty to Chief Commissioner, No 1658 E, Silchar 12th Dec 1903, 
Assam State Archives. Hereafter, ASA. 
3 Amrit Bazaar Patrika, 20th May 1921. National Archives of India. Hereafter NAI. 
4 The etymology of the term is sometimes traced to the Tamil word kūli, signifying ‘hire’ or 
‘wage’, and also to theethnic group (Kolī) performing menial tasks in Western India. A. Yule, 
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late eighteenth-nineteenth century colonial capitalist worlds, through 
discursive constructions and material practices for ‘mobilised-immobilised’ 
labour.5 In particular, the ‘coolie labour system’ organised in a period of 
abolitionism, was often depicted as a ‘solution’ to the impeding ‘problems of 
labour shortage’.6 Soon women, men and families indentured and shipped 
from the ports of India and China began supplementing and at times replacing 
the slaves on the capitalist enterprises of the Caribbean, east and southern 
Africa, the Indian and Pacific oceans and Australasia.7 The aspiration of 
freedom that encapsulated the spirit of abolitionism was apparently 
undermined by contracts which bounded the ‘free labour’, raising moral 
indignation and political action. Coolie labour, was often proclaimed as a 
particular compromise between the past (slave-labour) and the future (free-
labour), straddling the two different regimes, yet a stage in that promised 
transition.8  
                                                                                                                                
C. Burnell and W. Crooke, Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo Indian Words and 
Phrases, and of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, Geographical and Discursive, 
(London, 1903) pp. 249-250. 
5 I use this expression to underline the constant play of the strategies of mobilisation and 
immobilisation inherent in the coolie constructions. J. Breman and V. Daniel, 'The Making of a 
Coolie', The Journal of Peasant Studies, 19 (1992). 
6  For all the contradictions and confusions which marked the colonial construction of ‘labour 
problem’, the latter’s significance for the colonial project was enormous. 
7  In the post-slavery plantations and colonial enterprises coolies came to be identified with the 
Asiatic labour from India and China, working under terms of indenture. The recruitment, 
transport and settlement of coolies was conducted under patronage of the colonial regimes and 
worked through native middlemen and recruiters, in what came to be described as the ‘coolie 
trade’. O. J. Hui, 'Chinese Indentured Labour: Coolies and Colonies', The Cambridge Survey of 
World Migration (1995) pp. 51-56. 
8  The narrative of progress/transition was primarily an outcome of the post-Enlightenment 
spirit that freedom characterised the natural human condition and the ‘universalization of free 
labour was the raison d’être of history’. This discourse of freedom had apparently banished 
unfree labour relations (like coolie labour) from the life of capital. This goes against the 
findings of Gyan Prakash who has eloquently argued that the emergence of capitalism as a 
global system ‘took shape in and profited from structures ranging from peasant production to 
plantation slavery.’ The history of unfreedom, he contends, ‘is the history of capital in 
disguise.’ Keeping those qualifications in mind, the attempts then to write a history of coolie 
labour does not start from the premise that it was “not yet” proletarian labour or ‘not 
completely’ proletarian labour, but subscribes to a more “plural” notion of labour. G. Prakash, 
‘Colonialism, capitalism and the discourse of freedom’, International Review of Social History 
41 (1996) pp.9-26. Also see Linden, M. van der Linden, Workers of the world: essays toward a 
global labor history (Leiden, 2008). 
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Assam tea coolies have been subject to a variety of enquiries and historical 
studies. In the early studies on the Indian tea industry and some “pioneering” 
tea companies, issues of labour were either marginal or absent.9 The trade 
union activism of Sanat Bose, seminal scholarship of Ranajit Dasgupta10 and 
doctoral dissertations, in the late 1970 and 1980s, of Rana Behal, Ramakrishna 
Chattopadhyaya and M.A.B. Siddique, have brought plantation labour back 
into historical focus.11 
 The historical interest in labour reflects a broader trend in historiography, 
where from some predictions of a decline and “end” of labour history has 
given way to a growing sense of renewal.12 The new labour history has been 
very productive in exploring new themes and unsettling older frameworks and 
certainties. Yet an overwhelming emphasis on the indentured system and 
colonial policies has not yielded any sustained interest on the experiences of 
work and labour of Assam coolies and how such processes were negotiated 
and intervened by the workers. A point of departure of recent studies on the 
“indenture” has been the negotiations and experiences of social groups and 
even individuals. The wealth of “evidence” generated by an elaborate and 
intrusive colonial bureaucracy, monitoring and controlling the overseas 
movements, in contrast to a relatively more “deregulated” and less supervised 
Assam coolie system, has been critical in this incongruity.13 The lack of 
                                                 
9 P. Griffiths, History of the Indian Tea Industry (London, 1967); H.A. Antrobus, The Jorehaut 
Tea Company Ltd (London, 1948); H.A. Antrobus, A History of Assam Company (Edinburgh, 
1957). 
10 R. Dasgupta, ‘From Peasant to Tribesmen to Plantation workers’ in S Karotemprel, B.D. 
Roy (ed.) Tea Garden Labourers of North East India (Shillong, 1990) pp.19-23. S. Bose, 
Capital and Labour in the Indian tea Industry. (Bombay, 1954) 
11 R. Behal, Some Aspects of the Growth of the Tea Plantation Labour Force and Labour 
Movements in Assam Valley Districts (Lakhimpur, Sibsagar and Darrang) 1900-1947. 
(Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1983); R. Chattopadhyaya, Social Perspective of Labour 
Legislation in India: 1859-1932 (Calcutta University, 1987); M.A.B. Siddique, Evolution of 
Land Grants and Labour Policy of Government (New Delhi, 1990) 
12 P. Mohapatra, Situating the renewal: reflections on labour studies in India (New Delhi, 
1998). 
13 Many recent studies have documented and utilised a variety of sources like letters, petitions, 
depositions and oral testimonies to “deconstruct” the official view and understand the 
‘experiences’ of migration and indentured labour in  different contexts. For the Indian migrant 
in Mauritius M. Carter, Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British 
Empire (London, 1996) and for the Chinese migrant in Cuba see L. Yun, The Coolie Speaks: 
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scholarly attention should not  imply  that a more localised nature of the 
migration to Assam had less transformative consequences—social, biological 
and cultural—than the long and hazardous passages across the seas to distant 
destinations. The historical evidence of Assam coolie migration and settlement, 
to the contrary, suggests a substantial demographic movement over time, a 
higher incidence of abuses in recruitment, greater rates of mortality during 
transit and a largely “permanent” character of the population shift.14   
A parallel trend to this large scale movement of individuals was the drives of 
plantation capitalism towards greater systematisation and routinisation. This 
changing nature and organization of Assam tea gardens remains to be 
conceptualised and historically situated. Such a process marked a shift from a 
predominantly violent strategy of work intensification and control of workers 
in the earlier plantations— to strategies of a closer supervision of  their work 
and life—through an elaborate authority structure and newer forms of control 
on the late nineteenth century. A new ‘time-work-discipline’ was attempted to 
be formalised and enforced.  The   “industrial organisation” of work on 
plantations will seek a reassessment of an overt focus on coercive strategies of 
labour control in the literature. 
                                                                                                                                
Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves of Cuba (Philadelphia, 2008). Some personal 
and autobiographical writing of indentured and ex-indentured labourers have been recently 
‘unearthed’. The cases of Bechu (West Indies) and Munshi Rahman Khan (Surinam) are most 
well recorded.  C. Seecharan, Bechu: 'Bound Coolie' Radical in British Guiana 1894-1901 
(Barbados, 1999) and M.R. Khan, Autobiography of an Indian Indentured Labourer: Munshi 
Rahman Khan, 1874- 1972 (Delhi, 2005). For an analysis of Bechu’s “critique” of the 
indenture system through his writing in the press see P. Mohapatra, '“Following Custom”? 
Representations of Community among Indian Immigrant Labour in the West Indies, 1880–
1920', International Review of Social History, 51 (2006) pp.173-202. 
14 R. Dasgupta, ‘Structure of the Labour Market in Colonial India’ Economic and Political 
Weekly 16, no.44-46 pp.1781-1806; P.Chaudhury, ‘Labour Migration from the United 
Provinces, 1881-1911’ Studies in History 8, no.13 (1992) pp.13-41; P. Mohapatra, ‘Coolies 
and Colliers: A Study of the Agrarian Context of Labour Migration from Chotanagpur’, 
Studies in History 1, no.2 (August 1985) pp.247-303; S. Chatterjee and R. Das Gupta, Tea-
Labour in Assam: Recruitment and Government Policy, 1840-80, Economic and Political 
Weekly 16, nos. 44-46 (November 1981) pp.1861-1868; R Shlomowitz & L. Brennan, 
‘Mortality and Migrant labour en route to Assam, 1863-1924’ Indian Economic and Social 
History Review 27, no.3 (Sep. 1990) pp.313-330. One such stream of migration from 
Chotanagpur to the tea plantations of Assam and Bengal is the subject of a recent documentary 
film Kora Rajee (Land of Diggers).  
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  A stabilisation of plantations and the planter strategies of routines and 
supervision also occasioned cultures of work and life taking form on 
plantations. Culture—which has been a point of emphasis in the “new” labour 
history—is not taken in its essentialist sense. Culture is neither purely drawn 
for a pre—plantation past nor is it understood to be completely “derived” and 
produced from a new structural form—plantation. This will require a closer 
analysis of the quotidian practices of workers—where cultures and routines of 
work and life were produced, reproduced and transformed.   
This emphasis will seek a re-evaluation of the nature and forms of bargaining 
and worker politics on the plantations.  A body of scholarly literature has 
emphasised that the plantation regime and the system of contracts had deterred 
the capacity of plantation workers and they chose accommodation and 
individual acts of passive resistance as a “strategy” appreciating the realities of 
the plantation system and structures of power in the larger colonial society.15 
Desertion has often been read as a predominant mode of resistance and an 
individualised strategy of “escape” from the harsh plantation life. Such 
understandings do not necessarily appreciate  that in colonial classificatory 
modes desertion was employed as an overarching category—which ranged 
from individual withdrawal of services, to  withdrawal of smaller and even 
some larger groups of workers. The right to private arrest as empowered by the 
contract and the elaborate system of policing and tracking down the 
“absconders” also led to a gross underreporting of the phenomena. There also a 
tendency of plantation managers conflating worker deaths with desertion, as 
suspected by some officials and also noted by an Indian investigator. This was 
a well worked out strategy of keeping the mortality rates within the 
“acceptable” limits.16 
                                                 
15 See B. V. Lal, ‘“Nonresistance” on Fiji Plantations: The Fiji Indian Experience, 1879-1920’ 
in B.V. Lal and D. Munro (ed.) Plantation Workers, Resistance and Accomodation (Honolulu, 
1993) p. 188; M.J. Murray, ‘White Gold’ or ‘White Blood’? The Rubber Plantations of 
Colonial Indochina’, 1910-40 and P. Ramasamy, ‘Labour Control and Labour Resistance in 
the Plantations of Colonial Malaya’. Both articles in Plantations, Proletarians and Peasants in 
Colonial Asia, special edition, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, nos. 3&4 (1992) pp.56-59, 
pp.97-104. 
16 There was also a growing tendency to explain the incidence of desertion as a “racial” 
phenomenon—where the workers from North Western Provinces and Bihar (upcountry) were 
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Some recent studies on protest in the nineteenth century Assam plantations, 
have unsettled a dominant framework—in Indian labour historiography in 
general and Assam plantation historiography in particular—of an evolutionary 
transition from individual to collective forms of protest—especially linked 
with growth of national movement and  communist revolution in the twentieth 
century.17 However, these explorations have not adequately conceptualised the 
nature and forms of bargaining and protest in the nineteenth century.18 The 
framing of protest has oscillated from an understanding of greater 
politicization in the twentieth century to remaining as contingencies. A more 
grounded study will reveal how such immediate contingencies were not 
divorced from the worker solidarities produced in the practices of life and 
work on plantations. These collective expressions were informing and were 
informed by workplace organization, patterns of residence and various new 
occasions on plantations. The production of the “new” occasions was also 
marked by the “reproduction” of older cultural and religious occasions. 
                                                                                                                                
seen to be particularly prone to “bolt”. The annual labour reports from the early 1870s—
working on this principle—classified desertions according to the “racial” background of the 
workers. The labour and health reports of the late 1870s and early 1880s suggested some 
connections between desertion and new arrivals having low earnings, and also with plantations 
having a higher rate of mortality. From the late nineteenth century one can see a greater urge in 
the colonial administration to generate a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. One 
of the classifications tried to explain this along three criterions—a. nature of contract b. period 
of residence, c. supposed cause. Rana Behal, ‘Forms of Labour protest in Assam Valley Tea 
Plantations, 1900-1930’, Economic and Political Weekly 20, no.4 (Jan 1985) p. PE-20. Enquiry 
at inspections of tea gardens in Assam into the causes of desertions among labourers. Assam 
Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, February 1904. ASA; The Bengalee 27, no.40 (Oct 2, 
1886) p.473 cited in D. Ganguli, Slavery in British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972) p.7. 
17 This view of “evolution” forms part of many studies. Sukomal Sen, Working Class of India: 
History of Emergence and Movement, 1830-1990 (Calcutta, 1997) p.60; Sanat Bose, Capital 
and Labour in the Indian Tea Industry (Bombay, 1954) p.96; Amalendu Guha, ‘Formation of a 
Working Class in Assam plantations: A Study in Retrospect’ in North East India Council for 
Social Science Research (ed.) Problems of Tea Industry in North East India (Calcutta, 1981); 
R. Behal, ‘Forms of Labour Protest in Assam Valley Plantations, 1900-1930’, Economic and 
Political Weekly 20, no.4 (Jan 1985). See Chapter 6 for a detailed critique and an analysis of 
the “incident”. 
18 N. Varma, ‘Coolie Strikes Back: Collective Protest and Action in the Colonial Tea 
Plantations of Assam, 1880-1920’, Indian Historical Review; R.P. Behal, ‘Power Structure, 
Discipline, and Labour in Assam Tea Plantations under Colonial Rule’ in R. Behal & M van 
der Linden (ed.) Coolies, Capital and Colonialism: Studies in India Labour History (2006, 
Delhi); R. Behal, Coolie Drivers or Benevolent Paternalists? British Tea Planters in Assam and 
the Indenture system, Modern Asian Studies 44, no.1 (2010); Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘Crime and 
Punishment on the Tea plantations of Assam’,  in M. D. Dubber and L Framer (ed.) Modern 
Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford, 2007) pp.; E Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British 
India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 2010) pp.142-184. 
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 This will require greater attention on plantations not as given homogeneous 
structures which reproduce uniformly across time and space. The various 
conceptualizations of plantation as harbingers of modernity, as total 
institutions, as abstract spaces, have to be firmly located in different historical, 
geographical and social settings.   
  A quest for migrant workers and planter strategies of contracting migrant 
workers (or coolies)—emerge as one of the early resolutions of such plantation 
aspirations in the post-slavery world.  These processes were operating in a 
global framework, but its specific manifestation needs to be carefully mapped.  
For instance the framing of a special indenture contract (Assam contract) did 
not do away a general contract—the Master and Servant contract (Act XIII) in 
Assam plantations. The contract(s) assumed specialised and overlapping forms 
in its attempts to immobilise workers in a fairly differentiated plantation 
landscape.  The indenture system in Assam based on the historical experience 
of Assam contract and Assam valley plantations has to be grounded.  This 
differentiation in the practices of indenturing will also need to be situated in 
the broadening of the identity of the recruiter. 
Drawing from range of insights and concerns of labour history, social history, 
history of work and studies of protest, this study is based on a variety of 
sources. The colonial archives at the national and local levels will be particular 
interest and significance. Till 1874, Assam was part of the province of Bengal 
and the material for an earlier period is drawn from the relevant reports on 
Bengal.  The planter narratives, autobiographies, memoirs are crucial to 
understand the strategies of management. There is also some investigation of 
the “scientific” literature dealing with various aspects of plantation work and 
life of workers. This kind of literature has also to be located in a changing 
plantation mode where a greater degree of systematization and control was 
desired.Contemporary periodicals allow us different perspectives about Assam 
tea gardens—ranging from pro-planter perspectives, an emerging Indian 
middle class and anti-slavery voices. Some oral narratives recorded in the areas 
of recruitment and on tea gardens give us new perspective on plantation 
experience. Again photographs of plantations and visual sources are closely 
interrogated as historical texts. 
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The first part situates the emergence of migrant workers and the contract(s) 
(Assam contract and Act XIII contract) in the changing nature, organization of 
work and operation scales of plantations in colonial Assam. How did 
plantations employing contract coolies develop a relationship with recruiters 
and how does it change over time.  The changes in nature of contracts and 
modes of recruiting from the 1870s (especially through certain legislative 
initiatives) created the basis for harsher contracts and facilitated massive 
migration. The trends also occasioned new modes of plantation organisation 
and intensification of work. These interlocking processes in analysed  in the 
next part through an unpacking of the unpopularity of Assam, the planter 
concerns and the worker practices of drinking and the notions of customary 
emerging on plantations. Informed by such understandings, the last part looks 
at a moment which stimulated the end of contracts.  The episode in the 
twentieth century is carefully discussed to how it encapsulated processes of 
continuities and change. 
The first chapter looks at the context and practices of the introduction of tea 
production in Assam. It shows how the shift in acquiring the art of making tea 
to the practices of cultivating tea was framed in the plantation mode. The 
plantation structure was premised on routines of work and the immobilisation 
of workers. Such a process was intensified with the emergence of private 
enterprise in tea and the growing scales of production. A local migrating group 
was identified as the settled workers required by the plantations. The planter’s 
desire for a shift to migrant workers was rooted in these experiences of work 
and labour.  
The second chapter details the nature of shift to migrant workers and 
emergence of penal controls. The major line of enquiry is how the strategies of 
planters backed by colonial state were informed by the responses of workers 
on the plantations. Here, I look at the nature of the contract regime and how it 
developed a relationship with the modes of recruitment of workers. This 
contract regime was reconstituted through a discourse of freedom which 
translated into legislative action of the colonial state. How were these 
processes encapsulating planter desires to enforce the contracts and deregulate 
the modes of recruitment? The different experiences of the contract system and 
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modes of recruitment in the two planting regions (namely Assam Valley and 
Surma Valley) of Assam are also explored in this chapter. 
The third chapter specifically focuses on the last two decades of nineteenth 
century.  During this period Assam plantations underwent massive expansion 
of tea acreage, increasing scales of tea, accompanied by large migration of 
workers under harsher and longer contracts. How were these changes 
perceived in the recruiting regions? The attempt here is to unpack the category 
of “unpopularity” which came to be associated with Assam tea gardens. 
The fourth chapter takes the problem of alcohol consumption of workers as an 
entry point to discuss the shifts in the organisation of production in plantations 
and the emerging forms of work cultures. Such processes also have to be 
located in the context of a significant demographic shift of plantations and the 
changing forms of plantations with new strategies of intensification of work.  
Extending these enquiries, the fifth chapter explores the forms of negotiation 
and bargaining on plantation by contrasting the developing notions of 
customary (Dustoor) with the formal notions of contract. Again situated in a 
changing plantation context, the idea of customary will show spaces of 
bargaining between managers and workers, which were not entirely effaced by 
contracts. This will allow us to take this as entry point to explore the practices 
of work and life on the late nineteenth century plantations. 
The last chapter shifts the focus to the 1920s which marked a major crisis in 
the contract system and its eventual transformation. The massive withdrawal of 
workers from the plantations during the height of the non-cooperation 
movement known as Chargola exodus is explored. Through a detailed 
investigation of the event, both continuities and changes in strategies of work, 
and patterns of collective forms of protest will be explored. 
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1. Introduction of Tea, Plantation Production and 
Early Notions of Work and Worker 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter situates the notions and practices of work and labour in the 
context of the introduction of tea cultivation and the inauguration of plantation 
mode of production in Assam. The first section tracks the shifting concerns and 
strategies of the East India Company, interested and engaged in the task of 
producing the valued commodity in its Indian possessions. Here we analyse the 
changing objectives of the colonial tea project. After the so called “discovery” 
of the “indigenous” tea plant in Assam in the early 1830s, it moved beyond an 
exclusive focus on acquiring the “skilled” art of manipulation of leaves (by 
Chinese tea makers), to organizing the manual work for clearing the forests 
and procuring the tea leaves (by local tribes and peasants) growing in the wild. 
Here we examine how the perceived disinclination of the local Assamese to 
participate in this project was mapped in the qualitative and essentialised 
binary discourse of labour—the lazy indigenous contrasting to the industrious 
imported labour.19 Such anxieties as we go on to discuss, became more 
pronounced when the “experimental” tracts made way for a more “regular” 
plantation mode of production which systematically encountered a recurrent 
shortage of workers in the formalising period of tea manufacture. 
  The valorisation of “imported labour”—as the next sections will discuss—
hinged on the assumption of them donning the mantle of the committed and 
settled workers on plantations, in contrast to the local tribal and peasant groups 
decried of being perpetually entrapped in the agricultural cycles and their 
opium smoking habits. The identification of outsider/imported labour was 
however fluid at this stage, where Kacharis—an ethnic group within the 
province, and the extremely amorphous category of “Bengalis” from outside 
                                                 
19 The cultural construction of lazy native was critical to the ideology of colonial capitalism in 
several contexts. Alatas shows how the reluctance of the Malays, Indonesians and Filipinos to 
participate in the colonial economy was read through the stereotype of the “lazy native” in 
these discourses. S.H. Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the image of the Malays, 
Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th century and its function in the ideology of 
colonial capitalism. (London, 1977). 
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the province, “settled” and worked on the plantations of the pioneer tea 
company—the Assam Company.20 
 The later sections of the chapter will make a case that it was not until the late 
1850s that  coolie—the much celebrated labour category considered ideal for 
plantations—was employed to designate the ‘imported labour from outside the 
province’ in the colonial-capitalist discourses on Assam. Now the referents 
were the social and regional groups travelling to the overseas plantation 
colonies as indentured labour. They were now reckoned to be indispensable for 
accomplishing the amplified labour needs of an industry, expanding much 
beyond a few companies in select localities of Assam.  
 The workers demanded from outside the province were not just limited to 
provide remedy for the short numbers. Tea coolies for plantations were ideally 
imagined to be composed of familial and kin members incessantly travelling as 
groups. Apart from serving the purpose of being “fixed” and “bound” in/as 
structures of families, the proposition encapsulated the potential of labour 
participation of families in accomplishing the differentiated and specialised 
nature of work in the functioning plantations—organised along the axes of 
gender and age. The interest of this chapter in tracing and interrogating this 
transition to migrant workers is also to underline the limits of the strategies of 
plantation capital and policies of the colonial state in dislocating, 
immobilising, and depoliticising the local society. 
1.2 Discovery of Tea and the Skills of Chinese Work 
The idea of the ‘introduction of tea cultivation’ in the newly acquired 
possessions of East India Company in the early part of nineteenth century was 
tied to larger geopolitical, commercial and scientific developments; where 
uncertainties of commercial relations with China, the profitability of the tea 
trade and the partially successful propagation of the plant in other parts of the 
globe, made the proposition not only urgent and lucrative, but increasingly 
                                                 
20 The category of Bengali was used for workers travelling from Bengal to various inland and 
overseas destinations. See Chapter 2 for details. 
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feasible.21 The immediate point of consideration in this regard—as indicated in 
the influential minute by the Governor General of India, William Bentinck—
was to map, assess and ascertain the various configurations of soil and climate 
within their vast and diverse possessions in the subcontinent, which could offer 
the precise combination in which the ‘China plant’ could flourish to an extent 
to render it commercially viable for private speculation. This would then 
necessitate, as he argued, ‘concerted measures for obtaining the genuine plant, 
and the actual cultivator’. This underscored at the very outset that the notions 
of not only the plant and its habitat but also the knowledge and art of its 
manipulation was patently Chinese.22 A Tea Committee was duly constituted 
in February 1834, as the institutional and scientific framework to carry out the 
“experiment” of exploring and recommending the measures for introduction of 
tea plant in India.23 
The essential task of the Tea Committee for initiating measures for the 
“introduction” of tea was apparently complicated by the reports of “discovery” 
of tea in Assam. These reports  confirmed tea to be ‘beyond all doubt 
indigenous’, having received letters and conclusive evidence from the 
                                                 
21 The introduction of plants in the colonised world was a long drawn out process. The Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial empires in the New World, Africa and Asia had involved in 
“transaction” and “circulation” of various plants. A more formalised strategy of plant 
introduction and plantation cultivation was an outcome of a strategy and policy of the colonial 
empires of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. P. D. Curtin, The rise and fall of the 
plantation complex: essays in Atlantic history (Cambridge, 1998); J. Crawfurd, ‘On the 
History and Migration of Cultivated Plants Producing Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, etc.’ Transactions 
of the Ethnological Society of London 7 (1869) pp.197-206; D.R. Headrick, ‘Botany, 
Chemistry, and Tropical Development’ Journal of World History 7, no. 1 (1996). 
22 Minute by the Governor-General of India, 24th January 1834 in The Measures Adopted for 
introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant within the British Possessions in India (British 
Parliamentary Papers, 1839) pp.5-6. Hereafter, The Measures Adopted for introducing the 
Cultivation of the Tea Plant. 
23 The Tea Committee in its inaugural statement agreed to idea of the necessity of the right 
(read Chinese) combination of soil and climate for any significant success of its introduction; 
but admitted that ‘due to lack of statistical inquiries directed to this particular subject’, it knew 
‘too little to form an accurate comparison with the tea districts of China’ and India. On a 
preliminary and extremely limited information, they speculated that the lower hills and valleys 
of Himalayas, the eastern frontier and the Nilgiris and the mountain tracts in southern and 
Central India was most likely to fit the bill or in other words resembled the tea countries in 
China,. Members of the Tea Committee to Secretary to the Government in the Revenue 
Department, 15th March 1834. The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the 
Tea Plant p.16. Also see N. Wallich, Observations on the Cultivation of the Tea Plant for 
Commercial Purposes, in the mountainous parts of Hindustan in The Measures Adopted for 
introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant. 
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administrative-in-charge of the province Captain Jenkins and his subordinate 
Lt Charlton. Underlining the significance of the occasion, the Committee 
waxed eloquent: ‘by far [it is] the most important and valuable discovery that 
has ever been made on matters connected with the agricultural and commercial 
resources of this empire’.24 This, however, did not discourage the Committee 
and its informants to persist in invoking China tea (the genuine) in validating 
the credentials of the Assam tea (the indigenous).25 The Committee formally 
constituted a scientific deputation to map, verify and scientifically assess the 
claims and nature of Assam tea.26 In a recent study, Jayeeta Sharma argues that 
the trope of “wildness” informed the colonial scientific discourses in 
characterising the tea plant found in Assam and also the practices of its 
manipulation observed among the local tribes.27 The colonial civilising 
mission was sought to be realised through the introduction of “civilized” 
Chinese tea maker/cultivator and domesticating the “wild” Assam plant by 
confinement and cultivation.28  
                                                 
24 Members of the Tea Committee to Secretary to the Government in the Revenue Department, 
24th December 1834. The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant 
pp.32-33. 
25 The committee referred to the place of “discovery” (one month’s march from Suddya and 
Beesa) ‘to be adjoining the Chinese frontier province of Yunan’. Captain Jenkins detailing the 
geography of the region indicated that the mountainous region which divides Assam and 
Cachar to have ‘a direct continuation passing into China into the tea countries of Sechuan and 
Yunan’ and that the ‘northern bend in the latitude of Suddya meets a branch of the snowy 
mountains (the place considered ideal for tea growing in China)’. While Captain Charlton 
narrated his interactions with couple of natives from the Chinese province of Yunan who 
assured him that the tea tree growing near Suddya exactly resembled the species they had there 
and that there can be ‘no doubt of its being bona fide tea’. Members of the Tea Committee to 
Secretary to the Government in the Revenue Department, 24th December 1834; F Jenkins, 
Agent to the Governor-General North-Eastern Frontier  to the Secretary of the Committee of 
Tea Culture, 7th May 1834; Letter from Lt Charlton to Captain Jenkins, 17th May 1834. The 
Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.32-36. 
26 Members of the Tea Committee to Secretary to the Government in the Revenue Department, 
13th March 1835. The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.15. 
27 The Singphos and Kamtees were in the habit of drinking an infusion. This was similar to the 
procedure that was in use with Burmese to prepare tea. J. Sharma, ‘British science, Chinese 
skill and Assam tea’, Indian Economic & Social History Review 43 no.4 (2006); The Measures 
Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.34-35. 
28 Naturalist worked with a different conception of science. Domestication effected changes in 
the organism, which were partly inherited and intensified these changes by selection during 
many generations. J. Sharma, ‘British science, Chinese skill and Assam tea’, Indian Economic 
& Social History Review 43 no. 4 (2006). For a general discussion on colonialism as a 
19  
 The necessity of introducing Chinese tea makers revealed the early anxieties 
about work and workers in achieving the desired objective of producing tea in 
India. The work, unlike the later coolie work on plantations, was portrayed as 
“skilled”, requiring the “true” yet “jealously guarded” art of processing leaves 
to produce black and green tea, known only to the Chinese. Jenkins, the 
administrative head of Assam, requested the scientific deputation for Assam to 
be accompanied with Chinamen. He expected them to travel through Burma 
into Yunan to forge and activate networks of contact and facilitate the flows of 
existing knowledge about tea manufacture.29 The Tea Committee issued a 
fresh directive to its representative who had returned from China with tea seeds 
to undertake another trip to recruit qualified Chinamen, who could oversee and 
supervise the cultivation and manufacture of tea. This, they contented, was the 
key to the ‘successful introduction of tea culture within the British 
territories’.30  
Chinese tea makers were not easy to procure and also came at a substantial 
cost. For instance, the inaugural batches of Chinese tea makers landing in 
Assam in the late 1830s came under great duress, loss of life and heavy price. 
Their presence, however, quickly raised hopes among the 
administrative/scientific circles that the valued art of tea making could now be 
passed on to the colonised natives. They believed that the tea enterprise would 
                                                                                                                                
civilising mission, see M. Mann and H. Fischer-Tine, Colonialism as a Civilising Mission 
(London, 2004). 
29 Jenkins further urged the government to take active measures in facilitating and stimulating 
the trade links between Ava (Burma) and Assam in the hope of attracting Chinese cultivators 
to reclaim what he described as the wild wastes of Suddya. The scheme of getting the Chinese 
cultivators through the overland route than directly from China met with the Committee’s 
approval because of its cost effectiveness, but the scheme was unlikely to bear immediate 
results. F. Jenkins, Agent to the Governor-General North-Eastern Frontier to the Secretary of 
the Tea Committee, 6th January, 1835. The Measures Adopted for introducing the cultivation of 
the Tea Plant within the British Possessions in India p.37. 
30 Such a tendency was also evident from Dutch Trading Company (Nederlandsche 
Handelsmaatschappij)  sending   an employee between the years 1827 and 1833, who travelled 
around six times to China in order to get the necessary data on cultivation and manufacture, 
and to fetch skilled Chinese labourers with their tools.  The Dutch Government even ordered 
seeds from Japan through the intermediary, the physician F.V. Siebold in 1825. The first tea 
gardens were laid out in December 1835. Members of the Tea Committee to Secretary to the 
Government in the Revenue Department, 18th September 1835; Secretary to the Government in 
the Revenue Department to Members of the Tea Committee, 21st September 1835. The 
Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.46-47; Bulletin Du 
Jardin Botanique, 1 no.4, (1919) p.196. 
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in due course of time liberate itself from the shackles of Chinese skilled 
workers.31 Operating along those lines, Robert Bruce decided to employ his 
entire native staff as apprentices to the Chinese tea makers.32 To further secure 
this valued knowledge, he diligently recorded and graphically illustrated the 
earliest process of manufacture employed by the Chinese, which was published 
in 1838 as An Account of Manufacture of the Black Tea as Now Practised at 
Suddeya in Upper Assam. 33  
 
                                                 
31 Members of the Tea Committee to Secretary to Government, 12th January 1837; Secretary to 
the Government in the Revenue Department  to the Tea Committee, 13th March 1837; N 
Wallich to Secretary to the Government in the Revenue Department, 30th November 1837. 
Robert Fortune, the incharge of the British tea enterprise in the North Western provinces also 
regarded the importation of Chinese manipulators at exorbitant wages as a ‘temporary 
measure’, the long term objective being the ‘instruction of the natives’. The Measures Adopted 
for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.87-94; Report upon the Tea Plantations of 
Deyra, Kumaon and Gurhwal by Robert Fortune, 6th September 1851, Selections from the 
Records of Government, North Western Provinces (Agra, 1855). 
32 R Bruce to Jenkins, 20th Dec 1836 The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of 
the Tea Plant. 
33 A recent study argues this to be one of the early examples of expatriation for work purposes 
in the context of a transfer of technology from an ancient civilization to a modern colony. 
These expatriate craftsmen were sought after both for their expertise in the tea-making process 
and for their ability to train others, particularly the local Assamese. Few of the first group of 
Chinese tea cultivators and processors who moved to Assam in 1837 lasted the full three years 
of their contract. A. L Pichon, China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the 
Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong, 1827-1843 (Oxford, 2006). 
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Fig 1.1: Manual and illustration on tea manufacture in Assam, 1838.34 
The transfer of skills from the civilised to the colonised was one of diminishing 
returns, especially in terms of the wages paid. The trained native black tea 
maker got only nine percent of what was paid to the Chinese counterpart, while 
the native green tea maker barely received a third of the monthly remuneration 
of the Chinese colleague. 
1.3 Framing Plantations and encounters with the Lazy Native 
Worker 
Alongside the acquaintance with the civilising methods of the Chinese tea 
maker/cultivator, simultaneous attempts were underway to “civilise” the wild 
Assam Plant.  By the middle of 1836, the botanical expert of the deputation 
Nathan Wallich, having extensively travelled, surveyed and mapped the wild 
sites in the province, proposed urgent measures for taking possession of the 
“natural” tea forests.35 Such an idea was mooted in the contention that the 
forests holding the valuable plant of potential exploitation, was at the time 
exposed to the ravages of the nature, native and beast. In what could be 
described as “proto-plantations” and containing the germs of a prolonged but 
contested process of dispossession of the forest commons. The creation and 
systematisation of enclaves was proposed by demarcating, clearing and 
                                                 
34 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce of the tea 
plantations in Assam (Calcutta, 1839). 
35 The area of tea in Upper Assam was located in three regions namely Singhpo country 
(Kojoo, Niggroo); Muttock country (Nuddoa and Tingree) and Gabroo Hills. The Measures 
Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.46-47. 
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guarding these sites.36 This found a clearer expression in a detailed order from 
the central administration instructing the local bureaucracy to take immediate 
steps to that effect: 
1st. To obtain by purchase or otherwise tracts of forests in the Singpho, Muttock, and 
Gubroo Hills 
2nd. That the tracts be placed under a systematic course of management, for 
establishing tea plantations 
3rd. That the Tracts be protected, by a strong fence, from encroachment and 
depredation of man and beast 
4th. That labourers be entertained to dig and level the ground, and drain lands at 
places where there is fear of severe flooding 
5th. That Chowkidars be hired to guard the tracts, to prevent theft of plants and 
seed.37  
 To realise the desire of taming the forests containing the wild tea into 
demarcated and ordered “plantations”, the company administration was not in 
a position to explicitly pursue a policy of acquisition, dispossession and direct 
control. They largely depended on personal persuasion, inducement, and at 
times exaggerated and even concocted promises to solicit valued local 
information and support.38 Even though he lacked the requisite scientific 
                                                 
36 This was in further agreement with Wallich’s scientific idea that the wild Assam plant, when 
placed in circumstances as nearly as possible resembling those in which the cultivated/civilized 
China plant should yield the best results. At the same time, to conclusively show the feasibility 
of producing tea in Assam for commercial purposes, for which the committee was explicitly 
formed, Jenkins strongly recommended that the tea cannot exclusively be picked from the wild 
and had to be put through the test of cultivation (civilization)—both native and imported. 
Further elaborating the proposed structure and nature of the “proto-plantations”, he 
recommended that an appropriate site should be decided (with the Chinese expertise) and the 
cultivation undertaken in the right earnest. He reassured the government that the whole 
experiment cannot be too burdensome as the only major expense being the remuneration of 
European superintendence and the Chinese planters, as the land can be acquired at almost no 
cost and coolies for what he described as ‘little additional charge’.  Seeds which arrived from 
China were sown in Calcutta early in 1835, and the plantlets, 42,000 in number, distributed. 
Assam and the Himalayan Mountains (Kumaon, Dehra Doon, North West Provinces) got 
20,000 each. The remainders 2,000 were transported to Madras. N. Wallich to Francis Jenkins, 
15th March 1836, The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.66. 
For more details see D. Arnold, ‘Plant capitalism and company science: the Indian career of 
Nathaniel Wallich’ Modern Asian Studies 42 no. 5 (2008) pp.899-928. 
37 Bruce complained about many tracts being cut down in “ignorance” by the natives, to make 
room for their rice field and firewood. Secretary to the Government in the Revenue 
Department to Captain Jenkins, 23rd May, 1836, The Measures Adopted for introducing the 
Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp.68-69. 
38 For example, the sites at Gubroo hills under the native chief (Raja Purandar Singh) was 
partially brought under Company’s possession on assurances that the Chinese instructor of tea 
cultivation and manufacture would train the chief’s men, who still retained possession of half 
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qualification and training, the elevation of Robert Bruce as the British 
superintendent of “tea forests” in Assam, was on account of his acquaintance 
with the local language, custom and terrain and his proven abilities in forging 
ties with the local groups.39  
 The area of tea exploration operation in the Singpho country was still 
tenuously linked to the deepening influence and presence of the Company in 
the province. The resident tribes of the region, from whom Bruce got hold of 
the first tea plants, exhibited a degree of reluctance towards the project of 
clearing the forests.40 In a letter addressed to Jenkins, Bruce mentioned the 
earliest ‘resistance’ of the natives to the labour demands of the tea experiment. 
He lamented that the Singphos ‘work how and when they please’ and they 
made it clear to him that ‘they would not clear the jungle when it grows’. After 
largely unsuccessful attempt to lure their chiefs with guns and opium, Bruce 
remarked: 
 Singpho country cannot be available (for tea), unless we import men to make the 
Singphos more industrious…these men will not work for any long as they have 
sufficient opium and rice...as long as coolies can get four rupees per mensem at 
Suddeya, they will never go to Singhpos (territory) for that sum.41 
The demands for imported labour to compel the natives to work, underscored 
the early attempts to favourably alter the local labour supply situation. A 
sufficient supply of the chief staple (rice) and the drug of preference (opium) 
was read as the condition and cause for the native’s disinclination to labour. 
                                                                                                                                
of the hills. The chief of Tingree in the Muttock country initially resisted to the overtures of the 
company authorities, but later came around the issue and even actively supported with men and 
material. This was on the understanding that the company would leave the production and 
manufacture of tea in his control, after the successful execution of the experiment. Captain 
Jenkins to N. Wallich, 5th May 1836; Major White to Lt. Millar, 30th March 1836; Lt Millar to 
Major White, 19th April 1836; R Bruce to Lt. Millar, 14th April 1836; Raja Purandar Sing to 
Major White, 13th April 1836; Bruce to F. Jenkins, 1st October 1836. The Measures Adopted 
for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant pp. 69-71, 84. 
39 N. Wallich to Francis Jenkins, 15th March 1836; Secretary to the Government in the Revenue 
Department to Captain Jenkins, 23rd May, 1836. The Measures Adopted for introducing the 
Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.66, pp.68-69. 
40 Singphos are divided into twelve principal tribes, each having its own chief or Gaum. Bisa 
Gaum had an arrangement to become the ‘organ of communication’ with other chiefs at a 
monthly allowance of fifty rupees and furnished a contingent of hundred men. J. McCosh, 
Topography of Assam (Calcutta, 1837) p.151. 
41 C.A. Bruce, Superintendent of Tea to Captain Jenkins, 10th February, 1837. The Measures 
Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.92. 
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This view failed to take into account that the wages on offer (between 3 and 4 
rupees) were an inadequate inducement to work in the tortuous and trying 
jungle terrain. Nevertheless, the instances of the reluctance caught the attention 
of the administrative chief of the province and he raised this issue in a 
correspondence with a member of the Tea Committee: 
…For this evil (native labour) it will not be difficult to find a remedy, I hope, when 
the tea becomes to be largely worked by encouraging the emigration of more 
industrious races from Chota Nagpur, or elsewhere; but in the present state of our 
preparations, in regard to the manufacture of tea, it does not appear immediately 
necessary to offer any particular suggestions.42 
Jenkins agreed with the view of the necessity of imported labour and 
particularly referred to the facilitation of emigration of the ‘more industrious 
races of Chota Nagpur or elsewhere’ as a potential remedy. This was an 
apparent allusion to the “labour solution” debates of the 1830s and the 
formalisation of the coolie labour system for overseas plantations, especially 
recruiting “races” from Chota Nagpur in eastern India. But he maintained that 
the present incipient stage of experimental operation in Assam did not justify 
such an organised measure.43 
1.4 Experimental Plantations and the search for Immobilised 
Worker 
The operationalisation of the experimental plantation, with the arrival of the 
Chinese tea makers, starkly revealed the logistical inputs, work practices and 
labour integral to an effective functioning of a plantation. This went beyond a 
mere technical know-how of the methods of manufacturing tea—black and 
green. By that time, more than a hundred “natural” tea sites had been already 
identified and earmarked and the person in charge (Bruce) boasted of having 
enough seed and seedlings to ‘plant whole of Assam’.44 However, a meagre 
                                                 
42 Bruce procured around 17,000 plants for his “nurseries” in Suddya from the Muttock and 
received further supplies of 16,000 China plants in 1837 from which the first tea was produced. 
Captain Jenkins to N. Wallich, 20th February, 1837. The Measures Adopted for introducing the 
Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.92. 
43 The Measures Adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant p.34. 
44 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
p.3. 
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working force at his disposal meant that only five of these tracts could be made 
operational.45 It was not just a matter of numbers, but also of permanence and 
stability with regard to the working force which was proving to be a stumbling 
block. Apart from his proposal of getting more tea makers with assistants (one 
tea maker with six assistants for each tract), Bruce noted the indispensability of 
fixed workers (thirty for each tract), especially pluckers of tea leaves.46 A 
cursory glance at the statistics of the working staff of the experimental stations 
(Table 1.1) reveals that an overwhelming majority of the permanent employees 
were delegated tasks in the manufacturing/manipulation of tea leaves (tea 
makers), with the rest engaged in construction (carpenters, sawyers), 
packaging (canister maker) and transport of tea (Mahouts).  
 
                    Number Wages 
Superintendent 1 500-0-0 
1st Assistant 1 100-0-0 
2nd Assistant 1 70-0-0 
Chinese Black 
Tea Maker 
1 55-11-6 
Asst Chinese 
Black Tea 
Maker 
1 11-1-6 
Chinese Tea 
Box Maker 
1 45-0-0 
Chinese 
Interpreter 
1 45-0-0 
Chinese Tea 
Box maker 
1 15-8-6 
Chinese Green 2 15-8-6 
                                                 
45 The manufacturing operations could not be carried out at each and every individual 
site.Leaves plucked, sometimes from great distances, had to be brought at two centrally located 
sites where the Chinese tea makers resided and worked with native assistance. The quality of 
the leaves was seriously compromised due to delay in transfer (causing early fermentation) and 
the damage caused to them due to the excessive amount being carried in every individual 
transfer. R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 
1839) p.29. 
46 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
pp.24-25 
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Tea maker 
Chinese Tea 
Box maker 
1 33-4-6 
Chinese Lead 
Canister 
Maker 
1 22-3-0 
Native Black 
Tea maker 
24 5-0-0 
Native Green 
Tea maker 
12 5-0-0 
Native 
Carpenter 
1 4-0-0 
Coolie Sardar 1 10-0-0 
Mahout 4 6-0-0 
Mahout mates 4 4-0-0 
Sawyers 4 4-0-0 
Dak runners 2 3-8-0 
Duffadars 4 3-0-0 
 
Table 1.1: Employees of the ‘Experimental Plantations’ in Upper Assam, 1840.47 
Agricultural work, at this stage comprised primarily of clearing of jungle and 
plucking of leaves. The bulk of leaves were still plucked from the wild, 
because of the limited state of cultivation and immature seedlings on the 
“experimental” plantations. The work was carried out by locally obtained 
hands procured through the agency of local labour contractors and the work 
supervised through the lone supervisor (coolie sardar), employed in the 
ranks.48 Apart from not having any pluckers on the staff list, there was rarely 
any regularity in this work. Bruce regretted about ‘seldom getting hold of the 
same pluckers two seasons running’.49 This had a bearing on the outturn of 
                                                 
47 R Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
p.12 
48 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
p.14. 
49 There was also a difference in dimensions of bushes in Assam in comparison to China as it 
was almost double its size. Bruce further observed that unlike the obvious perception, plucking 
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plantations, as experience strongly suggested, as regular pluckers were more 
“efficient” and could pluck twice as fast in comparison to the new recruits. 
Reflecting on the challenges of running a “proto plantation” and speculating on 
the nature of the working force desired, Bruce remarked: 
 This difficulty (of not having regular workers) will be removed when we get regular 
people attached to the Plantations; or when the natives of these parts become more 
fixed and settled in their habitations, and do not move off by whole villages from one 
place to another…when the aversion they have throughout Assam to taking service for 
payment, has been overcome…there is a gradual change taking place in the minds of 
the labouring class of people, or coolies; for occasionally some good able-bodied men 
come forward for employment… [During] cold season two or three hundred can be 
collected; but as soon as rains set in, all those that have no bonds, or are not involved 
in debt, go off to their cultivations, at the very time when our Tea  operations 
commence…as long as things continue in this state, the price of Tea will be high.50 
Bruce underlined that the future profitability of a private tea enterprise in 
Assam and its competitiveness with the Chinese tea hinged on the ability of 
mobilising groups who would remain regular/attached to plantations. Here a 
degree of control could be exercised over their life and labour. Though enough 
working hands could be patched together in the non-agricultural season, the 
numbers dwindled dramatically with the advent of the rains and the 
commencement of the agricultural season. Bruce expressed his inability in 
exercising any substantial “influence” on the local society, apart from a 
handful of individuals immobilised through bonds and debts. He characterised 
this labour situation as a particular manifestation of the general unsettled state 
of the local society and a deep seated popular prejudice against wage-work. He 
particularly singled out the so called “opium mania” for the depopulation, 
degeneration and general condition of laziness of the Assamese society and 
proposed an immediate ban on it:  
Opium mania, that dreadful plague which has depopulated this beautiful country, 
turned it into a land of wild beasts, with which it is overrun, and has degenerated the 
Assamese, from a fine race of people, to the most abject, servile, crafty, and 
demoralized race in India.51 
                                                                                                                                
was not ‘a very easy and light employment’ as the pluckers had to stand in an upright position 
for hours in a difficult terrain to gather the leaves often causing swelling in their legs. R. 
Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) p.21. 
50 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
p.21. 
51 R. Bruce,  Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
p.14 
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Bruce reiterated Jenkins’s solution of the imported worker/ “superior race” of 
labourers’ presuming their attachment/settlement to the plantation would 
ensure a degree of control desired over their labour. This proposition of 
imported labour was portrayed by him in fairly glowing  terms—as a set of 
people ‘growing up for our plantations, to fell our forests, to clear the land 
from jungle and wild beasts and to plant and cultivate the luxury of the world’. 
Such an attachment, he reasoned, could serve another vital purpose of 
‘encouraging their women and children to do the same—in plucking and 
sorting leaves’. His interactions with the local groups had convinced him that 
they ‘will not permit their women to come into the Tea gardens’.52  The 
distinctive nature of the plantation workforce (of family labour rather than just 
male workers) and the centrality of female and child labour to the work process 
was articulated in the “formative” stage of the Assam plantations. 
1.5 Privatising the discovery and the emergence of the Assam 
Company 
These operational setbacks of the tea experiment could not dampen the 
excitement and hysteria generated by the news of the “discovery” of tea in 
Assam, which was receiving rave reviews in contemporary British press. These 
reactions reflected a sense of anticipation about the evident feasibility of 
producing tea within the bounds of the Empire, threatening to end the long-
standing Chinese monopoly of the drink. This mood was eloquently articulated 
in a contemporary treatise on the subject: 
Discovery (of tea) has been made of no less importance than that the hand of Nature 
has planted the shrub within the bounds of the wide dominion of Great Britain: a 
discovery which must materially influence the destinies of nations; it must change the 
employment of a vast number of individuals; it must divert the tide of commerce, and 
awaken to agricultural industry the dormant energies of a mighty country.53 
The enthusiasm reached a crescendo when the samples of tea produced in the 
experimental plantations and packaged in around ninety odd chests were 
forwarded to the tea brokers and dealers of London in 1838. The much 
                                                 
52 R. Bruce, Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) 
pp.14-15. 
53W. Sigmond, Tea its Medicinal Efforts and Moral (London, 1839) p.3. 
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publicised ‘First Public Sale’ in the London’s tea market—Mincing Lane, drew 
substantial public interest and high prices in the market. “Competent judges” 
were that not only the plant but also the finished product was ‘scarcely to be 
distinguished from China Tea’.54  
 Having conducted the experiment of cultivation, manufacture and 
marketability of Assam tea, the East India Company now found itself in the 
position to realise the founding objective of privatising the venture. Such an 
idea was ‘popularised’ by the exaggerated pronouncements from “authorities” 
and “experts” on the ground, whipping up the jubilant mood of the British 
public and market basking in the success of the “discovery” of tea in the 
Empire.55 Bruce’s speculative commentary on the potentialities of 
transforming Assam into ‘one big tea garden’, and Jenkins’ far-fetched 
assertion regarding the ‘extent of discovery’ which justified an ‘immediate 
commencement of manufacture at the largest scale by capitalists’, were 
generally read as informed opinions on the feasibility and profitability of large 
scale investments of private capital, in the contemporary British journals, trade 
magazines and information manuals. A passage from the 
topographical/scientific survey of the province, quoted generously in these 
publications, read more like an “infomercial” targeting the potential European 
settler, colonizer and entrepreneur: 
Assam’s climate is cold, healthy, and congenial to European constitutions; it’s 
numerous crystal streams abound in gold dust and masses of the solid metal; it’s 
mountains are pregnant with precious stones and silver; its atmosphere is perfumed 
with tea, growing wild and luxuriantly; and its soil is so well adapted to all kinds of 
agricultural purposes, that it might be converted into one continued garden of silk and 
cotton, of tea, coffee, and sugar, over an extent of many hundred miles.56 
 The relevance of work and workers to fulfil such aspirations remained 
marginal to these discussions. The anxiety (about work and labour), 
intermittently surfacing in Bruce’s otherwise optimistic rendition of the 
functioning plantations in Assam, were apparently resolved by the specific 
solutions he offered—ban of opium, importation of labour and use of 
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55 Information on the discovery and character of the tea plant in Assam (London, 1839) p.10. 
56 J. McCosh Topography of Assam (Calcutta, 1837) p.133. 
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machinery.  It was widely held that with the sustained injection of British 
capital and enterprise, tea would become profitable enough to induce the 
natives from the locality and the overpopulated regions of India to seek 
remunerative employment on Assam plantations. A common theme 
underlining these assertions was a belief in the transformative/civilizing 
potential of British capital, technology and enterprise in inculcating values of 
industry to the native and simultaneously revolutionising the processes of work 
and production.57 
 A climate of market frenzy and hopes of fabulous profits culminated in the 
floating of a joint stock company, Assam Company in London with the explicit 
intention to acquire the experimental plantations with related establishment and 
undertake the production of tea for export to the British market.58 The most 
decisive incentive and benefit that the colonial state offered to private capital 
was the institution of the Wasteland Acts. This rendered vast stretches of 
land—an important “factor of production”—available at throwaway rates in 
the districts of Upper Assam (Lakhimpur and Sibsagar). The Assam Company 
initially concentrated their activities in these districts, dividing the operations 
into three divisions (Northern, Southern and Eastern) and headquartered at a 
place called Nazira. Yet a characteristic nature of the joint stock companies 
(like Assam Company), with a decisive control over operation and expenditure 
with the board of directors and shareholders, removed from the scene of 
production and often determined by profit and fluctuations of the markets, had 
a significant bearing in conditioning the nature of  management and work on 
the plantations. 
                                                 
57 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of these themes in a different context. 
58 The “excitement” in this project among the mercantile houses trading with India and the 
leading firms in the tea trade can be gauged from the fact that all the shares were picked up 
before any public notice of it had appeared. Assam Company was not the lone player in the 
field. European and Indian men of “capital and repute” in Calcutta had already formed the 
Bengal Tea Association with a similar intention. The Bengal organisation realising the 
“junction of interests” agreed to merge under the banner of Assam Company, with offices in 
London and Calcutta. The monopolistic streak of Assam Company went beyond a mutually 
beneficial settlement with an emerging rival. They negotiated to acquire two third of the 
existing plantations of the East India Company, regretting not to possess the remaining one 
third on the argument that the emerging “competition” could be detrimental to a “pioneering” 
enterprise. H.A. Antrobus, A History of Assam Company (Edinburgh, 1957) p.37. 
31  
 The company at the outset vigorously pursued a policy of expansion of 
operation, investment in the modes of transport and establishment of 
infrastructure, but continued the existing practices of agricultural work and 
manufacturing, having inherited a majority of the personnel involved in the 
“experimental” stage.59 Unlike the limited scope and intention of the 
experimental stage, the Assam Company could not rely on collecting the 
leaves from the wild. They took sustained measures to systematically cultivate 
the plant. Bruce had earlier demonstrated with some success that tea plants 
flourished when the forests were burnt down and the land hoed to be made fit 
for cultivation. Much of this jungle clearing and hoeing work, like in the 
experimental plantation, was done in the cold season by locals procured 
through the prevalent “Gang system”.60  
 Assam Company plantations also experienced a severe “crisis” of workers 
during the agricultural season. The situation posed grave consequences, as it 
not only meant a fall in the quantity of the leaves plucked, but also due to lack 
of sustained tending and weeding, the cleared land often fell into disuse. There 
was a glaring discrepancy in the area of clearance and the land actually put 
under cultivation and regularly tended. In 1842, only two hundred odd acres of 
land was under cultivation out of more than six hundred fifty acres cleared in 
northern and eastern divisions. Again in 1843, around two thousand five 
hundred acres cleared land in southern division was left unattended due to 
“insufficient” supplies of labour.61 Internal enquiries into the workings of the 
                                                 
59 Responding to the concerns of tea makers and working hand on the experimental plantations, 
the Assam Company went overdrive with recruitment even before the actual transfer of 
establishments in Assam to the Company. The idea of tea makers hinged on getting the 
Chinese and they requisitioned to companies and private individuals in Singapore and Penang. 
Batches of Chinese were despatched from November 1839 till the end of 1840. The Chinese 
experiment was described by London Board in 7th May 1841. H.A. Antrobus, A History of 
Assam Company (Edinburgh, 1957) p.56. 
60 K.K. Sircar, Labour and management: First Twenty years of Assam Company Limited 
(1839-1859), Economic and Political Weekly 21, no.22 (May 31, 1986). 
61 The early plantation practice in Assam had established that the period from March to 
October to be the manufacturing season when the ground had to be hoed once every two 
months which believed to have an influence on the capacity of the plants to bear leaves and 
therefore the overall outturn of the tract. Again when the trees flush, the young leaves should 
be plucked and even a delay of a day made it ‘deteriorate and unfit for manufacture’. R Bruce, 
Report on the manufacture of tea and on the extent and produce (Calcutta, 1839) p.21. 
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Company recommended discontinuation of cultivation in the northern and 
eastern division and concentrate efforts on select tracts in the southern 
division. Even a system of cultivation by local Assamese peasants through 
advances was mooted, where the Company would concentrate exclusively on 
manufacture. 
 The necessity of “imported” labour, which can be “fixed” to plantation, 
became very evident from the early stage of plantation cultivation. Kacharis, a 
“mobile” tribal group from the contiguous districts of Nowgong and Darrang 
and circulating in gangs in these districts were engaged in the company’s 
gardens, partially fulfilling the demands for ‘regular people attached to the 
plantations’.62 Their crucial and growing presence was mentioned in an early 
report of the company: 
In the manufacturing season when the hands are insufficient to pluck the leaves which 
in short time become too ripe for manufacture and are lost. Endeavours are being 
made to send up gangs of Kachari…under agreement to serve for a fixed term.63 
This presence of local groups like the Kacharis, who could be “settled” through 
agreements and advances, was already acknowledged by some Europeans who 
had visited Assam through Bengal in search of “profitable” investments. One 
such speculator writing in 1835 to the Chief Commissioner of the province 
gave an extremely favourable impression about the Kacharis and their 
significance to any European enterprise in the province: 
Custom in the country (Assam) which would prove highly advantageous to a 
European manufacturer, giving themselves out in bondage for a certain time on 
receiving a small sum. There is only their food to furnish…Cacharee families may be 
engaged for 10 and 15 rupees for four or five years; their women and children work on 
the fields.64 
1.6 Early Plantation enterprise and Kachari as the Ideal 
Worker 
                                                 
62 Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861). 
63 Report of Calcutta Board of Assam Company for the year 1840-1841. H.A. Antrobus, A 
History of Assam Company (Edinburgh, 1957) p.386. 
64 Hugon to Captain Jenkins, 15th April, 1835. Transactions of the Agricultural and 
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The “internal “migrant” groups like the Kacharis were potentially appropriate 
for the labour demands of the Assam plantations. Their mere presence did not 
satisfactorily answer certain key issues: Were the problems of fixing workers 
permanently resolved?  Did Kacharis become the “ideal workers” of the Assam 
plantation? Were the early Assam planters successful in immobilising them 
under trying conditions of life and remuneration? 
 It is pertinent here to briefly indicate the geographical setting and nature of the 
early plantations in Upper Assam. These plantations mostly were dispersed 
clearings in the middle of vast stretches of forest and often at the limits of 
human habitation, local markets and the networks of transport and 
communication. Such a fragile living situation obliged the management to 
arrange food provisions, especially rice for the resident labour population. 65 
On some plantations certain portions of land was set aside for the cultivation of 
food grains and vegetables. A regular provision of rice often became a subject 
of contention between Kachari labour and the local management.  In July 
1843, the superintendent of the southern division expressed his inability in 
retaining Kacharis because of the failing supplies. Such a situation recurred 
again in 1845 in the Eastern and northern divisions. Groups of Kachari workers 
left work due to “insufficient provisions”. In 1846, the Directors in response to 
a prolonged lean phase in the Company initiated some efforts to economise 
and decided to terminate the “rice benefit”. The local superintendents in Assam 
took strong exceptions to such moves on the fear that it could lead to imminent 
Kachari backlash. 66  
The Kacharis commitment to the Company’s plantations was also contingent 
on the wages on offer. A reduction and delay in payment caused discontent, 
work stoppages and even “strikes”. The management’s decision to “hold” the 
payment or keep a part of the due amount was often a deliberate strategy to 
“bind” the Kacharis. This often proved counterproductive. In the year 1848, 
                                                 
65 At the commencement of its operation the Company was importing rice from Bengal (Pabna 
and Rungpur) and later from the district of Darrang. But it had to supply through its own boats. 
H.A. Antrobus, Assam Company (Edinburgh, 1957) p.387. 
66 K.K. Sircar, Labour and management: First Twenty years of Assam Company Limited 
(1839-1859), Economic and Political Weekly 21, no.22 (May 31, 1986)  p.M-39 
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Kacharis on a Company’s factory (Satsoeh) refused a month’s pay, which was 
nearly three months’ in arrears and struck work. Their interruption continued 
for a few days and they resumed work only after the superintendent gave a 
written assurance of future payment within fifteen days. There is also evidence 
of some articulated resentment at times regarding the discriminatory wages 
paid to the imported Bengali labour. In the year 1846, around two hundred fifty 
Kacharis left the Company’s gardens for being paid less than their Bengali 
counterparts.67  
 In the colonial-capitalist narratives, Bengalis alluded to a “generic” rather than 
an “ethnic” category. This overarching description incorporated a variety of 
individuals and groups being recruited in the province of Bengal, coming from 
varied social and regional background. This source of recruitment assumed 
some importance in the Assam Company’s operations.68 The “labour agents” 
of the company conducting their operations in Bengal, tapped into the labour 
market of agricultural workers, seasonal migrants and the developing 
indentured labour market for the overseas colonies.69 The elementary 
infrastructure of travel and communication, prohibitive costs of recruitment 
and the indifferent results of the company recruiters made this source 
unreliable, expensive and highly inadequate to the demands of the “fixed” 
workers.  Yet the Bengali “imported” labour was purposefully sustained as the 
countervailing factor to the Kacharis throughout the early period. After the 
bitter experience of the 1848 strike, the Superintendent of Assam Company 
urged the Calcutta Board that the Kacharis should not be depended upon and a 
more sustained effort be made to get Bengalis.70 A relatively successful 
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69 By the end of 1839, Assam company had eight Europeans recruiters stationed in Bengal. . 
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recruiting operation in Bengal the following year resulted in a further cut of 
wages of the Kacharis.  
 There was another parallel trend of Kacharis seeking employment in other 
European enterprises coming up in the period. For instance, the Assam Coal 
and Timber Company operating in Naga Hills in the north eastern frontier 
opened up other opportunities to the Kacharis in late 1840s. There were 
partially successful attempts by the management of Assam Company to 
mutually agree with the new enterprise against “enticement” of labour. The 
discourse of enticement and strategic moves to interfere with the emerging 
market of labour was evident from the early stages of plantation enterprise in 
Assam. 
The depressed condition of the pioneer tea company, from the early 1850s, was 
partially halted and reversed through a combined strategy of rationalised 
practices of business, management of labour and methods of cultivation on the 
plantations. Certain concerned opinions had earlier expressed surprise that with 
such “low rate” of wages being paid to the workers (Rs 5 for the leaf 
manipulators and Rs. 3 for coolies), the Assam Company should be embroiled 
in any serious financial or operational difficulties. It was argued that ‘under a 
suitable and inexpensive system of management, Assam ought to be able to 
compete with China in the cultivation of tea’.71 The official historian of the 
Company citing this as a significant juncture in the changed fortunes of its tea 
enterprise mentions that the Board of Directors streamlined the managerial 
staff on the ground, and went for a further reduction of wages offered to 
resident workers. A plantation labour regime premised on a clearer description 
and delegation of work and stricter discipline of the resident labour was 
attempted to be framed and enforced. The cultivation of rice lands, for 
example, was discontinued as it was now seen as an infringement of the 
plantation work process. The nature of assignment and assessment of tasks was 
made particularly more stringent and at times “excessive”. Kachari labour alive 
to the intensification of the work process and wages on offer were 
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simultaneously seeking alternative employment on the tea plantations which 
were taking shape in the early 1850s.72  
 The involvement of the new private interest groups and individuals in tea was 
motivated by the improved fortunes and operational experiences of the Assam 
Company. The strategies of the ‘colonization of India and its resources’ now 
perceived tea cultivation as one of ‘the most profitable and agreeable 
occupation’. It was contented from ‘the most trustworthy evidence, and from 
personal observation, that in time India will be able to supply not only to Great 
Britain, but also to Australia and America’. The attempts to move away from 
China as the sole source of tea was paralleled by a “rethinking” of “natural” 
habitat and the processes of manipulation of tea  being peculiarly Chinese. The 
early tea enterprise in Assam gave enough reasons to believe that the plant 
could survive and flourish in a much wider range of temperature, soil and 
elevation than what the Chinese case would allow. The “classical” methods of 
planting and processing were also being reworked and improvised, in 
agreement with the specificities and contingencies of the local situation.73 
 The monopoly of Assam Company in the cultivation and production of tea in 
the province was weakened by the early 1850s with the formation of new 
plantations in the existing planting districts and the other districts of Assam 
Valley (Table 1.2).  
 
 
                                                 
72 In the district of Lakhimpur, the Government garden at Chaboah was sold to a Chinaman 
named Among, which was later purchased by Messrs Warren, Jenkins and Co in 1851. Colonel 
Hannay who played a part in this transaction started his own plantation near Dibrugarh in 
1852. In the district of Sibsagar, plantations were started by R Spears (Nigri Ting, 1853) J.E. 
Dodd (Noakochorie, 1854) and George Williamson (Cinamara, 1854). This trend of private 
European individuals taking up land grants to establish tea gardens was further facilitated by 
the liberalisation and expansion of the wasteland policy in 1854 and tea gradually found its 
way into all the districts of Upper Assam (Kamrup, Darrang and Nowgong). By the end of the 
decade there were 68 “tea factories” in the districts of Assam Valley with more than 54,000 
acres of land acquired for the purpose of planting tea.  Captain C. Holyroyd, Collector of 
Sibsagar, to Colonel F. Jenkins, Commissioner of Assam. No 172, 2nd November 1859. 
Captain H.S. Bivar, Principal Assistant Commissioner, Lakhimpur, to Colonel F. Jenkins, 
Commissioner of Assam. No 71, 8th October 1859. Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal 
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 Tea 
factories 
Land 
acquired 
(acres) 
Land 
cleared 
(acres) 
Production 
1858-59 (in 
pounds) 
Sibsagar 31 13,796 5,227 8,46,249 
Lakhimpur 10 14,038 1,700 2,82,000 
Kamrup 10 12,207 297 6,160 
Nowgong 14 11,034 … 48,000 
Darrang 3 3,783 375 23,280 
Total 68 (48 
distinct 
proprietors) 
54,859 7,599 12,05,689 
 
Table 1.2: Tea Production at the end of the decade of 1850s.74 
The fresh and sustained impetus of plantation expansion coincided with a 
period of relative agricultural growth in Upper Assam, making the availability 
of labour scarce and pushing up the wages significantly.75 This further 
jeopardised the task of mobilising enough working hands that could satisfy the 
specific requirement of being available in the “manufacturing season”. 
Commissioner Jenkins reflecting on the expansion of the plantation enterprise 
in the province and new “problems” of labour stated: 
New Planters have been attempting to push on their cultivation to a greater extent than 
the means of procuring labour in the Province rendered judicious and prudent…more 
land has been planted, than can be kept thoroughly weeded and attended to, and 
during the short season of picking leaves, much of the produce is lost for the want of 
hands.76 
A distinct outcome of the expansion of tea enterprise and a broadening of the 
notion of the “ideal” habitat and terrain was the interest of speculators in the 
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cash crops, such as mustard, jute and tobacco, thus creating an exceptional demand for labour 
in the old agricultural sector. The District Commissioner of Lakhimpur informed that the 
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H.S. Bivar, Principal Assistant Commissioner, Lakhimpur, to Colonel F. Jenkins, 
Commissioner of Assam. No 71, 8th October 1859.  Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal 
(Calcutta, 1861); D. Kumar (ed.), Cambridge Economic History of India (Vol II) p.311.  
76 Colonel F. Jenkins, Agent to Governor General, North Eastern Frontier to E.H. Lushington, 
Officiating Secretary to Government of Bengal, 11th November 1859. Papers relating to tea 
cultivation (Calcutta, 1861) p.23. 
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southern districts of Cachar and Sylhet (Surma Valley), which were earlier 
considered to be unsuitable for plant and systematic cultivation. These 
relatively “populous” districts were perceived as “immune” to the shortages of 
labour, which had plagued much of the enterprise in Assam valley. The natives 
of Cachar—witness to the initial spurt in tea activity in Surma valley—like 
their Assam valley counterparts, found little incentive in switching occupation 
to plantation labour on a full time basis. Only a minority offered their services 
in the non-agricultural season. The strategies of planters to oblige the locals 
through advances and “job contracts” for the following manufacturing seasons 
failed to yield the desired results. Many were said to ‘evade’ or ‘partially fulfil’ 
their obligations. Planters increasingly relied on streams of seasonal labour 
from Sylhet (about 2/3rd of the total), who would leave their homes during the 
winters to find employment and trek back to their agricultural fields before the 
advent of rains. This was grossly inadequate for the plantation work cycle as a 
significant period of their “absence” constituted the tea manufacturing season. 
The planters tried to attract and ‘settle’ (especially Kacharis) by advancing 
money, providing loan for cattle and a certain extent of rent-free land. But 
without any legal obligation to labour, the employers were unable to compel 
the ‘settled labour’ to work on the tea gardens as and when they required. 
There was also a tendency of these settlers of returning the loans and advances 
and moving on to another location.77 
The various moves of the Surma Valley planters to attract the Kachari labour 
had in fact put an additional strain on the labour situation in Upper Assam as 
indicated by the Chief Commissioner of the province: 
It was hoped that the commencement of Tea operation in Sylhet and Cachar would 
have attended some relief to Assam, in drawing off the number of speculators, but that 
does not seem to have been the case as yet, and it is unfortunate that a considerable 
extent the planters on that side of the hills have been drawing on Assam for coolies, 
preferring our Kacharis to the ryots of those districts.78 
A growing consensus about the “insufficiency” of the labouring groups like 
Kacharis to render the increasing demands of regular/fixed labour was also 
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conditioned by their enhanced capabilities to bargain for wages and conditions 
of work. Such anxieties of the employers found expression in the reports of the 
superintendent of the tea Company who now complained that Kacharis with an 
‘increasing intercourse with the Assamese, are gradually acquiring their vices 
(opium smoking) and becoming less valuable as labourer’.79 The work they 
rendered was now described to be ‘deficient in amount and of worst 
description’ and another serious concern was that they were not ‘under proper 
discipline, feeling our dependence on them’.80  Experience had told them that 
they could leave the garden or even strike at some provocation or grievance. 
But this labour discontent and mobility, in the context of expanding, 
rationalising and systematising plantation enterprise was becoming 
unacceptable. Such apprehensions were exacerbated in the much publicised 
‘Kachari disturbance’ of 1859, eliciting strong responses from the planters and 
the local administration.  
On the 7th of October 1859, the Kacharis stationed in the headquarters of the 
Assam Company in Nazira, assembled in front of the Superintendent’s 
bungalow. They complained about a harsh fine imposed on one of their 
colleagues and demanded higher wages. This was rejected by the management. 
The next day around six hundred Kacharis from the Satsoeh factory with a 
concerted demand for a general wage hike. The management expressed its 
inability to comply without an explicit permission from their higher authorities 
in Calcutta. On further persuasion they ‘discharged’ the dissenting Kacharis 
from their employment. The following morning the Kacharis returned to 
continue their demand. A very nervous management now sought help from the 
local police who marched around 50 sepoys making arrests and threatening the 
protesting Kacharis to get back to work.81 
  The Commissioner of the Province acknowledging the graveness of the 
situation supported the Magistrate of Sibsagar in establishing a militia guard 
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close to Nazirah to ‘prevent any further breach of peace’. He lamented the 
almost absolute dependence of planters of Upper Assam (Lakhimpur and 
Sibsagar) on the ‘whim of Kamrup and Darrang Kacharis’. They were 
described as ‘a race often difficult to manage, exceedingly jealous of ill-
treatment, and who at Nazira, have lately shown a dangerous spirit of 
combination and mutiny’. The event, he suggested should be a ‘warning to the 
Assam Company and planters generally not to employ any great masses of 
Kacharis together’ and make provision against such strikes, ‘by importing 
other classes of labour, who can prove a check upon the Kacharis’. Such 
sentiments were reiterated by the directors of the Assam Company who 
convened a meeting in November 1859 and immediately called for an 
investigation to ascertain the material conditions of the Kacharis working for 
the Company. They welcomed the decision to establish a militia guard and also 
agreed that a lasting solution to prevent a recurrence of such “violent” 
incidents could only be when there are ‘a larger proportion of coolies of 
another class’.82 
1.7 Assamese peasant as coolie labour 
Before coming around to the ‘solution’ of obtaining coolies from outside the 
province which till then had proved to be extremely irregular and expensive, 
several planters desired that  the state play a more active role in producing 
coolies from within. Bruce had earlier observed that the native’s ability to 
cultivate sufficient rice and opium acted as a deterrent to their participation in 
the labour process of the proto-plantations. Such sentiments were reinvoked in 
the changed context of an expanding plantation enterprise and a more 
regularising work regime. The state was again called upon to discourage the 
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workers were inhabitants of the district and rest were the migrant Kacharis and Bengali labour. 
In British Guiana following the end of the apprentice system in 1838, ex-slaves organized 
themselves into task-gangs and went from plantation to plantation bargaining with owners over 
wages and conditions, a process which culminated in strikes (1842 and 1848). This, and not a 
labour shortage, was the reason for the dramatic increase in the immigration of Indian 
indentured workers from 1851 onwards. The introduction of Haitian workers into the 
Dominican Republic during the 1880s followed the first strike by Dominican labour employed 
on the sugar plantations against the imposition of wage cuts. Papers relating to tea cultivation 
in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861); T. Brass, Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree 
Labour: Case Studies and Debates (London, 1999) p. 161. 
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cultivation of opium (as Bruce had earlier suggested) and augment the rent on 
agricultural land. The administrative incharge of Darrang echoed these 
sentiments in his report on the tea cultivation in his district: 
…Undoubted fact that the ryots have the very greatest objection to exert themselves in 
the least degree, so long as they have sufficient rice and Opium; and any measure 
which would raise the Assamese population from the lethargy induced by excessive 
indulgence in the use of Opium, would unquestionably result in an improved 
condition of the people both physically and morally, at the same time that an increased 
rate of taxation would oblige the ryot to work, and thus benefit himself and the Tea 
Planters.83 
This discourse of moral and physical improvement of the Assamese peasantry 
revealed the plantation capitalist anxieties of pushing ‘more couched labour 
into the market’ (or producing coolies working for plantations). This was to be 
achieved through a significant decrease in incomes from agriculture (by raising 
assessment of land) and monopolisation and commodification of the drug of 
local preference—by prohibiting opium cultivation and providing opium 
through government shops. They believed that this would compel the peasant 
to work for wages on tea plantations ‘to obtain cash, both to protect himself 
from the land revenue as well as enable him to purchase genuine opium from 
the Government’. The creation of the necessity for cash to be earned through 
wage-labour/coolie labour was premised not only on the fulfilment of the 
peasant obligations of revenue, but also on the satisfaction of an addiction. 
Interestingly the supposed reason of Assamese laziness was not desired to be 
eliminated but controlled and made an obligation to participate in the labour 
process of the plantations.84 In this context, the recurring trope of the opium 
smoking lazy native indicates the failure of planters to immobilise the native 
(tribals/peasants) in plantations and plantation labour regime as coolie labour, 
under trying conditions of life, work and remuneration. HS Partridge, a tea 
                                                 
83 Letter from Captain A.K. Comber, Principal Assissant Commissioner to Darrang to Col. F. 
Jenkins, dated 20th October, 1859. Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861) 
p.20 
84 Cuban and Peruvian planters permitted, and even encouraged, the sale, barter and 
consumption of opium by their coolies, in effect creating a mechanism of social control by 
alternately distributing and withholding this very addictive substance to desperate men. See, 
‘Opium and Social Control: Coolies on the Plantations of Peru and Cuba’ 
Journal of Chinese Overseas 1, no. 2 (November 2005) pp.169-183. 
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planter in Nowgong supporting the idea of “monopolisation and manipulation 
of addiction” in the service of the plantation enterprise remarked: 
…Attempts should be made so as to decrease the cultivation of that drug (Opium) in 
Assam, while the Government Opium could be supplied to be purchased by those who 
could not do without it. This would cause more labourers to work in the Tea 
plantations for ready cash.85 
Simultaneously the plantation capitalists favoured a strategy of pressurising the 
native peasantry to wage-labour through excessive taxation. Though land 
revenue was hiked in certain districts, concerns were soon raised that a 
considerable enhancement of revenue could create a situation of a decreasing 
quantity of land being cultivated—resulting in a fall of collections in actual 
terms. The shrinking incomes of the peasantry could further curtail an 
emerging market for British commodities, particularly ‘English cloth’ and 
‘government salt’. There was an argument that the profitability of the tea 
enterprise was evident from the ever growing number of speculators pouring 
into the province and therefore their desires for ‘cheap coolies’ did not justify 
compromising the larger colonial interests of revenue and market. 
1.8 The Migrant Worker solution 
The limits of producing coolies internally marked a growing consensus for 
procuring imported coolies (from outside the province) as the “only remedy” 
for labour in Assam plantations. This has to be appreciated in a context of the 
development of internal labour market that had enabled local groups (like 
Kacharis) bargaining capabilities for wages and living conditions. The failure 
to significantly dispossess the peasantry could not ultimately alter the 
dynamics of the internal labour market. Apart from remedying this scarcity, 
imported coolie held the potential to realise the unfulfilled desires of 
discipline, immobility (living in the neighbourhood of plantations and working 
throughout the year) and completion of a variety of tasks (employment of 
family labour of men, women and children) which was essential for the nature 
of work and the work process of the plantation enterprise in Assam.86 A 
                                                 
85 Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861). 
86 In one of the contemporary pieces it was argued that the ‘these coolies with their families, 
will appropriate large tracts of rice lands; and in course of some years… may hope to find the 
Assamese, compelled by the want of land to forsake their “fixed habits” and “gentlemanly” 
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similar process has been observed in a different setting where the ‘failure to 
turn labour power into a commodity left them (planters) to find an alternative 
and politically acceptable form of unfree labour and a population which could 
be induced to accept such relations of production’.87 
In this scenario the administrative chief of the province reiterated that the 
existing difficulties and failures to import Bengali coolies had to be 
surmounted ‘before there can be any great extension of our present Tea 
plantations’. This he believed was now a question of ‘national importance’ as 
the land taken up for tea in Assam if rendered productive had the potential of 
producing up to thirty million pounds of tea or half the tea imports from China 
to England. 88   
The global framework in which Indian coolies were being mobilised for 
plantation work became a point of reference in the deliberations on the 
question of labour importation into Assam. The Governor of Bengal suggested 
that Assam planters imitate the system of hiring adopted by the sugar planters 
of Mauritius. This was described as ‘a well contrived and equitable system’ 
where ‘a good selection of immigrants and families, decent wages (5 dollars) 
and a system of ration’. He wanted the planters to take independent initiative in 
this regard as he believed that because to a greater  proximity of the principal 
‘recruiting grounds’, a much lower wage and other benefits (land for 
cultivation in lieu of rations) could be an adequate inducement for the 
intending migrant to choose Assam.  
On the question of difficulty of labour…see no good reason why labourers or coolies 
should not be imported from the lower districts of Rajmahal, Bheerbhoom, etc. If the 
colonists of the Mauritius, Demerara, Trinidad etc can obtain labourers from India, it 
should not be difficult for the planters of Assam to obtain them…imported labourers 
can bring their families, which is not the case when they go to the Mauritius or the 
West Indies…profits of tea-planting in Assam have been proved to be so great that 
                                                                                                                                
prejudices, gladly work for hire’. ‘Our Tea gardens in Assam and Cachar’, Calcutta Review 35 
(September 1860) p.54. 
87 R. Miles, Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly Or Necessity (London, 1987) p.89. 
88 Col. J. F. Jenkins, Agent to Governor General, North Eastern Frontier to E.H. Lushington, 
Officiating Secretary to Government of Bengal, 11th November 1859. Papers relating to tea 
cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861) pp.23-26. 
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planters could easily afford to give such remuneration to imported labourers as would 
command their services.89 
The planters and some local officials agreed that this new stage and scale of 
importation had to be more “organised” and “systematic” to undo the earlier 
setbacks to ensure the success of the present venture. A tea planter’s 
association was formed in 1859 to combine resources and efforts in recruiting 
in the districts of Bengal. There were meetings of planters and grantees of land 
in the districts Lakhimpur and Sibsagar in early 1860 to deliberate on the 
recommendations of the Governor and come to some common ground.90 The 
systematic and organised demands on imported labour in a sense also reflected 
the ‘systematisation’ and ‘corporatisation’ of the plantation enterprise in 
Assam. In the late 1850s several joint-stock companies were formed with the 
intention to purchase the smaller private tea gardens.91 This again had a 
bearing on the magnitude and intensity of the requirement of working hands. 
While the private planter’s operation usually was contingent on their limited 
resources and the local labour situation, the companies were obliged to 
maintain a larger operation and working force. Illustrating this apparent 
difference a tea proprietor from Cachar remarked: 
Private planter may only require labour for 100 acres, as far as his capital will go, but 
the Company requires labour for many thousands, and probably more…private 
planters go to clusters of villages, but that will not do for the company.92 
                                                 
89 Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861) pp.23-26; ‘The Resource of 
India and its colonization’, Universal Review (1859) pp.343-62. 
90 Proceedings of a meeting of the planters of the Sibsaugor District, held at Cinnamara 
Factory on the 16th June 1860, for the purpose of taking into consideration, certain 
observations and suggestions referring to the importation of labor into the Province of Assam, 
as contained in an Extract from a letter from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal, to the General’s Agent, North-Eastern Frontier, No. 203 of the 20th January 1860. 
Papers relating to tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861) pp.69-71. 
91 By the end of 1861, 160 plantations were held by 62 companies and individuals. Assam 
Company had 24 plantations in Sibsagar, Lakhimpur and Darrang. Jorhat Company had 2 
plantations in Nowgong. The East India Company had 7 plantations in Sibsagar and Lower 
Assam Company had one plantation in Kamrup. Of the private companies, 15 companies held 
19 plantations in Lakhimpur, 3 hold 5 plantations in Sibsagar, one hold 4 plantations in 
Kamrup and one holds one plantation in Nowgong. Remaining gardens were in hands of 
private parties, 17 of whom are natives (mostly in Sibsagar and Lakhimpur). Papers relating to 
tea cultivation in Bengal (Calcutta, 1861). 
92 J. B. Barry, a Surgeon by training and proprietor of a tea company in Cachar. Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Progress and Prospect, and the best means to 
be adopted for Promotion of European colonisation and settlement in India, Minutes of 
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 The Plantation enterprise now showed strong preference to solicit state 
support in framing a system where large number of coolies could be procured 
economically and also defining some ground rules on which they would labour 
on the tea gardens. They often argued that the cost and difficulty of getting 
coolies from outside the province was to a great extent due to the poor 
communication infrastructure of the province and a general indifference of the 
colonial state towards the plantation enterprise in Assam.93 There was some 
criticism of the government support in facilitating the transport of coolies to 
the overseas destinations in Mauritius and West Indies, where the Assam 
planters were said to be left only to pick the ‘refuse’ rejected by the migration 
agents of these colonies: 
A native will not leave his village except under the protection of the Sircar or 
Government and he will go anywhere with it. The emigration to the Mauritius and the 
West Indies is under the protection of the Government and they are induced to go and 
I believe that if the Government gave us the same protection that they afford to the 
Mauritius and the West Indies we should have no difficulty in getting labour into 
Cachar and Assam.94 
There were demands of the supply of coolies to be coordinated through an 
emigration agency in Calcutta, under the control of Planters but worked with 
Government patronage. Apart from facilitating the recruitment and transit of 
coolies, the patronage of state was desired to frame an “agreement/contract” 
(for 5 years) between the coolie and the planter which would be binding in the 
court of law. The plantation capitalist discourse of contract and stricter 
penalisation of breaches was the definite attempt to shape the profile of the 
imported worker as disciplined and immobilised. The extension of breach of 
contract to Assam emanated from such concerns. The planters however 
remained evasive on the question of wages, describing the “peculiar” nature of 
                                                                                                                                
Evidence in Reports from Committees, Colonization and Settlement (India) Vol IV  
(London,1859) pp.214-226.  
93 Journey from Calcutta to Upper Assam in steamers took 12-15 days and in native boats it 
could take upto 6 months. Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the 
Progress and Prospect, and the best means to be adopted for Promotion of European 
colonisation and settlement in India, Minutes of Evidence in Reports from Committees, 
Colonization and Settlement (India) Vol II (London, 1859) p.46. 
94 J.B. Barry in  Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Progress and 
Prospect, and the best means to be adopted for Promotion of European colonisation and 
settlement in India, Minutes of Evidence in Reports from Committees, Colonization and 
Settlement (India) Vol IV  (London,1859) p.222. 
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plantation life and work where they contended that “benefits” and “piece-rate” 
made such clarity irrelevant. The colonial state remained reticent at this stage 
to define and regulate the system. 
The project of “producing coolies” was now framed and the means of 
mobilisation (recruitment and transport) and immobilisation (settlement and 
conditions of work) of the imported labour on the Assam tea gardens. 
Plantation capital now required the patronage of colonial state and its juridical 
and administrative infrastructure to participate in its struggle with labour for 
“producing coolie”. 
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2. Contracts, Contractors and Framing the Coolie 
Solution. 
2.1 Introduction 
  The consensus within the official-planter circles regarding the “coolie 
solution”, as hinted in the preceding chapter, held the promise of becoming a 
permanent remedy for the imminent work/labour anxieties on the Assam tea 
plantations of the late 1850s. The labour/work crisis, induced by the continued 
vacillation of the Assamese peasants towards plantation work and the 
enhanced bargaining capabilities of the local labouring groups (like the 
Kacharis) in the backdrop of “plantation industry”, could be offset and 
stabilised by the sustained and systematic influx of workers from outside the 
province—identified as coolies.   
  The early incidence of migration of workers, especially during the “tea 
mania” of the 1860s, exhibited tendencies of privatisation of recruitment, 
soaring rates of mortality during transit, and a general climate of 
“unwillingness to work” and “unsettlement” on the plantations.95 This stood in 
stark contrast to the anticipated situation of a steady traffic of “cheap”, 
“disciplined” and “settled” labour. Migrant workers were not naturally 
assuming the roles and function of coolies. Taking this as the point of entry, 
the chapter traces and situates how the processes and strategies to frame 
coolies were articulated through a crystallizing nexus of the plantation labour 
regime and the coolie labour market. Qualifying a uniform/unchanging nature 
of plantations and the labour regime in Assam, the discussion would be 
                                                 
95 The spectacular and speculative growth of the Assam tea industry during the 1860s and the 
consequent human cost has been subject to a host of official enquiries, contemporary 
commentaries and historical studies.  The “crisis” in the industry which immediately followed 
this period was investigated in reports commissioned by the Bengal government in the late 
1860s and early 1870s. In the same period, a colonial offer named William Nassau Lees 
offered a first-hand account of the turbulent times. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to 
Enquire into the State and Prospects of Tea Cultivation in Assam, Cachar and Sylhet 
(Calcutta, 1868); W. N. Lees, Tea cultivation, Cotton and other agricultural experiments in 
India: A review (London, 1863); W. N. Lees, Memorandum Written after a Tour through the 
Tea Districts of Eastern Bengal in 1864-1865 (Calcutta, 1866). For later studies see P. 
Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea Industry (London, 1967) pp.96-108 and R.S. Rungta, 
Rise of Business Corporations in India (London, 1970) pp.95-108. 
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attentive to the changes and shifts in the discursive and material strategies and 
practices. 
 The first section discusses the formalisation of the Assam contract in the first 
half of the 1860s. It particularly interrogates as to how the contextual 
anxieties—for “protection” and “exceptionalism”—became a justification for 
its indispensability and retention throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. The next two sections extend this argument to contend that the 
rationale of “protection” and “exceptionalism”—encoded in the Assam 
contract—attempted to construct and legitimise the authoritarian privileges of 
the plantation managers and the interests of plantation capitalism while, 
simultaneously and systematically, depriving the workers of their rights, 
benefits and the abilities to bargain with the employers. This contradictory 
impulse will be explored further through an “unpacking” of the positions taken 
within the different levels of the colonial establishment, which in effect 
allowed the tenuous “protection” offered by the Assam contract to be 
undermined by the rampant usage of a General Workman Breach of contract 
Act (Act XIII of 1859). This neither had the “protective” clauses of the Assam 
contract nor had the sufficient “legality” to be categorically applied to the 
plantation workers.96 
 The developing indenture/contract system—encompassing a range of 
indenturing strategies and practices through the application of the contracts 
(Assam Contract and Act XIII contract) became a key mechanism in the 
production of low-waged/cheap and disciplined coolie-labour on the 
plantations. A critical variable in “producing” coolies (as desired by the 
plantation-capitalism) hinged on the costs of the labour recruitment and 
                                                 
96 Ian Kerr argues that Act XIII of 1859 was one of the two Acts  framed particularly to deal 
with disputes between employers and employees in the late 1850s, in what he characterises  as 
a more widespread presence of labour process under capitalism in India. I. Kerr, ‘Labour 
Control and Labour Legislation in Colonial India: A Tale of two mid-nineteenth century Act’, 
South Asia, Vol.27, no.3 (April 2004) pp.7-9; Also see P. Mohapatra, ‘Assam and West Indies, 
1860-1920: Immobilising Plantation Labor’ and M. Anderson, ‘India, 1858-1930: The Illusion 
of Free Labor’, both articles in  Craven P. and Hay D. (ed.) Master, Servants and Magistrates 
in Britain and the Empire (Chapel Hill, 2004) pp. 455-80, 422-454. 
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stability of the labour supplies, which was obtained primarily through the 
private labour contractors and labour agencies based in Calcutta.97  
The next section delves into the nature of this growing market of coolie labour 
for Assam tea-gardens. Here, we particularly underline the plantation strategies 
of “cheapening” the cost and “improving” the quality of the supplies by taking 
recourse to more informalised modes of recruitment, especially what came to 
be designated as the sardari system.98 It will further be discussed as to why in 
the face of this “cheaper” and “preferred” sardari alternative, the widely 
despised arkatis not only survived but continued to flourish, satisfying certain 
specialized “labour/work needs” of the plantations. 
A convergence of interests in the production and marketing of Assam/Indian 
Tea from the 1870s resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the plantation 
industry and the manner and scale in which it intended to produce its tea and 
coolie. The new “pressure groups” pushed for “reforms” in the Assam contract 
system and its modes of acquiring labour. The stated objective was to 
rationalise operational costs, stimulate production and undertake corresponding 
“propaganda” measures to make Assam/Indian tea more visible in a 
cheapening and competitive global tea market. The next section traces the 
process through which these intentions/aspirations of special tea interests were 
translated in the colonial state’s rhetoric of “freedom”. It was now proposed to 
substantially do away with the existing body of “rules” (read restrictions) in 
the labour market and effect consequential changes in the Assam contract 
system through a new legislation—the Act I of 1882.  The “free system”, 
                                                 
97 R. Behal, ‘Coolie Drivers or Benevolent Paternalists? British Tea Planters in Assam and the 
Indenture system’, Modern Asian Studies 44, no.1 (2010); J. Sharma, ‘Lazy’ Native, Coolie 
Labour and the Assam Tea Industry’, Modern Asian Studies 43, no.6 (2009); R. Behal and P. 
Mohapatra, ‘Tea and Money versus Human Life’: The rise and fall of the Indenture system in 
the Assam tea plantations, 1840-1908’, Journal of Peasant Studies, nos. 2 & 3 (1992).  
98 Some recent studies have drawn upon the insights made by Raj Chandravarkar on the nature 
and changing fortunes of jobber in Bombay textile industry to reassess the nature of Assam 
sardar. See R. Chandravarkar, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Jobber System in the Bombay 
Cotton Textile Industry, 1870-1955’, Modern Asian Studies 42, no.1 (2008); T. Roy, ‘Sardars, 
Jobbers, Kanganies: The Labour Contractor and Indian Economic History’, Modern Asian 
Studies 42, no.5 (2008); S. Sen, ‘Commercial recruiting and Informal intermediation: Debate 
over the Sardari system in Assam tea plantations, 1860-1900’, Modern Asian Studies 44, no.1 
(2010). Also see P. Robb, ‘Labour in India 1860-1920: Typologies, Change and Regulation’, 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland 4, no. 1 (1994) pp.46-49. 
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which the 1882 legislation proclaimed to facilitate, in fact, had a paradoxical 
impulse. While reversing the declining trends of labour migration, opening 
new areas of recruitment and depressing the costs of labour engagement, it 
made the terms and scope of Assam contract more stringent and the planter 
controls over labour more comprehensive. The last sections delves into how 
the revamped Assam contract system  allowed the planters greater license to 
further their interests, while the corresponding “protection” for labour got even 
more narrowly defined and their abilities to bargain even further restrained.   
2.2 Protection, Exceptionalism and the beginnings of the Assam 
Contract 
  The concerted efforts to “import” people for Assam, like the news of the 
discovery of tea in the province, were imagined to have a “transformative” 
impulse on the nature and magnitude of production of the commodity. The 
potential of Assam to displace China as the seat of tea cultivation and 
production was now understood to be contingent on the outcome of the labour 
importation drives from outside the province.99 The sense of anticipation was 
further heightened by a general assumption that Assam held the potential of 
becoming the preferable and much more accessible destination for the 
thousands of migrants from the overpopulated districts of India, who were 
presently transgressing caste and cultural norms in their protracted and 
uncertain journeys across the seas, to labour in the post-slavery plantations.100 
  A phenomenal demand for workers in Assam in the early 1860s—catalyzed 
by a fresh round of “liberalisation” in the wasteland policy stimulating wild 
                                                 
99 Colonel Vetch and Dr. Barry, in their submission to a colonial committee, made an urgent 
case for the extension of an emigration system under similar regulations as in place in 
Mauritius. In a tone similar to Bruce and Jenkins, Vetch claimed that Assam possessed more 
waste land and was capable of fulfilling the entire English demand for tea. Dr. Barry further 
added, ‘that there are thousands upon thousands of acres available for tea cultivation in 
Cachar’. Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Progress and Prospect, 
and the best means to be adopted for Promotion of European colonisation and settlement in 
India reprinted in The Calcutta Review 34 (January-June 1860) pp.16-33. 
100 Assam was depicted in the English Press of Calcutta as a more attractive destination for the 
potential migrant boarding ‘steamers and having a comfortable trip up their own native rivers’. 
This was portrayed in stark contrast to the uncertainties of ship passages to the overseas 
colonies where they had to venture the dreaded Kala Paanee. ‘Our Tea gardens in Assam and 
Cachar’, The Calcutta Review 35 (September 1860) pp.59-60. 
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speculation and “boom” in the tea industry—was barely in sync with any 
“natural” flows of labour from within and outside the province.101 The agents 
of the tea companies responsible for maintaining an optimum supply of labour 
started meeting the extraordinary demands through a practice of outsourcing 
the recruitment and transit of workers to private labour contracting agencies in 
Calcutta. The presence and escalating significance of organised private 
interests in the “coolie trade” was itself a manifestation of the sustained and 
amplifying demand for workers in the overseas plantations and the new inland 
destinations like the Assam tea gardens.102  
 The agencies relied upon the services of a number of professional native 
recruiters (arkattis) who conducted their recruitment drives in the districts of 
Eastern India and forwarded their recruits by foot and rail to Calcutta. The 
recruits were temporarily housed in the numerous stations (called depots) 
owned by these agencies/contractors. Batches of assembled individuals were 
later taken to Koostea, about hundred miles from Calcutta, and despatched by 
steamers and flats to Cachar and Assam tea gardens.103 The long, tedious and 
the hastily organised sojourns by steamers commuting on the river 
Brahmaputra usually took longer than the passages of the “coolie ships” to 
Mauritius and reported significantly higher rates of mortality. For instance in 
                                                 
101 According to a calculation of workers required per acre of land (at a conservative estimate 
of one for every acre) the Assam tea planters were in need of 200,000 adult workers in this 
period. M.A.B. Siddique, Evolution of Land Grants and Labour Policy of Government (New 
Delhi, 1990) pp.120-121. Also see K. Dasgupta, ‘Wasteland Colonization Policy and 
Peasantization of Ex-Plantation Labour in the Brahmaputra Valley’ in S. Karotemprel, B.D. 
Roy (ed.) Tea Garden Labourers of North East India (Shillong, 1990) pp.35-50. 
102 Calcutta had emerged as a major hub for labour migrating to overseas plantations and 
Assam tea gardens. M. Carter Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834-1874 
(Delhi, 1995); S. Chatterjee and R. Das Gupta, Tea-Labour in Assam: Recruitment and 
Government Policy, 1840-80, Economic and Political Weekly 16, nos. 44-46 (November 
1981). 
103 Steam navigation was extended to Upper Assam around the period of establishment of 
Assam Company in 1840. A few years later, a government steamer was put upon the line from 
Calcutta through Dacca until Guwahati. It was only in 1850, that the steamer service was 
extended to Dibrugarh in Upper Assam, which sailed once in a month. The private company 
Indian General Navigation Steam Company came to an “agreement” with the government that 
its service on Brahmaputra will be withdrawn. The time taken for transit from Calcutta to 
Upper Assam was three times to Cachar. Evidence of Colonel H. Vetch in Select Committee 
appointed to inquire into the Progress and Prospect, and the best means to be adopted for 
Promotion of European colonisation and settlement in India, Minutes of Evidence in Reports 
from Committees, Colonization and Settlement (India) Vol IV  (London,1859) p.198; P.J. 
Griffiths, A History of Joint Steamer Companies (London, 1979) p.635  
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the year 1861, the mortality during passage to Mauritius, West Indies and 
Reunion hovered between 1.5 percent and 5 percent while the Assam steamers 
were clocking rates as high as 20 percent to 50 percent.104 Concerns were 
voiced from within and outside the official/planter circles that if the existing 
state of affairs was allowed to continue, it would not only ‘neutralise the 
advantages of emigration’ but also ‘prevent labourers from emigrating to 
Cachar and Assam on any terms’.105 
  The “coolie solution” for Assam was under imminent threat and the colonial 
state decided to intervene. This was seen as a departure from its self-avowed 
position of “non-interference” in the matters concerning the planters and 
imported workers. Yet the “exceptional” nature of the migration to Assam in 
the 1860s (due to high incidence of abuses and phenomenal rates of human 
mortality) not only necessitated but also justified the intervention to “remedy” 
the existing state of affairs.106 A committee comprising of officials from the 
Emigration Department was constituted by the Bengal Government to 
investigate the nature and practices of the recruitment and transport of workers 
to the tea districts of Eastern India. The Committee’s investigations and report 
harped on the anxiety of loss and cost of labour (mostly on account of severe 
mortality and desertion) and attributed the blame squarely on the native 
contractors and their profit motivated practices for the tragic situation. They 
further recommended enactment of measures to provide a “system” beneficial 
alike to the labourers and their employers.107 Grave disquiet was expressed 
regarding the spectre of private interests in recruitment, ‘who are interested 
                                                 
104 In the year 1861-62, around sixty ships sailed from Calcutta to overseas colonies 
(Mauritius, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Reunion) 
with more than 22,000 people on board. The comparable detailed statistics for Assam steamers 
was not available and the rates of mortality were calculated from some selected cases. 
Statement showing the Material and Moral Progress of India, 1861-62 pp.302-303. 
105 Nassau Lees made a strong case for an interventionist role of state in the agricultural 
experiments underway in the 1860s. He argued that the ‘fixing of a new labouring population 
in those remote and isolated provinces of India was not the duty of growers tea, or coffee, or 
cotton, or indigo, but eminently the business of Government’. Statement showing the Material 
and Moral Progress of India, 1861-62, p.310; W. N. Lees, The Land and Labour of India: A 
Review (London, 1867) pp.207-208. 
106 Annual Report on the Administration of the Bengal Presidency, 1860-1861 pp.50-51. 
107 Statement showing the Material and Moral Progress of India, 1861-62 p.303.  
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solely in the profit to be made out of the capitalist’s urgent need of labour, and 
both labourers and employers were at the mercy of the contractor’.108  
The Bengal Native Labour Act III of 1863—emanating from the suggestions 
and recommendations made in the report—signalled the foundational 
“legislative” endeavour of the colonial state to institute a tentative “sanitary” 
infrastructure, supervision and control for labour migration to Assam. Now the 
recruiters and recruited were to be registered and the modes of recruitment and 
travel had to measure up to certain prior approved rules and standards.109 
 The premises of “exceptionalism” and the necessity of state “protection” were 
not just limited to characterise and intervene in the functioning of this early 
labour migration to Assam. The colonial-capitalist impressions on the 
“settlement” of the newly imported labour also began to be framed along these 
lines. Between 1863 and 1866, roughly a half of the 85,000 individuals landing 
on the Assam plantations were feared to have been permanently “lost” to death 
and desertion.110 Desertion and “unsettlement” of imported labour became a 
chronic concern for the plantations in search of “continuity” and “stability” of 
this labour—having invested considerably in their recruitment and transit.111 In 
                                                 
108 The committee particularly emphasised on the cost cutting measures employed which 
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110 Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874) p.21, pp. 38-40. 
111 Nassau Lees attributed the desertion to the low percentages of women in the batches (5 to 
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such a milieu, the “protection” of contract constituted the site of its remedy. A 
contemporary review of the tea operations in the province had underscored the 
centrality of contract for the immediate future of the industry: 
A contract Law is now acknowledged to be necessary and if the Government will but 
allow that it has a direct interest in the importation of a robust labouring population 
into its waste territory and make organization for Inland Emigration on a large scale 
feasible…present difficulties will we feel sure soon vanish and the tea trade of India 
will become of far greater importance than even Lord William Bentinck ever 
anticipated.112 
Contracts—as introduced by the 1863 Act—allowed engagement upto five 
years and the workers on failing to meet her/his obligation became liable for 
criminal prosecution. This nature of “contract” was fundamentally 
reconstituted in light of the high incidence of “unsettlement” on the plantations 
during the mania years—by the Assam Contract Act of 1865.113 The new 
contract explicitly empowered the plantation manager (under certain 
circumstances) to privately arrest the “deserting” coolies. Such an 
“exceptional” right was justified on the contention that the policing capability 
of the state in a “frontier” province like Assam was superficial, tenuous and 
generally weak.114 The “protection” of the interests and investments of planters 
apparently warranted such an exception.115 Many planters and colonial 
officials noted that the labour was being transported at the cost of the planters 
to Assam and were also guaranteed a predetermined rate of wage and living 
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standard on the plantation. In such a context the manager/planter should be 
guaranteed an uninterrupted presence of labour on plantations and work for the 
contracted period.116  
 The Acts of 1863 and 1865—emerging as responses to a particular “crisis” in 
the history of Assam tea industry—left a legacy in the form of a “system” 
through which the imported workers were recruited, transported and settled on 
the plantations in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.117 The necessity 
of “protection” of contract in an assumed “exceptional” context in which 
Assam recruitment and plantation operation was conducted—remained the 
raison d'être for its retention.  
 The succeeding Assam labour legislations (approximately once in every 
decade) during the course of  nineteenth and early twentieth century initiated 
alterations and revisions, responding to shifting concerns of the industry, but 
strongly upheld in principle the indispensability of the contract and its specific 
manifestation on the tea plantations.  
A particular “evolutionary” logic underpinned the idea and practice of 
“contract” system in Assam. The successive legislations/revisions in this 
framework were pictured as “stages” towards a progressively “freer” labour 
system. Yet, the possibility of such an appropriate moment (when Assam 
contract became redundant and therefore could be safely done away with) was 
constantly delayed. This was evident from the deliberations in the 1880s on the 
relevance of the penal contracts for Assam: 
Tea interests in Assam require the protection of a penal labour law…If there were 
anything like a local labour market for planters to fall back upon…be left to regulate 
themselves as elsewhere..Some districts gardens can depend on a more or less regular 
supply of local labour from Kacharis and other similar tribes, and some gardens that 
are exceptionally situated can subsist on the labour of time-expired coolies recruited 
from gardens less popular or less happily situated; but these are exceptions…A great 
majority of tea-planters in Upper Assam are absolutely dependent for the regular 
prosecution of their business on imported labour..The cost of importing is excessive, 
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more in fact than a whole year’s wages, and the strike or desertion of a large number 
of labourers at the busy season would, in the case of many gardens, mean not a 
temporary inconvenience merely, but the absolute ruin of the planter. On the other 
hand, it is abundantly manifest that the labourer is, as a rule, well looked after: he 
earns well enough after the first year (in contrast to home district); he is cared if 
sick…protected for ill-treatment…prompt payment of his wages ensured…still has 
strong inducements to desert… circumstances of tea-gardens are still so far 
exceptional as to require exceptional treatment and exceptional legislation to regulate 
the relations between the planter and the labourers.118  
This premise continued to hold sway even in the early years of the twentieth 
century when the then Viceroy Curzon broached this issue at some length 
during a speech addressed to tea planters of Assam: 
I agree with you (planters) in thinking that the time has not yet come when the 
protection and control, by special statute agency, of the industry in which you are 
engaged can safely be dispensed with…A day will probably come in the future when 
exceptional Labour Laws will not be required for the tea plantations of Assam…and 
when for the present artificial system will be substituted the natural operation of the 
laws of demand and supply. That is the ideal to which successive Viceroys and 
Secretaries of State, and I imagine also successive generations of Planters all look 
forward; but the means of access to these parts of Assam must be greatly improved, 
and the conditions of employment must be ameliorated and rendered more secure, 
before a natural stream of cheap and free labour can be expected to flow up and down 
the Brahmaputra (Assam) Valley. In the meantime, it is our duty to prepare the way 
for that consummation, by regularizing and purifying from abuse of reproach the 
existing contract system.119 
This persistent impressions of the absence of a local market for 
labour/indispensability of imported labour which characterised the 
“exceptionality” (of Assam) in the colonial-capitalist discourses—as briefly 
discussed in the previous chapter—was an outcome of the specific nature of 
plantation work and the tea industry, as it was taking roots in Assam. The 
marginalization of the local labouring groups (like the Kacharis) from the work 
force was a relatively prolonged yet an incomplete process. This was driven by 
their enhanced capabilities to negotiate terms with the planters, in a context of 
formalisation of “industry” and the intensifying contest for cheap and settled 
workers. The contract regime sustained this “deficient” nature of the local 
labour market through an active and legislative interference. Again the 
necessity of protection (as enshrined in the contract)—as this chapter will 
further argue—assumed a very partial connotation and purpose. This was to 
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perpetuate the interests of the tea industry and authority of plantation 
managers, while gradually and systematically circumscribing the promised 
rights, benefits and bargaining possibilities of the imported workers. 
2.3. The ‘Protection’ of Private arrest and the construction of 
managerial authority 
 It is pertinent here to outline the nature of tea enterprise and the life and work 
practices on the plantations, which became the premise for the assumed 
inevitability for the institution of private-arrest for the planters. The 
“systematising” nature of plantations of some larger companies (like Assam 
and Jorehaut) was interrupted by a mad rush of speculators in the Assam 
during the 1860s. This  had unleashed a feverish trend—of land acquisition, 
jungle clearing and opening of tea gardens—without any necessary 
consideration and investment in establishing a suitable and sustainable 
infrastructure for the thousands of labourers being assembled to live and work 
there. A photograph from the period reveals such elementary conditions of tea 
gardens of the period.  
  
Fig. 2.1: Tea Garden in Assam from the 1860s.120 
                                                 
120 View of a tea garden with thatched buildings in the distance taken near Cachar by Oscar 
Jean Baptiste Mallitte in the 1860s. A number of planters and workers are positioned on the 
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The labour “unsettlement” and mass “desertions” from these plantations were 
often a “response” to the grim circumstances of life and work, as evident from 
a few cases being reported by the local colonial officials.  
  For instance, in the year 1864, the resident labour force of a tea garden in 
Cachar (belonging to one Elgin Tea Company) left en masse on account of the 
rampant “unhealthiness” and daily incidence of deaths on the garden.121 On 
further investigations into the incident, the manager admitted to the “poor” and 
“diseased” circumstances of the garden and the very likely possibility of the 
entire resident population dying as a consequence of that. Such grim conditions 
of Assam plantations were hardly “exceptional” in the period. The hard and 
taxing work of manually clearing vast stretches of forested land to make way 
for tea planting was the order of the day.122 The rudimentary amenities of 
habitation and inadequate provisions of basic amenities made the “exhausted” 
and “overworked” worker vulnerable to debilities and diseases. In addition, an 
acute shortage and crisis of food supplies in the province precipitated by the 
burgeoning population created “famine like” situation on the gardens. The 
conditions were conducive for widespread destitution and mortality.123 
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A group of new arrivals on a plantation in Sibsagar district refused to join 
work. They found the place to be infested with leeches on which they were 
being assigned the task of hoeing. The intervention of the Deputy 
Commissioner to “settle” the matter amicably failed. The labourers showed a 
decided preference to court arrest (for breaching their work contracts) than 
return to the contracted garden. The attempts of the manager (Jamieson) to get 
these individuals back on the plantation after month long sentence was not 
entertained by the Deputy Commissioner. He explained that convicted 
individuals after having served their term were free to engage elsewhere in 
Assam or return back.124  
 The private recruiters (arkattis) engaging and recruiting the labour force in the 
districts of eastern India had little interest and incentive in giving the 
prospective recruit a fair sense of the conditions of  work, life and 
remuneration to be expected on the tea gardens. The Deputy Commissioner of 
a recruiting district in Bengal (Manbhum) informed a commission of enquiry 
(1868) that the recruiters with badges (required by the act) and licenses were 
often taken as Government servants, and that the tea garden work in Cachar 
and Assam was therefore presumed to be on sarkar’s (government) gardens.125 
There were some aspersions cast by local officials that the ‘runaways’ from the 
tea gardens were ‘chiefly among those who have not been fairly treated (and) 
who have been induced to come under false persuasions and who have not had 
their agreement explained to them orally’.126 Many of these disgruntled 
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individuals were assured ‘easy work’ with earnings of the order of ten to 
twelve rupees, but most of them barely managed to make two or three 
rupees.127 Stewart went to the extent of claiming that not a single batch he had 
examined showed any great knowledge about the agreement and also that they 
had little idea that ‘they are to be coolies’. He recommended the appointment 
of a protector of immigrant in Cachar, to counteract ‘the one-sidedness of the 
agreements which the coolies enter into in Calcutta with their eyes blind-
folded’.128 This view was largely reaffirmed by the findings of a report 
commissioned by the Bengal government to take stock of the tea industry in 
Assam. In contrast to the sanitised view often presented by the recruiters, the 
report enumerated difficulties encountered by the recruits in Assam: 
The labourers have too often been deceived by unprincipled recruiters…have been 
told that they were going to a garden in a country where the means of living were 
plentiful and cheap; where they would receive very high wages and have little to do. 
They have found themselves set down in a swampy jungle, far from human habitation, 
where food was scarce and dear, where they have seen their families and fellow 
labourers struck down by disease and death, and where they themselves prostrated by 
sickness, have been able to earn less by far than they could have done in their 
homes.129 
 An instance of blatant exaggeration and misrepresentation by the recruiter was 
reported from Dilkhosha tea garden in Cachar in the early 1860s. A batch of 
roughly hundred workers collectively left the garden marching up to the 
District headquarters to voice their grievances to the District Magistrate. 
Members of the contingent strongly resented the “digging” work assigned to 
them on tea gardens, when they had apparently enlisted themselves with the 
recruiter for service in the Bengal Constabulary. The predominant nature of 
work (clearing vast acres of forested land and hoeing the soil for cultivation) 
captured in the term “kodalir kaam” (digging work) became a recurring 
concern for many batches of coolies who were initially made to believe by the 
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recruiter that ‘they had to do nothing but pick up tea leaves and they would get 
two annas for every eight seers they picked’.130   
 This climate of “unsettlement”—induced by a combination of the conditions 
of work, life and remuneration prevailing on Assam plantations and the 
practices of recruitment—was perceived by the planters as an affront to their 
desires for a “disciplined” and “settled” plantation working force. Again, the 
nature of the contractual agreement—as introduced by the 1863 Act—was 
found to be grossly “inadequate” by the planters for such purposes. The only 
“remedy” it offered was prosecution under civil law. The conviction was 
generally perceived as an “injury” to the interests of planter/tea gardens 
because of an additional ‘loss of labour’ due to compulsory imprisonment.131 
A. Browlow, a planter from Cachar summed up this sentiment in a piece 
published in the daily Englishman: 
How is that daily, almost hourly, act of insubordination now occurs amongst the 
imported coolies in the district? Seemingly with no other object in view, but to tempt 
the Planter to strike his cooly, to present a valid excuse for the coolies appearing 
before Government officials...part of law (imprisonment) it is needless to say is a 
dead-letter; for it hardly need be tried to prove its unproductive results, the 
consequences is that the liberated black sheep goes about the district infecting others, 
and this is going on, and on, and on—and where it is to stop no one can say.132 
 To realise the desired objective to immobilise workers and force work, the 
planters often circumvented the provisions of law and resorted to widespread 
detention, confinement and physical abuse. A violent/physical strategy of 
“discipline” and “settlement” of labour at this stage was more rampant and 
substantially more effective in comparison to an earlier period.  
 An incident reported from a plantation (in Cachar district) in the 1864 alludes 
to the growing significance of this strategy, but also hints at its limits. During a 
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morning muster, the manager of the garden Schoneman charged a worker 
named Summon for not strictly complying with his instructions. In his act of 
disciplining, Schoneman dragged Summon to a nearby tree, tied him up and hit 
him with fists and stones. Summon remained tied the whole day, and in the 
evening when he was brought back to the coolie lines, he succumbed to his 
injuries. The following morning when some workers made an attempt to leave 
the garden, they were caught and brought back to the garden. Again around 
five workers were tied up to the trees, and kept in that state until the next day. 
After their release, many workers of the garden “collectively” set upon and 
bound Schoneman and his assistant, took possession of his revolver and left for 
the Sudder station. They were intercepted by a senior police official (named 
Daley), with whom they lodged a complaint and willingly surrendered the 
arms.133 
Such instances of physical disciplining of Kachari labour on the Assam 
Company plantations of the 1840s and 1850s—as noted in the previous 
chapter—were largely absent and even counterproductive when mildly 
employed, leading to many work stoppages, strikes and mass walkouts. The 
familiarity with the locality and the awareness of other options of employment 
implied that the locals (like the Kacharis) could not be settled and made to 
work exclusively by force and coercion.134 The presence of the emerging 
violent strategy of settlement was mentioned in a governmental report which 
noted that: 
..the (Planter) stuck to his work, and it is not a matter for wonder that he was 
unwilling to make allowance for the coolies not doing theirs; and as he could not pay 
them for doing nothing, and they must earn enough to live, he thought the best thing 
he could do for them, as well as for himself, was to make them work by any means he 
could. Some such line of reasoning as this led to the practice of tying and flogging 
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coolies…when the amount of daily task did not come up to what the manager 
considered they ought to do.135 
 This further substantiates the argument that the changing profile of the 
plantation work force (from local to migrant) occasioned the routinisation of 
practices of violence/torture in the 1860s. Absence of a fully “formed” 
plantation—where the “movement” and settlement of resident labour could be 
effectively monitored and controlled within its boundaries and organised in 
“coolie-lines” (residential quarters)—was not realising such desires of 
comprehensive plantation control.136 The “isolated” setting of the tea gardens 
in Assam and Cachar—abruptly sprouting in the midst of vast stretches of 
jungles and usually at the margins of the networks of communication and 
spaces of human habitation—most crucially contributed to such a condition in 
this period.137  
 The Assam and Cachar planters strategically mobilised and involving the local 
society in “coolie policing” by compensating those who captured and brought 
back the runaways. In Cachar, for instance, the garden staff and the local 
villagers were paid Rs 5 for every “catch”. This was later ‘adjusted’ from the 
earnings of the ‘absconder’.138 Such practices were confirmed by several 
managers and superintendents of the tea companies. In a correspondence with 
a tea district commissioner, the superintendent of the largest tea Company 
(Assam Company) revealed that the company managers had maintained an 
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organized establishment of chupprasises and burkundazes for the apprehension 
of runaway coolies’ and that it was effectively  ‘recognized by the Government 
officials of the day’.139 There were instances of these employees ‘not confining 
themselves to catching their own runaway coolies, but seize any person they 
like’.140 
 These “illegal” practices of policing, detention and arrest were substantially 
incorporated within the framework of legality through the infamous ‘right to 
private arrest’ bestowed on the planters by the 1865 Act.141 Though generally 
approved and welcomed by the officials of the day, this ‘extraordinary’ right 
also managed to raise some eyebrows. A senior Bengal official in a critical 
tone remarked that, ‘when the evils of the coolie’s condition were brought to 
its (Government’s) notice, it did not strengthen the district officers and insist 
on their protecting the labourers through the existing law. Instead of this, an 
Act (VI of 1865) was passed, which gave the employer the power of arresting 
runaways without warrant’.142 
 Yet the justification for allowing such a “privilege”—as indicated earlier—
was strongly premised on the “exceptionality” of Assam and the obligation to 
“protect” planter’s right to settle and force labour.143 This became the 
substance of the opinion voiced by the administrative head of the province on 
the subject: 
Since we have legislated for importing labourers into the Province, that further 
legislation is required to provide for their management after they have been imported, 
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otherwise importers must, for the protection of their own interests, be compelled to 
have recourse to measures which are confessedly illegal.144 
This action was even curiously positioned as a logical step in keeping the 
‘scales of justice even’. Here the coolie was perceived to have been the 
beneficiary of ‘special protection’ (by 1863 Act) against the manager and so it 
was ‘now the turn of the manager to be protected against the breaches of 
contract, or lawless acts of his coolies, as the master is against those of his 
lascars’.145 
 An underlying assumption in many of these contentions was the 
“insufficiency” and “deficiency” of the existing laws and the policing 
capabilities of the state to satisfactorily respond. For instance, a local official 
argued that ‘it (private arrest) might not be justifiable where a perfect system 
of police and magisterial supervision existed’, but ‘in the wilds of Cachar on 
the very borders of civilization, there is no such perfect system or supervision’. 
In such a context, the ordinary civil procedure was seen as generally 
impracticable as the ‘magistrates were few and far between’. This was seen to 
be even more imperative ‘in the case servants (tea coolies in this instance) 
from whom it was impossible to recover damages’.146   
  Notwithstanding the rationale of ‘exception’ (of Assam) and the necessity of 
“protection” (of planter’s right to settle the contracted individuals for work), 
the “privatisation” of the policing rights was a legal affirmation of the already 
rampant practices of capturing and detention exercised by the planters. There 
was ample evidence in the period leading up to the institution of the ‘right to 
private arrest’. This was not just restricted to the isolated plantations 
considering themselves less likely to be persecuted and consequently acting 
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more frequently, but ‘(the) law was much taken into their hands by all the 
planters whatever the distance from the (police) station’.147 
The colonial state agreed to partially relinquish its policing hegemony and 
even permit a degree of discretions on the part of the planters in pursuit of 
framing and producing an immobilised and disciplined working force. The 
planters, however, consistently exceeded their mandate and did not restrain 
their disciplinary practices to merely arresting “runaway” workers privately—
as granted to them by the 1865 Act.  
 A series of “incidents” reported from a Assam Company plantation 
(Cherajoolie) in Darrang district—a year after the legislation of 1865 Act—
alluded to the continuing incidence of  violence and its  undeniable relevance 
in attainting the work objectives and labour demands of the plantations of the 
period.148 The “evidence” of torture on the labourers of Cherajoolie tea garden 
“accidentally” came to the notice of a local functionary (Thomas Lamb) during 
a routine tour which was recorded in his official diary.149 The scandalous 
nature of these observations caught the attention of the higher authorities and 
Lamb was instructed to pursue some of his “references” in greater detail.150 
The subsequent investigation and a few oral testimonies (of individuals named 
Lalldawa, Juggernath, Padarut, Bebeejan, Bhodai, Ramdyall, Hurro Sing, 
Joothee, Roghoo, Bustub and Lalloo) which Lamb recorded—gave a graphic 
“personal” account of  the overlapping strategies of work and violence in place 
on the plantation.151 The “violated” individuals (who testified before Lamb) 
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confessed of having made aborted endeavours to “desert” the garden at 
different times. A common theme running through these ‘personal’ stories was 
a perpetual inability to accomplish the tasks assigned to them by the 
supervising authorities a desire to be relieved from their contracts.  Most of 
them told that they failed to clear a specified area of heavy jungle (20 tarhs) as 
mandated in the daily work schedule.152 Each incidence of “short work” 
activated a patterned disciplinary procedure by the management. While some 
(Lalldawa) had their food rations cut, all of them were physically abused and 
flogged on every such occasion by the assistant manager (Richard Dunn) and 
the native staff. This became the immediate reason for their decision to leave. 
After being apprehended (mostly by the resident Kachari labour), they were 
brought back and subject to a fresh round of beatings and physical abuses. 
Juggernath had his hands tied upwards to a tree and feet to the trunk and 
whipped with a cane. Through the entire ordeal the garden doctor kept an eye 
on his pulse—ensuring that the garden would not be deprived of his services 
due to the beating. During the “disciplining” of Padarut, where he was also 
bound to a tree and beaten by the manager and the duffadar, the native doctor 
filled in by regularly rubbing salt into his fresh wounds!153 The duffadar while 
receiving the orders to cane the offending Bebeejan was instructed by Dunn 
(the manager) to ‘strike lightly’ as the intention was just to ‘frighten her’. All 
of them were later taken back to their ‘routine tasks’ of clearing the heavy 
jungle. 
 The incidents confirmed the colonial anxieties regarding the necessity of 
protecting the “ignorant coolie” and provoked intense correspondence within 
the networks of the colonial administration and managed to find its way in a 
report presented to the British House of Commons. The episode was later 
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picked up by a prominent “abolitionist” voice ‘The Anti-Slavery Reporter and 
Aborigines’ Friend’, crusading against the emerging coolie labour systems in 
the different corners of the world. In their discussion of this incident they 
anticipate the ‘new form of slavery’ argument made persuasively by Hugh 
Tinker by suggesting that ‘wherever there is an assumption of absolute planter 
authority, the adjuncts of the plantation system should be rampant, and its 
brutalities exercised upon the bodies of the labourers, whether black, brown, or 
yellow—negro or coolie’.154  
 The general disapproval of actions of the “violent” manager leading to legal 
action and his dismissal from the ranks of the Assam company did not 
undermine a broader process that was set into motion where the  legally 
empowered privileges (like private arrest) and assent for the “protection” of the 
planter’s interests (to settle contracted labour for work) was sliding  into an 
assumed prerogative (by the planters) for an unhindered maintenance of the 
local order and paternal control over the labouring bodies—even justifying 
varying doses of violence and torture.155 The planters found great value in 
counteracting the disinclination for routinised plantation work characteristic of 
the difficult circumstances of operation (heavy jungle) and poor conditions of 
life and remuneration through systematised and routinised violence and 
torture.156  
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 This self-assumption of the planter/manager as the dispenser of order and 
justice motivated calls for even greater “latitude” and “freedom” with respect 
to the modes of punishment.157 By the late 1860s and early 1870s, planters 
were aggressively pitching for ‘discretionary magisterial authority over 
workmen…whereby he (planter/manager) may exercise a beneficial influence 
by threats, and in emergencies slaps, to keep up that state of discipline  that 
always exists in a well-regulated factory where the bane of court prosecutions 
has not penetrated’.158 This again drew sustenance from the standard ‘Assam 
is exceptional’ premise: ‘that with so few magistrates in the district, it must be 
planter himself that we must look to for the maintenance of order among these 
large bodies of labourers’.159 In fact, the jury convicting Richard Dunn for his 
“excesses” pronounced that many of the plantations in Assam are located 
twenty to forty miles distant from the nearest court of justice and therefore ‘the 
employers of labour had great difficulty in having recourse to legal means for 
enforcing the fulfilment of the agreements made and were often tempted to 
take the law into their hands’.  
  Such temptations encapsulated a consolidating aspiration of planters to 
further stretch the boundaries of control beyond the limits set by privatized 
arrest and allow the privatization of punishment and legalisation of violence. 
There were many planters who often lamented that ‘(they) have little power 
over their imported labourers and the support of the Magistrate is required to 
punish severely labourers’.160 For instance, the Section 102 and 103 of 
Contract Act II of 1870—which extended the planter’s right to private arrest—
also made it mandatory to produce the apprehended “deserters” to the nearest 
police station. The alteration was read in certain quarters as “unnecessary” and 
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sustained persuasion and pressure was brought to bear on the government to 
make it “optional” in practice.161 
 This seems to have had a bearing in the case of an arrested runaway from 
Darrang district (Agra Bank), who was sentenced to a day in the prison on the 
request of the manager as he was satisfied by the “suitable” punishment 
privately meted out to him.162 He argued that imprisonment generated 
possibilities of interaction with “bad characters” in the prison and did not have 
a comparable deterrent effect like “fines” and “extra work” on the plantations. 
‘If laws of no possible utility are made’, reasoned another planter, ‘they 
(planters) must supplement them by others which have a more practical 
bearing on the case’.163    
Flogging, as the incidents from the Cherajoolie tea garden confirmed, was 
“popular” within the planter circles as an effective mode of punishment, 
engendering the desired fear and compliance in the native labour.164 A planter 
even claimed that ‘coolies as a rule do not care for imprisonment in the least, 
and if flogging were introduced, it would stop a great deal of absconding and 
other faults’. There were several suggestions to make it a “substitute” for 
incarceration—being rationalized on the grounds that it was a mutually 
“beneficial” solution for the state (saving on the prison charges) and the planter 
(saving the loss of labour due to imprisonment).165 Moreover, its effectiveness 
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in compelling workers to labour under trying circumstances was “physically” 
documented and greatly appreciated by the planters.166  
 The planter attempts to carve a new space for their disciplinary practices and 
actions beyond the jurisdiction of the ‘law of the land’ were neatly summed in 
the rationale for the nomination of the magistrate in every planting district 
from within their ranks:  
(Planters) should not allow the (government) magistrates to interpret laws according 
to their whims and fancies…Tea represents a larger amount of capital invested than 
any other class of industry in India (carried out by European)…(and they) should be 
given a fair play in conducting their work.167 
 The colonial state agreed in principle to the “concerns” and “demands” of the 
planters, but was apprehensive to completely overhaul the policing and legal 
institutions and procedures to suit the purposes and interests of the planters. 
The demand for a “planter-magistrate” did not find the necessary approval, but 
several assurances were given by the local officials that the prosecution of 
deserters would be done away with or reduced to a minimum.168 
2.4. Assam Contract and the ‘Protection’ of the Coolie 
 The notion of ‘protection’ which was intrinsic to the logic of contract system, 
did not merely touch upon the concerns of planters and the industry, but also 
claimed in principle to guarantee and safeguard the interests of imported 
workers. The abuses in recruitment and mortality during transit, as mentioned 
earlier, were apparently addressed through the initiation of compulsory 
“registration” (for recruiters and recruits) and the establishment of “sanitary” 
norms and supervision by the 1863 Act.169   
 The colonial-capitalist discourses on the conditions on the plantations of the 
early 1860s were principally read through the category of ‘unsettlement’—
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revealing the anxieties and aspirations for discipline and stability of the 
working force. Yet, such a premise also generated some information regarding 
the conditions of work, life and earnings of the imported workers. For instance, 
the high incidence of mortality and desertion as induced by the potent 
combination of the circumstances of residence and the availability of necessary 
provisions and food was tangentially acknowledged in these enquiries.  
  Officials at the district level were intermittently articulating apprehensions 
regarding the ‘limited’ levels of information and background knowledge of the 
recruits contracting for plantation work. Reflecting on the initial experiences of 
work on Cachar plantations, a local colonial officer observed: 
they (Coolies) do not know that they have only to pluck the youngest and finest 
leaf…how can they tell what sort of work clearing and cutting jungle is…operations 
are different and vary enormously and tasks given in the schedule are for able bodied 
men in the most favourable locality…Coolies are at the mercy of the planters who 
insists upon the full tasks or reduces it as it suits his sense of justice. I do not think that 
it is fair that a blind bargain should be made.170 
 The work of plantation agriculture (like plucking and jungle clearing) which 
privileged prior initiation and familiarity—extensively noted by Robert Bruce 
during his stewardship of the experimental stations in Upper Assam—became 
even more relevant for  the newly imported workers labouring on tea gardens 
across the province. The “discrepancy” in the individual performance—
induced by the degrees of exposure to plantation work and by the specific 
location/condition of the site of plantation—was further complicated by the 
prevailing practices of task assessment of the labour. The task rate allowed 
planters/work supervisors a discretion and latitude to determine as to what 
constituted a “fair” amount of work (i.e. the daily task) to earn a daily wage on 
a particular garden. Variations in terrain conditions, nature of the work and 
experience of the worker were not factored in arriving at such rates. This 
resulted in sharp variations in individual earnings, placing the workers on the 
“difficult” gardens and newly arrived recruits at a distinct disadvantage. The 
disproportionately higher rates of mortality and desertion on particular gardens 
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and among the newcomers attested to such a tendency and continued to remain 
a “feature” of Assam plantations.171 
  The legislation of Act VI of 1865—principally motivated in regulating the 
conditions on the Assam plantations to restrain and curb the growing incidence 
of “desertions” and “unsettlement”—also touched upon welfare of the workers 
being imported into the province. A particular manifestation of the logic of 
protection—which underwrote the premises of the contract and the necessity of 
the Act—warranted the establishment of the post of “Protector” of coolies. 
They were supposed to act as the “representative” of state and ensure that the 
contracted worker did not have a “blind bargain” in circumstances deemed to 
be potentially dangerous and detrimental for them. The Protectors were 
required to regularly inspect the plantations and authorised to terminate the 
contracts on the grounds of failing health of the labourer and on valid 
complaints of ill treatment meted out by the management.  
 The 1865 Act initially fixed a “minimum” monthly wage (Rs 5 for men and 
Rs 4 for women) and required any subsequent deductions made for absence 
from work to be sanctioned by the local magistrate. There were other attempts 
to define a “working day” (9 hours) and “working week” (6 days). The 
subsequent legislations of Bengal government in the 1870s (Act II of 1870, Act 
VII of 1873) set standards of health and mortality on the gardens. Larger 
estates were obliged to have a “coolie hospital” manned by a European doctor 
and native attendants with basic medicine and medical equipment. Mortality up 
to seven percent was considered a tolerable rate for the tea gardens in the 
“unhealthy” province of Assam. Gardens showing death rates above seven 
percent were to be blacklisted, debarred from recruiting in the subsequent 
season or even declared unfit for human habitation and closed.172 
 The necessity and institution of the “protective” clauses for the imported 
workers came under sustained criticism from the planters as instances of 
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unwarranted and unnecessary state intervention. This view was captured in an 
assertion of a planter who categorically stated that ‘once the coolies land on the 
garden, all Government interference should cease’.173  The core premises of 
such criticism were based on an argument that the planters having substantially 
“invested” in the importation of workers would have an obvious “economic 
interest” in their ‘protection’.  This position was succinctly articulated by a 
planter: 
 Labour is the great machinery by which tea-land is made valuable; and it is costly 
machinery, too, especially for Assam tea-planters. Now, no man would be fool enough 
to buy a machine, and then willfully damage it.174 
 State intervention was considered to have negative repercussions it had on the 
conduct of discipline and authority on the plantations. Anxieties were 
articulated that ‘over-legislation and inspecting during transit, arrival and on 
garden had filled them (coolies) with the idea that they are more important than 
the masters’.175 A planter read in this a strong likelihood of ‘stirring up in their 
naturally suspicious minds grave doubts of their having been as well dealt by 
as they deserved’.176 It was further seen as ‘creative of insubordination as the 
coolie looked upon the magistrate as his defender against the employer’.177  
According to section 26 of 1865 Act, any complaints by the coolies had to 
come through the manager. This “right” was constantly discredited by planters 
for being frivolous and mostly intended  ‘to insult their employers and  (to) 
have the ultimate pleasure of confronting their employers as equal man to man, 
and swear his money away in the court of justice for an assault’.178 There were 
several reports throughout the nineteenth century of planters keeping cordons 
of chowkidars round the gardens and policing the connecting roads to prevent 
coolies from leaving to complain. There were other instances where the 
complaining parties were apprehended within the confines of magistrate’s 
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office. A provincial administration report in the early 1870s even noted that a 
planter ‘succeeded in inducing a weak or worthless native magistrate to punish 
a party of labourers for rioting’, when they were merely ‘seeking to institute a 
complaint for maltreatment’.179 Again when around fifty coolies of Hoogreejan 
tea garden (Northern Assam tea company), lodged a complaint to the Protector 
on account of their wages being seven months in arrears. The court objected on 
the grounds that strict procedure was not maintained by Protector.180 
There were other objections of police entering a garden to investigate any 
alleged grievance on the part of labourers, without the manager or employer 
being made aware of the intended inspection.181 Proposals were made for 
limiting such inspections to sanitary and medical issues.182 A strong reason 
motivating such concerns was that an unrestrained access of state functionaries 
(especially the police) diluted the claims of manager/planter as the absolute 
authority and further threatened to bring their actions within the jurisdiction of 
the legal structures and norms. Such state of affairs was seen as tantamount to 
“unsettlement” of labour, which the Act of 1865 was believed to counteract.   
  The Contract Acts justified on the “exceptional” and the necessity of 
“protection”—as these planter’s anxieties and criticisms alluded—had to 
operate selectively for the perpetuation of planter interests and simultaneously 
allow space for their unilateral authority. In such a context, the Protector of 
labourers also came to be characterised as a “troublemaker” and as a planter 
argued that ‘if not gifted with common sense in a high degree’, he could ‘make 
a farce of the numerous duties entrusted to him, and jeopardise a thriving and 
important industry’.183 This was deemed as disruptive to the “plantation order” 
where  ‘his (protector’s) visits, which occur about once every six months, 
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create a bad effect amongst those in whose interests he appears, and a 
management that may have been very successful in establishing a good feeling 
between master and men is unhinged’.184 
 These criticisms and determined planter pressures informed and conditioned 
the idea and practice of the Assam contract, as it emerged on the plantations of 
Assam. For instance, the subsequent Act of 1870 (revising the Act of 1865) 
dropped the minimum wage clause agreeing with the planter rationale that the 
differentiated nature of plantations in Assam did not justify a precise time-rate 
wage and necessitated an ambiguous task-rate assessment. 185   
This made the strict definitions of a “working day” and “working week” 
largely irrelevant and deeply contextual. Such ambiguity and flexibility, 
benefitting the differentiating interests of plantation capitalism, as we will 
further argue, became symptomatic of the nature and purpose of the Assam 
contract regime.  
2.5. Act XIII and the Assam Contract(s) system 
 A particular manifestation and instance of this ‘ambiguity’ was the widespread 
prevalence of Master and Servants Act or the Act XIII of 1859 on the tea 
gardens of Assam. The Act was originally intended to regulate the labour 
disputes in the towns of India. This was extended by a notification of the 
Bengal Government in 1864 to the tea planting districts—primarily to institute 
some mechanisms of control over the local labour (especially Kacharis) who 
were prone to “deserting” and “striking”. 186   
 This extension was made on dubious grounds—as the Act was legislated to be 
applicable to specific towns (rather than entire districts) and for “skilled” 
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185 E. Money, The cultivation and manufacture of Tea (Calcutta, 1874) p.11. 
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workmen taking advances from the employer for the discharge of a specific 
task/job. Recognizing such obvious and grave legal “exceptions”, the Bengal 
government maintained that the decision (to extend it to Assam tea gardens) 
was “experimental” and “tentative” and its future position with respect to its 
applicability (for plantation labour) would be conditional on the actual working 
of the Act. Yet, this ambiguity, doubtful legality and even the framing of the 
“special” Assam contract (by the Acts of 1863 and 1865), did not override and 
make redundant the “general” Act XIII contract in practice. The colonial 
approval for Act XIII contract further illustrated the partial notion of 
“protection” as the rationale for contracts. While the Act XIII contract 
guaranteed a degree of “control”/hold over workers, it did not have any partial 
“protective” labour clauses, as in the Assam contract. 
  An early distinction between Act XIII contract and the Assam contract was in 
their application to local worker and imported workers respectively. This 
distinction was quickly erased in the case of “settlement” of time-expired 
workers in the 1870s. The Act of 1865 permitted the individuals who had 
served their original terms of contract to be “reindentured”/ “recontracted” 
under the Assam contract. It was argued that a continued necessity of 
governmental ‘protection’ and “supervision” for imported workers prolonging 
their stay on the plantations. This stated position underwent a shift with the 
legislation of Act of 1870, where it was reasoned that after a period of 
residence in the province and familiarity with the work on the plantations such 
“protection”, as provided by the Assam contract, was unnecessary. The 
relevant section in the Act observed: 
When a man had once emigrated to the tea districts, when he had gained experience of 
the country…he would be left to the protection of ordinary law.187 
 
 The changed stand on the status of time-expired labour provoked fresh 
concern and opposition from the planting community, as it threatened to 
stimulate a local labour market populated by an army of floating individuals 
“relieved” from their contracts.  This was akin to the “labour situation” of the 
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early 1860s, which had mobilised planter opinion in favour of imported labour 
from outside the province (coolie solution) to curb the bargaining instincts of 
the native Assamese and abort the possibilities of any market of labour. An 
antidote for the impending crisis was outlined by the Chief Commissioner of 
the province in a letter addressed to the planters and published in 30th June 
1874 issue of the daily Englishman: 
…You (Planters) may have difficulties to contend with in consequence of the time-
expired coolies from the protection of Emigration Act…Freer the labour is the greater 
the difficulty of adjusting his claim is. Free labour is causing the same complications 
in England as it must one day cause here…good hope that your industry may weather 
the storm…may remind you the expedient of making contracts under advances with 
your labourers, and thus bringing them within the scope of Act XIII.188 
 
 The public approval of a provincial head for a contract (Act XIII) with suspect 
applicability to the imported labour evoked “critical” noises from the Bengal 
administration and the Government of India. The Secretary of Revenue and 
Agriculture Department, in a letter, observed that the extension of Act XIII 
through an analogy of the “skilled” workman and plantation coolies was 
misplaced, as the “advances” paid to the former were the fruits of their labour 
while in case of the latter it was merely an inducement for re-engagement. 
Also, the underlying assumption of coolie-work on the plantations as “skilled” 
work was far from being a settled issue. More significantly, the idea of 
extension defeated the logic and purpose of relieving the time-expired 
labourers from the jurisdiction/protection of contract (Assam contract) in the 
first place. The Bengal Government, in pursuance of the changed position, 
instructed the protectors/inspectors in a resolution dated January 1874: ‘to 
make it clear to the labourers who are bound by the provisions of the law and 
ones who are free’.189  
 The Chief Commissioner of Assam warned against ‘seriously unsettling the 
fairly amicable relations between employer and employee’. Such anxieties 
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were apparently voiced in his personal correspondence with some planters who 
told him of ‘the danger planters would be in if the fact if the fact of their 
(labourers) emancipation be made known to them’. The Chief Commissioner 
argued for application of Act XIII the reasons for granting such an extension: 
Application of the Act (Act XIII) is desirable, mainly on the ground that it is best 
method of checking illegal practices and to provide an easy legal remedy…courts are 
not sufficiently strong in Assam to afford protection desirable to both planters and 
coolies…there must be an inequality owing to superior physical force and other 
qualities (of planter) (and) we shall have violence practiced unless we allow legal 
remedy for default.190 
 
  The Chief Commissioner’s stand on the Act XIII question ultimately 
favoured the strategies of “retarding” the possibility of any local labour market 
of time-expired coolies and “sustaining” the “exceptional” character of the 
Assam labour situation. This was another instance in which a contract was 
called upon to dynamically intervene and render deficient/insufficient the local 
labour market on which it was paradoxically justified. The organising logic of 
the Assam contract (exceptionalism, necessity of protection and insufficient 
state policing) again became the validating rationale for the Act XIII contract. 
Act XIII contract promised to restore the “hold” and “authority” of the 
managers which was apparently weakened by the non-applicability of Assam 
contract for the time-expired labourers. 
 Further, the Commissioner gave his approval to persist with the “ambiguity” 
regarding the legal status of the contracted labour. In practice, the planters 
would often ‘claim’ the rights of control and arrest (of the Assam contract) for 
the Act XIII contracted labourers, without being obliged to offer the benefits of 
Assam contract or being subjected to its mandatory regulations and 
supervisions. The ambiguity and the overlapping domain of contracts rather 
being incidental and exceptional was central to the practice of the indenture 
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system of the Assam tea gardens—as it manifested during the course of the 
nineteenth century.191 
2.6 Contractors, Sardars and the Assam Contract System 
 The effectiveness of the contract system to produce coolie in the plantations 
but also to reproduce itself to a large extent hinged on a fair presence of 
workers—which after the early 1860s was almost entirely procured from 
outside the province. The huge human “losses” on the plantations due to high 
rates of mortality and desertion, without any addition through natural means 
(negative growth rate of population), made it imperative that an unremitting 
flow of people was maintained. This was not only to satisfy the labour 
demands of an expanding industry but also to barely sustain the average of the 
existing working force. The indispensability of “private labour contractors” for 
such purposes, as we have already mentioned, remained pivotal during the 
decade and later.  During the mania years (early 1860s) the contractors were 
managing to fulfill an annual requirement in excess of 30,000 individuals, 
attaining a high of 45,000 in the year 1865. This was followed by a sharp 
decline reaching an annual average of only around 5,000 recruits in the years 
1869 and 1870.192 
The rationalisation in the industry, after a period of speculation and collapse, 
was a factor in the falling numbers. But such a sharp decline created unease 
within the planter circles regarding the immediate and future labour situation 
on the plantations. Such fears of “insufficiency” of labour were heightened by 
a parallel and rising trend of the costs at which they were being procured. 
Some rough estimates of the Calcutta contracting agencies indicates that the 
labour contracting rates had jumped from ten to twelve rupees at the beginning 
of the 1860s to a whopping sixty rupees during the middle years of the decade. 
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This briefly subsided and settled at around forty five to fifty rupees during the 
closing part of the decade.193  
 Assam planters read these tendencies as yet another instance of the “price” 
they had to pay for the “unnecessary” governmental intervention. They 
consistently targeted the sanitary and bureaucratic regulations/norms, initiated 
by the 1863 Act, for hiking the cost of the recruitment and transit and putting 
an additional and unsustainable “economic” burden on a nascent industry. The 
burgeoning economic burden/investment’ (as a consequence of the 
governmental measures) was a premise for its protection—most notoriously 
through the luxury of private arrest for the planters. Further, the searching 
enquiries by the local district magistrates to ascertain the credentials of the 
recruiters and the consent of the recruits were discredited as irritants and 
perceived as a strong deterrent for many who would have otherwise gone 
“willingly” to Assam.194   
The labour contractors on whom the planters almost exclusively relied for their 
supplies were curiously perceived as the unintended “beneficiaries” of the 
plantation’s desire for labour of an imported variety. The arkattis (native 
recruiters)—who actually conducted the recruitment operations for the 
contractors in the villages and towns of eastern India—epitomised the abuse 
and corruption which characterised the “contractor system” in the planter 
discourses. 
  While their unique and indispensible function in the system allowed the 
contractors to extract inflated rates, they were frequently blamed for shipping 
“bad batches” filled with weak, sickly and useless people and bad races unfit 
for Assam—causing the high mortality, reluctance to work and desertion on 
the plantations.195 Here it is useful to indicate a persuasive discourse being 
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mobilised and formalised on the Assam plantations of a racialised sociology of 
labour, which mapped the labour-value of individuals and their ability to 
survive and flourish in the Assam on their constructed “racial” profile. The 
Junglees/Dhangurs of Chotanagpur, at least from the late 1860s, firmly 
occupied the pinnacle of this racial hierarchy and were widely celebrated and 
sought after for their innate ability to work hard and naturally adapt to the 
Assam climate. The upcountry coolies from Bihar and North West Provinces 
languished at the bottom and were often condemned to be “racially” 
conditioned for death and desertion on the tea gardens. This racial discourse of 
Assam coolie-labour which has assumed the nature of being fixed and 
unchanging in the historical scholarship, in fact, did show some shifts 
according to time and space. 196 
  The “bad batch” and the “bad race” theory, often feeding into each other, 
became a patent excuse for the chronic “unhealthiness” and mortality on the 
                                                                                                                                
Superintendent of Emigration for an investigation and report on the ‘alleged importation into 
Assam of an inferior type of coolie’ in the late 1870s. The opinion of the governmental 
authorities and tea garden managers and companies were contained in a report. J.G. Grant, 
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Emigration, 24th March 1879. Transport of useless coolies to Assam, Revenue and Agriculture 
Department, Emigration Branch A, nos. 32-35, November 1880. NAI. 
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Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of 
Colonial India’ in G. Bhadra, G Prakash and S. Tharu (ed.) Subaltern Studies, Vol X (New 
Delhi, 1999) and P. Chatterjee, ‘Secure this excellent class of labour: Gender and Race in 
Labour Recruitment for British Indian Tea Plantations’ Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
27, no.3 (July-Sep 1995). 
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tea gardens and thereby gave some substance to the defaulting plantations to 
evade the sanitary norms and the consequent penalties. ‘Before mortality rates 
on a garden are made cause for its being closed as unfit for human habitation’ 
argued a planter in the early 1870s, ‘the rate of mortality among the class of 
persons among whom deaths occur should be ascertained (as it) may equally 
be a question of the unsuitableness of the class of labourers for tea-factory 
work, as of the unsuitableness of the garden as a place of human habitation’.197 
This further ‘necessitated’, according to many planters, the strict plantation 
disciplinary practices to make the habitual bolters and shirkers populating the 
“bad batches”/ “bad races” to settle and work.   
 An alternative and relatively informal mode of labour recruitment and transit 
was simultaneously being explored by some of the larger tea companies (like 
the Assam Company and Jorehaut Company) during the years of acute labour 
demand and high recruiting costs in the 1860s. They encouraged some of their 
older employees (designated as sardars) to go back to their villages to get 
willing family members and acquaintances to return with them to work on the 
tea garden. The sardari system—as it came to be known on the Assam 
plantations—assumed a reputation of being a qualitatively superior and 
“cheaper” method of labour engagement, bringing in families, kin members, 
acquaintances and friends, more keen to settle down and work.198    
 The inaugural legislation (1863 Act) regulating the subject of ‘labour 
transport’ to Assam did not approve of any other system of recruitment and 
transit, apart from the “registered’ contractors engaging people who were 
required to offer consent in the presence of the magistrate in their home 
district. Later they were taken through government approved routes/depots to 
Calcutta, where they would sign the contract and then be despatched to the 
assigned tea gardens. These “illegal” practices of informal/sardari recruitment 
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found unqualified backing in an official enquiry (1868) assessing the 
potentialities of the Assam tea industry in the wake of a crisis (tea mania) and 
suggesting a “profitable” course of action for the investors and tea planters. 
The report favoured a strategy of promoting sardars as a measure to end the 
reliance on the ‘evil’ contractors who extracted exorbitant prices and dished 
out unreliable supplies. The “family-kin” nature of the sardari system was 
particularly singled out for facilitating a strong enduring relation between the 
employers and employed. Keeping in mind its undeniable value, the committee 
recommended that sardars be allowed extraordinary freedom to take up to fifty 
people and also be given a choice on the mode and routes of transport they 
wished to take.  This they reasoned would also diminish the menace of cholera, 
rampant in the overcrowded Calcutta depots, where the contractor’s recruits 
were obliged to congregate.199  
 The sardar was finally given a legal standing in the 1870 Act, but the Act did 
not completely subscribe to the recommendations of the 1868 report, and 
produced a distinction on the basis of the number of individuals the sardars 
actually engaged. The guiding principle was supposedly to contain the threat of 
epidemics, which had become a disturbing feature of the larger batches of 
migrating groups. The sardar with less than twenty recruits (petty sardars) 
was merely required to register in the recruiting districts and follow their own 
routes, while the ones with more than twenty individuals (recruiter sardars) 
had to obey all the procedures and rules stipulated for licensed recruiters. 
 This legalisation of the sardari system by the 1870 Act should have ‘logically’ 
transformed the ways in which the labour was recruited and organized on the 
Assam tea gardens—being accepted across the board as a cheaper and 
qualitatively superior mode than the prevailing contractor system. Yet, the 
dependence of Assam planters on the contractor showed no signs of waning. 
WA Stoddard, the manager of Naphuk tea garden in Assam valley, testifying 
to an investigation of the industry in 1873 admitted that :‘( he) prefers the 
dearer but safer course of importing from one of the many depots in Calcutta, 
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and thereby ensure that the estimated season’s operations shall be 
completed’.200 The division manager of the Assam Company plantations 
responding to the same investigation further explained the reasons for the 
importance of contractors for the tea gardens under his supervision: 
There are some of our gardens on which the labour force cannot be maintained 
directly by sardari recruiting; some gardens with short labour force and a heavy 
wastage have to depend partly on contractor’s coolies.201 
 It is fairly evident that though the contractor’s reliability in terms quality of 
labour supplied was under the cloud, his dependability in terms of quantity 
supplied and his proficiency in ‘delivering to order’ could not be matched by 
the sardar.  
 This was vital to the work operation in place on the plantations of the period, 
which was still governed by a large presence of working hands for conducting 
the varied tasks in the agricultural fields. It did not take away from the fact that 
the ‘original’ knowledge of planting and plucking learnt by the “pioneers” 
from the Chinese were being reworked, and ‘new methods which would yield 
more tea and maintain the yield of the bushes better’ was constantly tried and 
implemented. 202 The growing use of machinery had arguably “reduced” the 
labour employed on the plantations, but for the work that entailed ‘keeping a 
large number of coolies, viz. hoeing and plucking, no attempt was made to 
substitute other than the work of men’s hands.203  
 Contrary to Bruce’s prophecy of the revolutionary impact of British 
technology and mechanization, the indispensability and “skills” of hand labour 
in the processes of manufacture was only partially displaced. The 1872 
investigation reported that on some larger estates, the rolling of tea leaves was 
effected by the means of machinery, but most of the gardens were unable to 
employ steam-power and leaves were still rolled by hand. A planter while 
endorsing the efficacy of machines, found many of them as purely 
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‘experimental’ and ‘full of faults’ and which had to be ‘re-modelled before 
they will work’.204 In a prize winning essay on the ‘Manufacture of Tea’ 
published in the early 1870s, the author noted that the rolling machine had not 
entirely ‘superseded the necessity of hand rolling’ because they were incapable 
of giving ‘the nice final twist’, which could only be obtained by hand. He 
found that many gardens in Cachar after a period of trial had dropped using 
such machines and gone back to hand-rolling.205A statistical account of the 
province noted that ‘tea houses’ concurrently and alternately used rolling by 
hand and machine, depending on the labour situation of the gardens.206  
 Such practices of work and labour implied that a shortage of labourers 
employed in the differentiated yet related activities in the field and factory 
could gravely and negatively alter the quality and quantity of the garden’s 
yield. The value of the contractor for “safely” achieving such work/production 
purposes can be further stressed by quantifying the ‘magnitude’ of the labour 
replenishments required in the tea gardens in the late 1870s. For instance, in 
the year 1876, Jorehaut Tea Company operating in Assam valley had around 
3,500 acres under tea and roughly 3,800 working adults. The company’s 
assessment of the labour requirements for the approaching season (after 
factoring its usual “losses”) was around 1,700 adults or more than forty percent 
of the existing workforce. The assessment did not radically change in the 
subsequent season (1877), when a demand of 1,500 adults was placed before 
the agents in Calcutta for delivery.207  Situating an analogous trend for the 
entire province in the year 1878, one finds that the new migrants arriving in the 
districts of Sylhet and Cachar in Surma valley constituted around nine percent 
of the existing working force. The corresponding figures for the districts of 
Sibsagar, Lakhimpur and Darrang in Assam valley were significantly higher at 
15 percent, 18 percent and 26 percent respectively. The numbers rose 
dramatically for the remaining districts of Assam valley (i.e. Kamrup and 
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Nowgong), where more than 40 percent of the workforce had arrived and 
commenced work in the very same year.208  
Year Average 
Labour 
Force 
Percentage of  
new 
immigrants  
1877 146,513 45.2 
1878 172,569 43.4 
1879 184,935 36.6 
1880 188,497 21.5 
 
Table 2.1: Proportion of new immigrants in the workforce. 209 
It was very evident that to consistently muster such large numbers, which 
gained a particular urgency in some planting districts (mostly in the Assam 
Valley) and on some tea gardens (prone to “wastage”), the sardar’s 
recruitment was not adequate or even at times available, and the ‘option’ of the 
contractor had to be kept and exercised.  The relevance of the contractor was 
even more marked, for certain regions and particular estates stigmatized as 
“unpoupular” due to poor conditions of life and work. In those circumstances, 
the necessity to bind workers and force work through the “protection” of 
contract (especially Assam contract) would have to be backed by recruits 
provided by contractors.210 
In the 1870s, due to new modes of recruiting and also on account of the 
opening of other routes/regions of recruitment, the slide of the late 1860s was 
considerably arrested. From an annual average of around 5,000 recruits in 
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1870, the numbers steadily rose to above 30,000 in the period after 1875, 
reaching a high of over 40,000 recruits in the year 1878.  
 
Graph 2.1: Labour Migration to Assam 1870-1881.211 
2.7 Discourse of reform and the new contract regime 
The 1870s was a period of sustained extension of the plantation cultivation and 
growth in the production of Assam tea. The rapid spurt in production did not 
automatically translate into an “independent” identity for Assam tea in its 
primary market (Britain), where it was still used to blend the Chinese supplies 
to give “body” and “flavour” to them. The inauguration and almost three 
decades of plantation production in the colony (Assam) had partially shifted 
the sites of cultivation of the plant and sources of its supply, but it could do 
little to redefine the notion and taste of the finished commodity—which still 
remained predominantly Chinese.  
Such “anomalies” were being felt and concerted attempts were underway 
especially from the early 1870s—by various “interested” individuals, groups 
and “defence associations” to establish the “mark” and “taste” of Assam/Indian 
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tea (in the British market) and thereby stimulate its distribution and sale to a 
completely new level.  
At the same time, the formation of trade associations (like the Calcutta 
Syndicate) was pushing the tea of Assam/Indian origin into the new markets of 
Australia and United States. For instance, due to the efforts of the Syndicate, 
the exports to Australia jumped almost three hundred percent in one year from 
around 870,000 pounds in 1881-82 to 2,710,000 pounds in 1882-83.212  
 These trends of consolidation of varied interests in the marketing and sale of 
the Assam/Indian tea found parallels in the “association” of the tea production 
interests. The most prominent example was the formation of the Indian Tea 
Districts Association in London in 1879 with the object of acting as a common 
forum for those directly or indirectly interested in the cultivation of tea in 
British India.213  
  A particular instance of such collaboration found expression in a 
memorandum drafted by a London group of businessmen and entrepreneurs 
interested in “Indian tea” in the year 1880. The memorandum, at very outset, 
underlined the necessity to buttress the presence of Indian tea in its existing 
market and coordinate attempts to break into newer terrains by expanding 
production, while at the same time, checking the “costs” at which Indian tea 
was being manufactured. The present and future nature of the tea market, it 
prophesised, necessitated that the finished commodity had to be decisively 
“cheap” to remain competitive with the other producing regions like Java and 
Ceylon, offering a similar product. Mechanisation, the memorandum further 
argued, as a potent solution to bring down costs had its “limitations” because 
of the peculiar nature of tea operation meant that ‘hand labour must always be 
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employed and it governs the cost of production’. Such an understanding 
pointed at the direction where the costs had to be controlled, as precisely 
mentioned in the text: 
On the maintenance therefore of an adequate supply of coolie labour, at a cost 
calculated to leave a fair margin of profit on the capital invested, hinges the entire 
question of the future of the tea enterprise. 
This notion of a labour/worker category as the key to the “future” of tea 
enterprise had a strange ring of familiarity to it. In the 1840s, the Tea 
Committee identified the skilled Chinese tea makers as that critical factor. The 
managers of the pioneer Assam Company in the 1850s reposed their faith on 
the Kacharis to assume the role of a stable resident working population. This 
view shifted by the late 1860s. The imported workers from outside the 
province (or the coolie solution) were widely believed to address the work 
concerns of a rapidly expanding industry. By the late 1870s, a cheap and 
unremitting supply of these coolies was seen as the fundamental issue. This 
opinion was reiterated by a Chief Commissioner of the province who believed 
that the Assam planters ‘to hold their own against the fierce competition of 
China and Ceylon must have coolies on reasonable terms’.214 In fact, the 
memorandum explicitly mentioned that the ‘excessive cost of recruitment’ and 
‘stringency of labour laws’ had made the Assam labour expensive. It called for 
‘withdrawing the present restrictions of trade’ and allowing a ‘greater freedom 
of contract’. 
 “Freedom” and “removal of restriction”, demanded in the memorandum, was 
a reiteration of the state discourse with respect to Assam migration—as 
articulated in the labour legislation of 1873. The Act had proposed certain 
provisions to facilitate what it characterised as “free emigration” and “free 
recruitment” in light of “improving” communication between the recruiting 
districts and Assam.215 This was also in tune with the idea of “progressive 
freedom” as the guiding purpose and intention of the contract. Free emigration 
was depicted as the “spontaneous” and “unsolicited” emigration of natives of 
                                                 
214 F.H. Skrine, Laborious Day; leaves from the Indian record of Sir Charles Alfred Elliott 
(Calcutta, 1892) p.73.    
215 The passing of the Act was synchronous with the establishment of a through line of road 
from the recruiting districts of Bihar and Sonthalia to Dhubri. Assam Labour Repot, 1881 p.1. 
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India to Assam. The latter term (free recruitment) was intended to apply to a 
system of “inducing” individuals to emigrate. They were to be furnishined with 
the “means” of doing so (by their potential employers) without the necessary 
supervision of the state machinery. But the Act did not permit the “freely 
recruited” individuals to be contracted under the terms of Assam contract. The 
anticipation here was to tap into the famine stricken regions by giving the 
distressed communities some “assistance” to reach the tea districts and work 
under the terms of the ordinary law or a civil contract. However, such 
attempts/schemes did not yield the desired results, as anticipated by the 
colonial state. While the “unsolicited” spontaneous migration was barely 
forthcoming, the inability of planters to “bind” the imported individuals under 
the terms of Assam contract after having ‘assisted’ and “financed” their 
inducement and transit was a serious deterrent towards “free recruitment”. The 
planters feared that the new labourers could be “enticed” away by the liberal 
offers from other employers, or they could plainly decline to be contracted 
(even under Act XIII) except on offer of a substantial bonus. 
 In light of these arguments and other suggestions made in the memorandum, 
the colonial state set up a committee to comprehensively assess the working of 
the Act of 1873.216 The investigating Commissioners in the report faulted the 
legislation for having failed to deliver on certain crucial counts. With respect to 
migration of workers, the Act was seen as not affording “sufficient” 
encouragement for free emigration and putting unnecessary restrictions on the 
desired sardari recruitment. While on the plantations, it was found wanting in 
the enforcement of contract and for offering insufficient “protection” to the 
employers for unlawful absence, idleness or desertion of contracted 
labourer.217 
 The substance of these criticisms alluded to a skewed view of “freedom” (like 
that of “protection”)—which should operate selectively and for the interests 
                                                 
216 The committee was appointed in October 1880 and it commenced its sitting in December 
1880 with A Mackenzie as its president. Assam Labour Report, 1880, p.1. 
217 Proceedings of the Commission appointed to amend the Labour District Emigration Act VII 
(B.C.) of 1873; The Report of the Commission on the Labour Districts Emigration Act. 
Legislative Department Proceedings, no.227, January 1882. NAI. 
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and objectives of plantation-capitalism. While the labour market was to be 
made more free/deregulated through the removal of restrictions on recruitment 
and in particular for the sardars; the plantation labour regime was desired to be 
further “intensified” by the strict enforcement of contracts and more 
comprehensive scope for penalisation. This ostensible contradiction of 
reconciling “freedom” with “unfreedom” became the premise and purpose of 
the new Act—Act I of 1882.218 The deliberations leading up to the legislation 
of the Act were also noteworthy for having received unprecedented attention 
from the native intelligentsia (especially Bengali), who were voicing their 
opinion in the legislature, political associations and the press about the nature 
and function of the British rule in India.219  
 A prominent focus of the committee framing the Act narrowed on the 
sardar—as the desirable agent of “freedom” in the system of recruitment for 
Assam tea gardens. There was some disquiet within the committee for what it 
characterised as a “suspicious” premise of the state and planters, which was 
perceived to have stigmatised and impeded the sardari system. The suspicion, 
it was contented, stemmed from the attitude of state—which obligated the 
sardars to obtain a certificate of recruitment with a validity of not more than 
six months, compelled them to have these certificates countersigned in the 
recruiting districts by the magistrate and further did not authorize them to carry 
more than twenty recruits without going through the “policed” channels of the 
contractor’s depot.220 
The relevant sections of the Act regulating the sardari system tried to resolve 
this dilemma. It extended the period of the sardari certificates to one year, 
                                                 
218 Proceedings of the Commission appointed to amend the Labour District Emigration Act VII 
(B.C.) of 1873; The Report of the Commission on the Labour Districts Emigration Act. 
Legislative Department Proceedings, no.227, January 1882. NAI. 
219 Lt Governor of Bengal during the discussion leading up to the legislation remarked that the 
‘subject (of Assam labour legislation) has been discussed in 1862, 1865, 1867, 1870, 1873, 
1878 without causing considerable opposition on the part of the native community’ and now he 
was ‘surprised by the active and tardy native opposition’. Extract from the Abstract of the 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor General of India, dated the 5th July 
1882 in Legislative Department Proceedings, no.307, January 1882. NAI. 
220 Proceedings of the Commission appointed to amend the Labour District Emigration Act VII 
(B.C.) of 1873. NAI. 
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terminated the compulsion of getting these certificates countersigned by the 
magistrate of the recruiting districts or bringing the sardari recruits to them for 
registration. The sardars were further given the “freedom” of registering the 
recruits at any ‘convenient’ place, provided they did that before they left the 
province of Bengal. The restriction on the number of recruits was also lifted—
with a general “advisory” that every gang of twenty should be guided by a 
‘responsible person’. But the authority to the issue the recruiting certificate 
remained with the planter and they were further entitled to prolong them 
(beyond one year) by merely intimating the protector/inspector. These 
certificates also listed instructions from the planters and a deviance on the part 
of the sardar could initiate severe prosecution and penalties. The practice of 
stationing a representative of planter/tea Company in the recruiting districts—
the so called Local agent—was legitimised by the Act, and they were assigned 
with powers to oversee the activities of the sardar during recruitment and 
given the authority to charge them for any misdemeanours.  These measures 
and especially the legalisation of the local agent had a significant bearing on 
how the “reformed” sardari system functioned and flourished.221 
Along with the ‘reformulation’ of the sardari mode of recruitment, the Act 
attempted to recast the Assam contract, further underlining the partial 
“freedom” and limited “protection” it claimed to champion. A long standing 
demand of Assam planters to have the period of contract extended from three 
to five years was now encoded in the new Act. A five year contract was 
admitted by the inaugural 1861 Act, which was later reduced to three years in 
the 1865 Act—considering the “unsettled” conditions of plantations. The 
subsequent Acts of 1870 and 1873 retained the three year ceiling for contracts. 
The proposed extension of the contract period drew its substance from a 
standard justification of the planters—that a period of three years was grossly 
inadequate to recoup the colossal sums “invested” in the recruitment, transit 
                                                 
221 An outright prohibition on the contractor system was however ruled out on apparently 
“humanitarian” considerations—that it would be a serious injury to the many individuals 
deriving their livelihood from it.  But the committee admitted to the pressure/reason for the 
toleration of this ‘evil’ on the grounds ‘(that) there are some gardens which are not yet in a 
position to employ sardari-recruiters and must for the present depend upon professional 
assistance’.The Report of the Commission on the Labour Districts Emigration Act. Legislative 
Department Proceedings, no.227, January 1882. 
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and settlement (medicine, housing, and infrastructure) of the workers. This was 
further seen as a logical extension for the Assam plantations, considering the 
contract for overseas plantations already extended up to five years.222  
 The hike in the contract period and the parallel drawn with the overseas 
plantation attracted the attention of some native organisations, especially the 
British Indian Association, who were voicing their reservations to the proposed 
changes being made to the Assam coolie-labour system.223 They cited to the 
different “principle” motivating the overseas contract, where the wage 
structure was gradually incremental, and the coolies received food rations 
along with their cash payments. The Assam contract in contrast had stagnant 
minimum wages till the third year, and only in the last couple of years did the 
wages increase slightly. Rations were rarely provided to the contracted workers 
in Assam, and the cost of the “benefit” of rice supplies was always deducted 
from their earnings. This alteration, as the association precisely identified, was 
designed to curb the bargaining capabilities of the labourers in negotiating 
higher wages after the expiry of their contract term (i.e. 3 years) and the cash 
advance (bonus) they received when they reengaged under the only applicable 
contract (Act XIII). This became even more evident when the sections 
extending the contract period made it abundantly clear that the labourers were 
no longer engaged for a particular tea garden but to an employer/company. 
This allowed the planters/companies to freely “relocate” their workforce to 
new, unhealthy gardens, which was not permissible under the terms of the 
earlier legislation. 
 The right to private arrest, as retained in the present Act, most starkly 
compromised the self-proclaimed objective of promoting “freedom.” The 
anomaly was lambasted by the British Indian Association when they equated 
the private arrest rights with the “fugitive slave law”. Responding to such 
                                                 
222 In the late 1870s, the Sanitary Commissioner of Assam trying to explain the differential 
rates of mortality between the colonial coolies and Assam coolies argued that the ‘shortness’ of 
contract gave little interest to the Assam planters. 
223 Memorial dated 3rd January 1882 from A.M. Bose, Secretary, Indian Association addressed 
to Governor General of India. Legislative Department Proceedings, no.308, January 1882; 
Letter dated 4th July 1882 from Kristo Das Pal, Secretary, British Indian Association to 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Legislative Department. Legislative 
Department Proceedings, no.306, January 1882. NAI. 
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grave charges, the tea association merely reminded them that ‘such a power 
has existed since 1865’.224 The colonial state firmly backed this retention and 
cited other “exceptional” circumstances where a similar “privilege” had been 
invoked.225 An influential section of the Assam administration was very much 
in favour of allowing a far greater scope than what was permissible in the 
existing private arrest rights, giving in to the pressures exerted by the planters, 
who were systematically assuming the magisterial prerogatives. For instance, 
the Chief Commissioner of the province wanted the obligation of the 
“arrested” coolies presented before the local magistrate to be abrogated, while 
the Deputy Commissioner of Darrang in Assam Valley expressed a view that 
the managers should be given an absolute right to arrest irrespective of the 
prevailing circumstances.   
 The sections of the Act regulating the private arrest rights underwrote the 
compromise between the various positions and pressures. The Assam 
managers retained the right to arrest when their plantations were situated at a 
distance of more than ten kilometres from the nearest police station. But the 
subsequent formality of reporting the cases of “private” detentions to the police 
did not automatically lead to a magisterial enquiry. The magistrates were now 
instructed to act only if they deemed it to be absolutely “necessary”.226 
This control on labour was further achieved through a “realignment” of the 
domains and nature of the contract(s)—by which different categories of 
plantation labourer (local, imported, time-expired) was settled on the Assam 
tea gardens. The Act XIII contract—which from the early 1860s had offered a 
degree of “control” to the planters engaging local labourer and also helped 
                                                 
224 Letter dated 4th July 1882 from Kristo Das Pal, Secretary, British Indian Association to 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Legislative Department. Legislative 
Department Proceedings, no.306, January 1882. NAI. 
225 It was suggested that since the year 1854, British ship captains were empowered to ‘arrest’ 
the deserting seamen and other apprentices without a warrant. Section 66 of Burma Labour 
Law Act III of 1876 also allowed ‘private arrest’ under certain conditions. Legislative 
Department. Legislative Department Proceedings, no.227, January 1882. NAI. 
226 Also the penalty imposed on managers for ‘illegal arrests’ of coolies was substantially 
downscaled from Rs five hundred to only Rs fifty, when the existing law of the land imposed a 
seven rigorous imprisonment for a comparable offence committed by the other ‘ordinary’ 
subjects. Legislative Department Proceedings, January 1882. NAI 
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mitigate the planter’s paranoia of the time-expired labourer slipping outside the 
ambit of the contract (Assam contract), came to be variously perceived in this 
changed context as ineffective, insufficient and even inapplicable. The 
enhanced stature of time-expired labourers was often cited by the planters as a 
case in point—where they were depicted as becoming ‘the master of the 
situation’ and capable of ‘dictating’ terms of their re-employment (wages and 
bonus), when contracted under the Act XIII.227 The legal limitations on the 
applicability of Act XIII for plantation labourers—which never deterred the 
planters to prolifically use it in the first place—now became an excuse for a 
concerted demand of “protection” beyond it. Also the critical question of the 
necessity of some hold over the “freely recruited” individuals—which was 
seen as the principle shortcoming of the 1873 Act—was still unresolved. 
 The proposed ‘remedy’ of permitting the execution of Assam contracts in the 
labour districts of the province, was encoded in the sections 111 and 112 of the 
1882 Act. Under Section 111, the Assam contract could be enforced on the 
plantations itself, and subsequently forwarded to the Inspector for verification 
and registration. Section 112, on the other hand merely required the employer 
or his appointed representative to appear with the contracting labourer before 
the local Inspector or Magistrate for the formalisation of the contract.228  
The redefined procedure of the Assam contract—which paved the way for the 
“freely recruited” labourer to be brought within its scope—had serious 
ramifications on the legal control over the local labour market (comprising of 
the time expired coolies and Kacharis). The workers in the province could now 
be legitimately put under the terms of Assam contract and therefore become 
                                                 
227 A planter argued that it seems unfair that a man who has been put to no expense in bringing 
up the labour should be able, by the promise of an additional rupee a month to their pay, to 
“entice” away his neighbor several time-expired coolies. G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in 
Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.158. 
228 Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India, Revenue and Agriculture 
Department, nos.16-18E, dated 27th January 1882. Legislative Department Proceedings, 
no.312, January 1882. NAI. 
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subject to a longer period of engagement (of up to five years) with similar 
penal penalties (like the private arrest) as the newly imported workers.229 
2.8. Practice of Free System 
The “free system” in the Assam plantations, which the 1882 Act claimed to 
further and facilitate, had fundamental inbuilt biases. At one level, the labour 
market and plantation labour regime was sought to be ‘freed’ from the 
prevailing edifice of rules and regulations. This was done at the behest of tea 
interests, who were clamouring for unprecedented ‘reforms’ and ‘deregulation’ 
of the system, which they believed was imperative to fully realise the curbed 
potential of the Assam tea industry.  This they argued would stimulate a period 
of unprecedented productivity and profitability in the enterprise and address 
the local challenges and the global competition which the industry had to 
contend with in the late nineteenth century.  
At another level, the freedom of the plantation labourers—who were bound by 
a more coercive, intrusive and partial contract—was gravely compromised. A 
degree of labour protection and a notion of labour entitlement—which the 
                                                 
229 There were other moves to overhaul the obligation and oversight on the management with 
respect to the conduct of work and life on the plantations. Sections 112-116, took a decisive 
step in this direction by relieving the employers of the necessity to submit the task schedules. 
The brief of the labour inspectors regarding this issue was now restricted to an order of 
reduction of tasks as and when they found them to be “unreasonable”. This move was part of a 
long drawn process of restructuring of work and wage assessment practices on the Assam 
plantations, where the time rate of payment was initially made redundant under systematic 
duress from planters, in favour of a more ambiguous task rate assessment. Now, the fixation of 
tasks itself was rendered arbitrary and largely unregulated. Again the supply of rice to the 
contracted labourers at a fixed price was a critical item in the ‘non-wage benefits’ established 
through the protracted negotiations of Kachari labour with the Assam Company management 
and later incorporated within the “protective” clauses of the Assam contract. Under the terms 
of the reworked contract, this benefit was no longer mandatory. The alteration was reasoned on 
the grounds that in anticipation of a larger proportion of “flour eating” labourers from Bihar 
and North Western Provinces migrating to Assam in the coming years, such an obsession with 
rice supplies was anachronistic and unnecessary. Even the regulation instituted in the 
“unsettled” years of the 1860s—to penalise the gardens/settlements with chronically high 
mortality, by barring them from participating in any further labour recruitment or even 
complete closure—was being refashioned to create a window of opportunity for the defaulting 
plantations to persist under these life threatening circumstances. Sections of the Act, reiterating 
certain conclusions reached by recent debate and legislation on the issue, made the provision of 
certifying the running of ‘sick’ plantations, when the death rates of only a particular class or 
race breached the ‘acceptable’ limits. The restriction in such cases merely extended to the 
recruitment and settlement of the race/class of labourers in question. Extract from the 
Proceedings of the Government of India, Revenue and Agriculture Department, nos.16-18E, 
dated 27th January 1882. Legislative Department Proceedings, no.312, January 1882. NAI. 
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earlier legislations had constructed—were reversed in favour of a far greater 
latitude to the management to discipline labour, intensify work and  execute 
other ‘cost cutting’ measures. The arrogation of unilateral and unchecked 
authority by the plantation managers, which had become very evident from the 
beginning of the contract period, was thereby given more credence and 
legitimacy. The implementation of the 1882 Act—which came to force on 6th 
January 1882—most starkly revealed these latent tendencies, conditioning the 
strategies and practices through which tea and coolies were produced on the 
Assam plantations.  
 From the early years of the operation of the Act, there appeared a very 
discernable trend—especially in the tea districts of Assam valley—of putting 
the locals and time-expired labourers under Assam contract. At the same time, 
a vast majority of the newly recruited individuals from outside the province 
were brought by arkattis and sardars as ‘free emigrants’, and then put on a 
longer Assam contract in Dhubri in Goalpara district—the main point of 
debarkation for gardens of Assam valley—which interestingly was elevated to 
the status of a labour district, without actually indulging in any planting 
operations.230 The aspirations of tea planters to include a greater proportion of 
labourers (local, time-expired, imported) within the domain of the Assam 
contract, but stay clear of the corresponding rules and regulations, were 
thereby simultaneously served.231  The provincial labour report for the year 
1883 admitted to these specific fallouts of the Act: 
 
… Alteration which the new act has brought in its train was hardly foreseen by its 
framers, and has been effected almost by accident. The law intended that recruitment 
by contractors and garden-sardars should be under careful restrictions, but that free 
emigration should be encouraged. The outcome has been that both contractors and 
sardars have evaded the provisions of the law, and have to a large extent brought in 
                                                 
230 There was a distinct trend of contracts being enforced for a longer period in Dhubri than on 
the plantations. For instance in the year 1887, more than 96 percent of contracts executed in 
Dhubri was for 5 years, while in the other labour districts it was merely 2.8 percent.  Again in 
the year 1888, 98 percent of contracts in Dhubri were for 5 years. The report for the relevant 
year making a distinction between the two plantation valleys, mentioned that in Assam valley 
around 36 percent and in Surma valley not more than 2 percent of new contracts were for a 
period 5 years. Assam Labour Report, 1887 p.18; Assam Labour Report, 1888 p.23. 
231 In the year 1883, the  of Assam narrated the case of seventeen workers who complained of 
having been forced to sign a five year contract on the garden, when they had originally taken a 
three year contract. Assam Labour Report, 1883 p.23. 
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their recruits as free emigrants. Not a single contractor's coolie was brought under 
contract into the Assam valley in 1883.232 
The contention of the report with respect to these features manifesting 
inadvertently and not by design, is hardly sustained by other circumstantial 
evidence. Apart from bringing in a far greater number of plantation 
labourers—belonging to different categories and contexts—within the contract 
framework, the ‘deregulation’ in the labour market quickly multiplied the 
number of migrants going to Assam.  
 
Graph 2.2: Comparison on area under plantation, labour force and emigration on Assam tea 
gardens: 1880-1900.233 
The spurt in labour recruitment—which largely sustained throughout the late 
nineteenth century— was not an obvious outcome of the “simplification” of 
the bureaucratic procedures, opening up of “virgin” territories for recruiting 
and inclusion of other newer groups of recruiters and recruited within the 
process. In fact, this period was witness to a greater encouragement and even a 
sort of institutionalisation of practices like deception, abduction and 
                                                 
232 By the year 1886, free emigration was both actually and relatively more active than in any 
previous year. The emigration under the other systems having fallen to the lowest numbers 
recorded for the five years. Assam Labour Report, 1883 p.1; C.E. Buckland, Bengal under the 
lieutenant-governors; Being a narrative of the principal events and public measures during 
their periods of office, from 1854 to 1898 (Calcutta, 1901 ) p.765. 
233 M.A.B. Siddique, Evolution of Land grants and Labour Policy of Government (New Delhi, 
1990) p.143. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
18
80
18
81
18
82
18
83
18
84
18
85
18
86
18
87
18
88
18
89
18
90
18
91
18
92
18
93
18
94
18
95
18
96
18
97
18
98
18
99
19
00
Area under plantation Annual emigration
Adult labour force on plantation
100  
kidnapping in the labour market. These practices—generously contributing to 
the inflating number of migrants—became extremely feasible due to the same 
relaxation of the regulations and dilution of supervision. Planters and their 
agents in the labour market had ample scope and freedom to rampantly and 
systematically incorporate them in their standard recruiting strategies. The lack 
of governing ‘norms’ and concern for larger profits, further encouraged the 
labour intermediaries to pay little regard to the sanitary principles during the 
transportation of people to Assam. The rising rates of mortality during labour 
transit attested to this developing phenomenon.  
It was thought that the time had arrived when emigrants might be expected to come 
to Assam in large numbers without much assistance, or at all events without the 
stimulus and aid of the elaborate organization then provided by the professional 
supplier of labour, and that the system of contractors, arkattis, and so forth, would in 
time die a natural death; but, instead of this, the great and ever increasing mass of 
the labour supply business has remained in the hands of the professionals, with this 
difference, that, whereas formerly these persons worked under strict regulation and 
control, they now under the "free emigration" system work free from all control.234 
 The escalation of cases of deception by the recruiter, widespread abduction 
and massive labour deaths were strikingly reminiscent to the ‘pre-regulation’ 
period of the early 1860s—which became the ‘original’ context and premise 
for the colonial state to intervene and establish some rules and standards. The 
latest phase of “deregulation” and its ramifications generated deep concerns in 
the migrating regions and contributed to the “unpopular” perceptions of 
Assam—a phenomena which we will engage with in another chapter. At the 
same time, the “native” press (especially in the province of Bengal) got 
particularly interested in the ‘question’ of Assam coolie labour. One of the 
central themes of this engagement was the many cases of recruiting abuses in 
the Bengal districts—especially with respect to the abduction of single woman 
to Assam—which appeared with recurring frequency in the newspaper 
columns.235 
 
 
                                                 
234 Assam Labour Report, 1887, p.2. 
235 S. Sen, ‘Commercial recruiting and Informal intermediation: Debate over the Sardari 
system in Assam tea plantations, 1860-1900’, Modern Asian Studies 44, no.1 (2010) 
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2.9. Free System in Surma Valley 
 The provincial administration faced with dissenting and critical voices from 
within its ranks and the broader colonial society, continued to refute them in 
the annual labour reports—as being  isolated, inconsequential exceptions and 
emphasized the larger ‘good’ and long term ‘benefits’ the ‘free system’ had 
brought in its wake.236 The Secretary of State for India concurred with this 
position in an official correspondence in August 1886 agreed that ‘the most 
important change which the present Act (1882) effected was the 
encouragement of assisted (sometimes called free) emigration by relieving if 
from the legal trammels until the coolies reach the labour districts’. This 
position was reiterated during the course of some official and legal debates 
initiated to discuss the workings of the 1882 Act, which had gathered some 
momentum in the late 1880s.  The member in charge of a Bill introduced to 
amend the 1882 Act, which was later passed into law as Act VII of 1893 
concluded: 
The result of this protracted investigation has been not only to show that the 
continuance of the labour system established in 1882 is essential for the well-being of 
the industry, which has done so much towards colonising and opening out the rising 
province of Assam… It has been expressed again and again by successive Chief 
Commissioners and other impartial observers, that the condition of labourers on tea-
gardens is far superior to that of the masses in the districts from which they 
emigrate…The continuance of the system established in 1882 is still required as a 
means towards drawing-off the surplus population of the recruiting areas and opening-
out the sparsely peopled districts of Assam.237 
A special report on the working of the 1882 Act—published in the year 1890—
was the most comprehensive statement made in favour of the free system.  
Drawing a distinction between the labour systems of the two ‘planting’ valleys 
of the province, the report made a case for the relative “freedom” of plantation 
                                                 
236 The Local administration under pressure of this criticism made some feeble attempts to 
comprehend the problem and its magnitude, but rarely took the corresponding measures. For 
instance in the year 1888, the Chief Commissioner of the province issued two circulars 
instructing the district heads to make enquiries into the complaints of fraudulent recruiting and 
also to submit the result of these investigations every two months. Assam Labour Report, 1888 
p.11. 
237 C.E. Buckland, Bengal under the lieutenant-governors; Being a narrative of the principal 
events and public measures during their periods of office, from 1854 to 1898 (Calcutta, 1901) 
p.948 
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labourers in the Surma Valley.238 It was suggested that the workforce in this 
valley was mostly recruited through the informal ties and familial networks of 
the sardars working outside the Act, and later settled without any contract or 
under the “less harsh” Act XIII contract on the plantations.239  
  This was a shift on the position on Act XIII—which as we have argued was 
seen as ineffective and even inapplicable on the Assam plantations in the late 
1870s. This seemed to have encouraged the Chief Commissioner of the 
province Charles Elliot to make a proposal to withdraw it completely from the 
province, which formed the subject of Government of India despatch, dated 
17th July 1886, to the Secretary of State of India: 
…provisions (in Act XIII) were not less severe than those which attach to a contract 
under Act I, while they fall very much short of that act in the safeguards which they 
furnish for the due understanding and execution of his engagement by the labourer, 
and in their omission to require from the employer any compensatory advantages in 
the provision of cheap and suitable food, good lodging, maintenance when sick and 
reasonable wages, such as secured to the labourer by the Labour Emigration Act.240 
 The Secretary of State concurred with the Home Government about the 
doubtful legality of the application of Act XIII to tea coolies and welcomed the 
proposal of the Home government to consult the Chief Commissioner of 
province in taking steps for its repeal.241 But in an surprising volte-face, the 
Home government, in a despatch dated 5th October 1891 to the Secretary of 
State, came round to the view that though being objectionable only in 
principle, the Act  XIII contract had been “harmless and even beneficial” in its 
actual operation. A case was made of it being employed, not as an instrument 
for exacting unreasonable contracts, but as a “more lenient and popular penal 
contract law, from the labourer’s point of view, than the Act I of 1882.” It was 
seen as serving the long avowed objective of the government of being a 
                                                 
238 The report argued that the two valleys (Assam and Surma) ‘present important differences of 
procedure both as regards the mode of recruitment followed and the form and period of 
contract. Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the 
years 1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.8. 
239 For instance in the year 1887, there was not even a single Assam contract signed locally in 
Sylhet for a period more than 3 years. The corresponding figure for Cachar was only 79. 
Assam Labour Report, 1887 p.17. 
240 Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee (Calcutta, 1906). 
241 In a letter dated 4th November 1886 from the Secretary of State for India to Government of 
India., Working of Inland Emigration Act, 1882. 
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“transitional stage between strict penal contracts and a system of civil contract 
under the ordinary law”, for the Assam plantations.242 
 What provoked the colonial state take such a favourable opinion now; when 
only a few years back it was most determined to do away with what it 
described as a “harsher contract than Assam contract.”? Apparently this 
striking shift in the official rhetoric was conditioned to a large extent by the 
local enquiries of the successive Chief Commissioners of the province, who 
were quite appreciative of its “positive” value, favouring its retention.  
 One of Chief Commissioners, W.E. Ward, had gone to the extent of describing 
the coolie under Act (Assam Contract) as practically a “slave”, who had no 
choice but to serve out his/her terms of contract regardless of the conditions of 
the garden or the treatment meted out to him/her by the planter. Act XIII 
coolie, in contrast, was seen to have this ‘freedom’ of leaving the gardens if 
treated badly by the planters. The planters were said have no “satisfaction” in 
putting them behind bars for three months (the punishment for breach of 
contract), after which the coolie could legally refuse to return to the garden.243  
 Again, Chief Commissioner Quinton in a special report for the working of Act 
I in the years 1886-89 drawing a long list of the “benefits”, argued that there 
were less deaths, less desertions, less judicial punishment among Act XIII 
coolie, and also the wages earned were higher than their Act I counterparts. He 
was quite unequivocal in his statement that: 
It [Act XIII] places the coolie in a position of considerably greater independence and 
enables him to exact his own terms more easily than his fellow labourer bound by 
contract under Act I of 1882.244 
 Now, why would officials as highly ranked as the Chief Commissioners 
describe a contract without protective clauses as stimulating a freer, well-paid 
workforce; while the specially carved out “official” Assam contract, with all 
the elaborate provisions backed by an efficient official machinery, as to 
perpetuating slavery! 
                                                 
242 Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee (Calcutta, 1906).  
243 Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration A, 1-5/26/459, 1888, NAI. 
244 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.156. 
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 The discourse of “freedom” did not acknowledge the different contracting 
strategies particularly observed the significant value of Act XIII had for the 
Surma valley plantations; holding out to the planter come security ‘above the 
ordinary law’ for the expenses incurred. The district level officials of the valley 
had always expressed this opinion in their annual labour reports, that the Act 
was very “popular” among planters and any moves to take them away would 
meet with the sharpest opposition. Such concerns were confirmed when the 
resolutions passed in a public meeting of Cachar tea planters, held in Silchar in 
May 1887, and most emphatically protested against the anticipated repeal of 
Act XIII.245 The obvious paradox of the entire state of affairs was that, here, 
the planters were craving for the retention of an ambiguous contract, which 
neither gave the employer the “legal” right to private arrest nor the luxury of a 
long-term contract. Much of the official explanation, for this “decision” on the 
part of managers and planters was their realisation of complications and 
expenses arising out of Assam contract recruiting. It was said to cost more 
because of the delays and formalities required. Also the obligation to attend 
certain fixed places were said to offer the coolies the opportunity to be 
“enticed” away by contractors or other recruiters.246  These explanations sound 
inadequate, and would be equally applicable to the other valley of Assam, 
where the recruitment under the Assam contract during the 1886-88, period 
was as high as 88 percent.247 
 This brings into clear relief, the specific geographical and social terrain of the 
Surma valley, which attracted certain “natural” streams of labour that the 
valley of Assam was perpetually deprived of. The superior accessibility and 
networks of communication of the valley opened spaces for “informal” modes 
of labour recruitment. Also a fair amount of agriculture and human 
concentration in the valley meant that there were other inducements for the 
migrant in taking a decision to move into these regions.  Managers of the 
                                                 
245 Indian Tea Association Report, 1888 pp.64-70. 
246 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.13. 
247 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.21. 
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valley, especially in the Sylhet district, had over a period of time found a fair 
degree of success in procuring coolie by sending a number of sardars every 
year to their native districts. The sardars who received certain advances; 
recruited through their social and familial networks and arranging for their 
conveyance to the gardens without any governmental interference and outside 
the provisions of the Act. These coolies were then settled by Act XIII in the 
gardens, receiving the “bonus” amount on signing the contract. The Deputy 
Commissioner of Sylhet and the Sub-divisional officer of South Sylhet even 
talked of cases where coolie in the Chargola valley region of Sylhet, recruited 
through sardars refunding the cost of their importation out of their wages or 
otherwise, and staying purely on a non-contractual basis.248  
 The coolie in a relatively advantageous circumstance could not have been 
forced into entering a more stringent contract. The attempts were met with a 
‘resistance’ wherein there was a perceptible rise in the number of desertions; 
overall some 10 percent of workers absconded and in the district of Sylhet, 15 
percent of Act labour escaped during the 1882-1885 period.249 Describing the 
increase in desertion of coolie a contemporary official of the district remarked, 
‘that it is not at all a matter of regret’. It shows that ‘tea garden coolie have 
learnt to sell their labour power in the most profitable market, and are not mere 
adscripti glebae of the garden for which they were imported’.250 This bears out 
the “bargaining” capabilities of the labouring population in a region that was 
geographically well connected and where migration was through the garden 
sardars operating outside the legal institutional framework, mobilising ties of 
family and local society and networks of kinship. Also, in the ability of the 
coolie to “desert” it is important to appreciate differences in terrain of the two 
valleys. In the jungle tracts of the Assam valley with the large isolated gardens, 
                                                 
248 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) pp.12, 102-03. 
249 R. Behal and P.P. Mohapatra: ‘Tea and Money versus Human Life: The Rise and Fall of the 
Indenture System in the Assam Tea Plantations, 1840-1908 in Plantations, Proletarians and 
Peasants in Colonial Asia, Special edition, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, no. 3&4 (1992) p. 
163. 
250 The Subdivisional officer of Karimganj subdivision cited in the Assam Labour Report, 
1883. 
106  
the coolie was more likely to be “hunted” down, than in the comparatively 
crowded district of Sylhet and Cachar. The Deputy Commissioners of Sylhet 
and Cachar considered that there was very little difficulty in a coolie getting 
away if he wanted to.251 The arkatti batches of Assam valley were not 
necessarily from the same social/familial background being a haphazard and 
random assortment of individuals. Here the Assam contract with its powers of 
private arrest was viewed as extremely necessary tool to deter them to desert 
and bind them to the plantations, even if that meant a higher price.252  
 While making these valid observations regarding the different strategies 
employed in the mobilisation and organisation of labour in Surma valley, the 
report chose not to explicitly admit that these features preceded the 
inauguration of the “free system”. Also there was hardly any elaboration as to 
how such “informal” practices were furthered or facilitated by the recent 
legislation. The case of Balisera gardens, at the heart of these processes, most 
strongly contradicted this freedom promotion outcome of the 1882 Act, as 
implied by the report. 253 
 Balisera was a group of around fourteen gardens formed by a joint-stock 
company in the southern part of the Sylhet district (Surma valley)—where 
extension of tea cultivation had commenced with great fervour from the early 
1880s. Like the several other new ventures in the province, these gardens could 
hardly boast of a stable and sustainable infrastructure to house and feed the 
growing resident population. Also the nature of work—involving the strenuous 
task of cutting through the thick forested tracts to make way for functioning 
plantations—put enormous strain on the workers. It was hardly unanticipated 
that the incidence of sickness and mortality was unnaturally’ higher in these 
gardens. This also explained the general proclivity of the stationed workers to 
leave these “unhealthy” sites. To counteract these “deserting” tendencies, the 
                                                 
251 Assam Labour Report, 1886. 
252 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.109. 
253 About 1,900 coolie under the Act were imported in the district of Sylhet in 1885. Out of 
these 1,150 went to the subdivision of South Sylhet, where the South Sylhet Tea Company was 
opening out their new gardens. Assam Labour Report, 1886. 
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concerned company rather than investing in the development and improvement 
of the life supporting facilities, chose to go on a recruitment overdrive and 
brought far more workers within the framework of the Assam contract.  
 From the middle of 1880s, Balisera Company revised its policy of an 
exclusive reliance on garden sardars for labour supplies—which was proving 
to be grossly inadequate in this “udemanding” state of affairs. Professional 
labour contractors were now placed with “order” to provide the deficient 
numbers. The “free recruits” provided by the contractors were almost 
invariably put under Assam contracts, after their arrival on the tea gardens. 
This was made feasible by the modified procedures certified by the 1882 
Act—ensuring a comprehensive hold of managers over their mobility and 
labour. Out of the total number of 2,600 Assam contracts accomplished in the 
district of Sylhet in the year 1885, around 2,200 were accounted just from the 
Balisera gardens. More than 90 percent of these agreements were concerning 
the labourers obtained in the same year.254   
  The calculated application of Assam contract by planters—to ‘settle’  
newcomers, limit other threats of  ‘losses’ of labour due to the circumstances 
arising from within or outside the plantations, and enforce the desired working  
patterns—were  not the features of some “isolated” cases. In fact, they hinted 
at the contracting practices gaining ‘popularity’ in the plantations of both 
valleys—to attain the renewed drive for cultivation, production and the related 
intensification of labour—which were catalyzed by the provisions of the 1882 
Act.  
 The “simplification” in the execution of the Assam contract implied a shift in 
the balance of contracts (Assam contract and Act XIII contract). The managers 
could now legitimately put any of the different categories of plantation 
labourer (local, time-expired or imported) under Assam contract, or generally 
                                                 
254 Again when the construction work of Assam Bengal Railway was extended to Chittagong 
in the late 1880s, the tea planters of the contiguous district (Sylhet) exhibited a much greater 
intent in checking the mobility of labourers to the potentially more remunerative public work 
employment. In the year 1889, the number of the locally executed Assam contracts in Sylhet 
district rose dramatically, touching the figure of 4,200—a large proportion (around 4,100) of 
which were again the new migrants. Assam Labour Report, 1889 p.13 and Assam Labour 
Report, 1890 p.16. 
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augment the proportion of such contracts, as and when they felt it to be 
necessary. This turned out to be particularly useful for plantations which were 
removed from the networks of communication and market (especially found in 
Assam valley), or chronically suffered from disease and deaths—to nullify the 
general ‘unsettlement’ found among the workers there.255 This made a 
missionary remark that whether ‘Act I (Assam contract) ever intended to tie 
men down to such conditions of life or death’.256 The managers tremendously 
valued the efficacy of Assam contract in “settling” the new and refractory 
labourers in the routines and discipline of plantation life and work. 
 The contracting strategies were again contingent upon the manner and 
conditions under which labour could be mobilised and supplied. In the case of 
Balisera gardens, the strategy of the management to counteract the worker 
disinclination and desertion was by supplementing their labour pool through 
recruitment, and bringing these new recruits under the hold of the Assam 
contract. The accomplishment of such a strategy rested heavily upon the 
services of the labour contractors—who were able to provide the large 
numbers, in addition to the smaller contributions made by the garden sardars. 
The contractors predominantly brought their recruits into the province as ‘free 
emigrants’, who were later put on contracts in Dhubri or the respective tea 
gardens. This further underlined the limitations of the colonial state’s 
contention—that contractors would become obsolete with the advent of the 
“free system” and the “empowerment” of sardars. Contractors remained 
pivotal to the continuation and perpetuation of the contract(s) regime in 
Assam. 
2.10. Conclusions 
The Assam planters often explained their relationship with the 
contractor/contractor system as “reluctant”—which was “forced” on them 
because of the “exceptional” nature of tea operations in the province and the 
                                                 
255 Barker noted that the contractor (curiously designated as Government agent) was resorted 
when there was an immediate requirements to fill up vacant places of men whose agreements 
had expired and when there was a situation of opening out a new garden. G. Barker, A Tea 
Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.150 
256 C. Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies in Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.59 
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pressing necessity of labour. They never missed an occasion to condemn the 
“excesses” of the arkattis and welcomed measures to permit the “honest” 
sardars to flourish.  The free system apparently stemmed from such intentions. 
However, the complicity of the planters and tea industry in the expansion and 
penetration of the contractor system went beyond a simple relationship of 
necessity. The tea interests emulated, encouraged and participated in the 
system and its devious practices.    
Firstly, they took measures to reinvent the sardar and local agents in light of 
the highly prolific roles of contractor and arkattis respectively.  Secondly, they 
showed a stronger to push recruiting at any cost, which was made feasible by 
the ‘free system’.  There were cases of Calcutta tea firms broadcasting free-
recruiter licenses by the hundreds in districts of Eastern India. This authorized 
anyone and everyone—without verifying or even knowing their credentials—
to obtain ‘free recruits’ for these firms.257 
 Thirdly, they showed little hesitation in entering the networks of contractor 
system, without any intention to arrest or transform its abusive nature, but with 
an interest to make it more suitable for the industry.258 The assumption of the 
“contracting” roles by the Local agent was a step in that direction. The case of 
Babu R.D. Mukherji is very instructive in this regard. Mukherji was a garden 
doctor in service of Scottish Assam Tea Company for more than two decades. 
Apart from his routine medical obligations, Mukherji was also delegated the 
task of “contracting” labour for his employees during the recruiting season. 
Like any other contractor in Midnapur (from where he operated)—Mukherji 
opened lines of communication and exchange with arkattis and other market 
intermediaries. The company expressed satisfaction because they got their 
                                                 
257 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906). 
258 A particular instance was the formation of Tea Districts Labour Association in 1892 with 
the ‘object of taking over the various recruiting agencies and depots which had been set up and 
maintained previously by each Agency House or company. The association contolled both the 
operations of garden sardars and arkattis.’ Tucker hinted at the ‘firms in Calcutta’ who are 
agents of gardens in Cachar and purchase coolies in Calcutta cannot be ignorant of the fact that 
these coolies were intended for Dooars. H.A. Antrobus, A History of Assam Company 
(London, 1957) p.182; Government of India Despatch, dated the 22nd day of June 1889, with 
its enclosures, including Reports by Mr. Tucker; and of Memorial of the Indian Association of 
Calcutta, dated the 12th day of April 1888 (London, 1889). 
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supplies with lesser intermediation (so cheaper) and also the processes of 
verification and dispatch were discharged by their own employee (Mukherjee). 
 A similar strategy again came to the “official notice” during the course of a 
“surprise visit” of a professional contractor’s depot (named Hussain Khan) 
situated in Bilaspur (Central Provinces) by the local commissioner. The official 
found the existence of a well worked out arrangement operated by an assistant 
tea manager (acting like a Local agent) stationed in the depot, overseeing the 
regular delivery of recruits through the agency of his ‘sardars’ to the gardens of 
his employing company (Jardine, Skinner and Co).  These “batches” were not 
the ‘friends and family’ of the sardars, but acquired through the ‘sources’ of 
Hussain Khan. The telegrams recovered during course of the inspection were 
very revealing: ‘Pay contactors for free coolies, if more sardars required wire’ 
and ‘Return to the garden as soon as possible, tells Hussain Khan to arrange 
eighty good coolies’.259 
 In this context it is productive to revisit the incidence of “rising costs” of 
recruitment, which was the feature of the early Assam recruitment and 
remained largely present in the ‘free recruitment’ period.260 Since the early 
1860s planters complained that the poor communications modes, distance of 
the recruiting districts to Assam, obscene profit motives of the middlemen and 
several governmental regulations caused the recruitments costs to spiral and 
justified their inability to increase wages. However, neither the improvement in 
modes of communication (roads and railways), nor the comprehensive 
deregulation of recruitment (free sardari system and free contractor) 
significantly depress the expenditure on recruitment. This was primarily due to 
the fact that a combination of low wages and difficult living and working 
condition (or predominant conditions on Assam tea garden) was not a 
substantial encouragement to go there. This kept the intermediaries 
                                                 
259 In the 1890s, an assistant manager of Jorehaut Tea Company (named John Travers) also 
acted as a recruiting agent for his company. He was later made the company’s Superintendent 
of recruiters and organized sardari recruitment. H.A. Antrobus, Jorehaut tea Company 
(London, 1948), pp.321-22 
260 Information as to increase in cost of importation of coolies, Revenue A, nos 77-117, August 
1904, ASA 
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(contractors and sardars) interested, relevant and essential in the Assam labour 
market.  
 Costs in that scenario were determined by a “difficulty/risk scale”, where 
“duress” often became the only workable strategy for getting the required 
numbers for Assam tea gardens. The 1896 Labour Enquiry noted that the 
recruits from a similar social and geographical profile priced at twenty three 
rupees for the colonies were available only at fifty to sixty rupees for Assam. A 
colonial official investigating the systems of recruitment to Assam admitted 
that the contractor system had led to systematic abuses in the past and ‘it can 
only be defended on the ground that the tea industry cannot obtain sufficient 
labour in any other way’.261  
 Apart from the strategies to externalise the recruitment costs (as in case of the 
reformed sardari system) and attempts to reduce the mediation costs (through 
local agents and other intermediaries), the planters and companies, in the long 
run, found that it was ‘cost effective’ to pay lower wages at a higher initial 
recruitment costs, than exercising the other possibility of paying higher 
(market) wages at a lower recruitment cost (as in case of colonies). This logic 
was underscored by a planter from Ranchi. He observed that ‘if the (Assam) 
planter would have to raise the coolie’s pay or pay bonus, (he) would save the 
price he now pays for his labour and add to coolie’s pay, (but) one result would 
be that popular gardens would have an advantage in the matter of labour as the 
labour would tend to go to good gardens, and the unpopular ones would 
suffer’.262 
 The contracts and peculiar plantation practices apparently titled the balance 
heavily in favour of the planters. After being “contracted” the recruits often 
were in a disadvantageous position to bargain for employer, wages and 
working conditions. In a very candid note a local colonial official once noted 
that ‘(the) main effect of the Act (Assam contract) is to keep down wages 
without to any appreciable extent bettering the condition of the labourer’. He 
                                                 
261 J.F. Gruning, Recruitment of labour for tea gardens in Assam (Calcutta, 1909)  p.12 
262 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
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particularly favoured its abolition as he believed that ‘it was not part of the 
duty of Government to provide them (planters) with cheap labour’ and more 
crucially that it would stop binding down of newly-imported unacclimatised 
coolies, ignorant of the conditions under which they are to labour, to work for 
periods of three years or more on unhealthy gardens, where they have to 
choose between the risk of death if they stay, or imprisonment if they 
desert’.263 Such a view was reiterated by a commissioner of a labour district in 
the early twentieth century where he suggested that ‘the penal labour 
legislation (Assam contract), the strong feeling of espirit de-corps among the 
planting community, and their intimate social relations with the Government 
officials, all combine to put the employed at a disadvantage. They are neither 
given an economic wage when on garden, nor allowed to leave it when he can 
better himself’.  The ‘unwritten law’ of his district, as he went on to argue, was 
‘(that) once a tea garden coolie, always a tea-garden coolie’.264 
Did these conditions in the modes of recruiting marked by excesses and on the 
plantations characterised by the “exceptional” privileges granted to the planters 
and backed by colonial state completely exhaust spaces of negotiation for the 
workers? Did tea coolies simply remain as tea coolies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
263 A missionary stationed in Assam valley talked about the ‘avowed policy’ followed by the 
plantations ‘that it pays better to drive a coolie hard during the time of his contract and then let 
him go, and import another, than to drive easy, on the bare chance of his willing to re-engage.’ 
SDO Karimganj, Porteous, Assam Labour Report, 1884, p.3; C. Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies 
in Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.31. 
264 J. Johnston, D.C. Cachar to Secty to Chief Com, No 1658 E, Silchar 12th Dec 1903. 
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3. Unpopular Assam: Notions of Migrating and 
Working for Tea Gardens 
 
3.1 Introduction 
At the turn of the twentieth century, a group of labourers from Chota Nagpur 
working on the Duars tea plantations were persuaded by their manager to join 
the ranks of a tea garden in Assam, where the manager held certain business 
interests. These labourers identified Assam as an Agreement ka jagah (place of 
agreement/contract), where they would never want to go.265 Around the same 
time, a colonial official persuaded a labour gang leader from Allahabad (North 
West Provinces) working on the railroad construction in Assam on the 
possibility of shifting their services to the tea gardens. The leader feared that 
even a mere mention of the word “tea garden” would create havoc among his 
workers.266 The panic took grave proportions in the case of few hundred 
Gandas, lodged in a district prison of Sambalpur in Orissa, when they were 
proposed to be relocated to Assam as coolies for the tea gardens. The Gandas 
threatened to slit their throats, if forcibly taken there.267 
The geographically separated, socially differentiated and seemingly isolated 
episodes, in fact, hint at a range of anxieties which came to be associated and 
characterise the Assam tea gardens. This has to be situated in the context of 
changing nature of work organization in plantations, and intensified strategies 
                                                 
265 Perceptions of Assam as a place of agreement (contract) closely resembled the notion of 
Girmitiyas (people with girmit or agreement) associated with the indentured migrants to Fiji. 
Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.148. B.V. Lal, Girmitiyas: The Origin of Fiji Indians (Canberra, 1983); B.V. 
Lal, K. Fortune (ed.), The Pacific Islands: An Encyclopaedia (Honolulu, 2000) pp. 110-111. 
266 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906). 
267 The Labour Enquiry Committee of 1906 even proposed a more “proactive” strategy on the 
part of Assam plantations to induce the Gandas of Sambalpur who were described as ‘low 
caste weavers and day labourers addicted to thieving’ and numbering in excess of one hundred 
thousand. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour 
Districts (Calcutta, 1906) pp.37-38; Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee (Calcutta, 
1906) p.150. 
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of work.268 Such anxieties, as the incidents suggest, engendered a sense of 
apprehension, fear and resistance in the people willing to go there. It came to 
be acknowledged by the colonial officials, tea agents, and missionaries, 
stationed in the recruiting districts, that Assam was extremely “unpopular” and 
generally had a “bad name”.269 This was a startling admission in light of the 
positive colonial constructions of Assam tea gardens, throughout the 
nineteenth century, as an attractive avenue for the overpopulated districts of 
eastern and northern India, perpetually trapped in the vicious cycle of 
deprivation, starvation and famine.270 The realisation, however, was 
                                                 
268 See Chapter 5 and 6 for details. 
269 The 1906 Enquiry Commission found a widespread sentiment of unpopularity associated 
with Assam in the different recruiting districts. A construction engineer from Ranchi 
(Chotanagpur) opined that it was a way of frightening a person that he could be taken to a tea 
garden. Such proverbial “bad name” of Assam was noted by an English recruiting agent from 
Purulia. A labour contractor from Kharagpur (Bengal) felt that any kind of migration to Assam 
seemed unpopular. This closely resonated the opinion held by a missionary from Sambalpur 
(Orissa). The District Commissioner of Raipur (Central Provinces) mentioned that the idea of 
going to Assam was ‘something like being transported’. Some recent scholarship has argued in 
favour of allowing and exploring a closer connection between convict transportation and 
indentured migration. Drawing several examples from the overseas indentured migration, 
Anderson argues that such connection was not only expressed by contemporary colonial 
officials but ‘Indians also forged their own linkages, most particularly viewing migration 
through a prism of incarceration and transportation’.  Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.18, 24, 45, 48, 81. C. 
Anderson, ‘Convicts and Coolies: Rethinking Indentured Labour in the Nineteenth Century’, 
Slavery and Abolition 30, no. 1 (2009); A. Yang, ‘Indian Convict Workers in Southeast Asia in 
the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, Journal of World History 14, no.2 (Fall 
2003).  
270 In light of the impending famine of Bengal in mid 1870s, a lecture delivered before the 
Society of Arts, the speaker strongly recommended ‘that the populous tracts visited or 
threatened by distress, unemployed  labourers may emigrate to places where food is in 
comparative plenty…such as tea districts, the Doars, the provinces of Assam.’ One of the main 
objectives of “free recruiting” of the early 1870s was to tap into this famine distressed 
population and regions of Bengal and Bihar. In November and December 1873 several 
attempts were made by the local government in the districts of Saran and Tirhoot to encourage 
distressed families to go to Assam. This did not yield very positive results. Writing in the late 
1880s, the Secretary to the Anglo-Indian Evangelization Society stressed that ‘the 
overcrowded districts in Bengal and elsewhere should be encouraged and helped to emigrate to 
Assam, where they might readily find lucrative and easy employment.’  Again the Empire 
review journal of 1901 mentioned that ‘Assam system has been beneficial to the Central 
Provinces, from the most famine-stricken portions of which, and from the poorest parts of 
Bengal, the Assam tea gardens are chiefly recruited.’ Frere, On the impending Bengal famine: 
How it will be met and how to prevent future famines in India (London, 1874) p.79; Hansard’s 
Parliamentary Debates, 11th February-4th March 1890 pp.1635-1636 ; The Empire Review 2, 
no.7 (August 1901) p.471. Also see, S. Baildon, Tea Industry in India (London, 1882) pp.222-
223; V. Damodaran, ‘Famine in a Forest Tract: Ecological Change and the Causes of the 1897 
Famine in Chotanagpur, Northern India’, Environment and History 1, no. 2 (June 1995) 
pp.129-158. 
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necessitated by the mounting concerns that the reluctance and resistance in the 
migrating regions could threaten the sustained production of cheap, disciplined 
labour (coolie) for the plantation work process. It had become imperative to 
comprehend, control and counter it.271 Such comprehensions were 
predominantly framed in the stereotypical notions of the irrational and ignorant 
mind-set of the “inferior” castes and “primitive” tribes migrating to Assam, 
and their gullibility to the disinformation spread by the moneylenders and the 
local landed elites who deterred them (their creditors and tenants) from 
migrating. The unscrupulous private recruiters—arkattis, were particularly 
singled out for perpetrating the fear, anxieties and distaste for Assam. 
 Keeping such issues in mind, this chapter suggests how different concerns 
regarding Assam tea garden collapsed in the overarching category of 
“unpopular”. This attests to a general disruptive impact of Assam tea gardens, 
which became an enduring legacy of the “free system”, accentuated by the 
abuses in recruiting and intensification of plantation life and work. The notions 
about cha-bagaan (Assam tea garden) ranged from it being a metaphor of hope 
and loss to a site of fear and deception.272 The subsequent sections specifically 
focussing on the nature and substance of these perceptions does not suggest 
that such concerns were “absent” in an earlier period of migration and work on 
                                                 
271 One of the earliest systematic attempts was a deputation of residents of Santhal Parganas 
(Chotanagpur region) being sent to Assam tea gardens under the supervision of the colonial 
officials and local planters to get a firsthand information of the conditions of work and life. 
The deputation interviewed around two hundred coolies from twenty seven gardens in Assam 
Valley. Some of the questions posed to the workers were: 1. How is the country?, 2. How is 
the soil?, 3.How is the water?, 4. Scale of daily work, length and breadth, 5. Rate of monthly 
wages for daily labour, 6. Rate of wages for contract work excepting Sundays, 7. Gardens 
whose coolies are in good condition, 8. Gardens whose coolies are not in good condition. The 
results of the visit did not give a good impression to the observers and the report was advised 
by some colonial officials and the chairman of the Indian Tea Association (James 
Buckhingham) to be kept as confidential. Report of the deputation on the conditions of coolies 
in Assam gardens and Letter from G Toynbee, Commissioner Bhagalpur Division to Secretary 
of Bengal, General Department, dated 14th July, 1894. Revenue & Agriculture, Emigration B, 
nos. 1-4, NAI.  
272 Between 1871 and 1901 around 1, 80,000 individuals moved to Assam from the different 
districts. Special Causes of mortality of immigrant coolies, 1891-1901 in Proceedings of 
Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) 
p.235; H. Tinker, A New System of Slavery (London, 1974) p.50. 
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the tea gardens, but argues that it acquired a greater urgency and resonance in 
the late nineteenth century.273  
Understandably, such constructions/negotiations was informed by the 
geographical, social and economic profile of the migrant groups and the 
histories of their migration, but points of overlap and intersections came to 
manifest over a period of time. Here, I find Sabyasachi Bhattacharya’s 
emphasis on a “fuzzy” concept of labouring poor particularly useful. He 
emphasises a ‘commonality among labouring poor in cultural terms, as it tries 
to cut through the various divides (especially wage/non-wage)’. In the 
language of this culture, as Bhattacharya argues, ‘value is attached to poverty, 
indigence, destitution and hunger’.274 
3.2 Assam as a Lost World 
A recurring anxiety associated with the Assam cha-bagaan in the recruiting 
regions was a deep sense of loss. Numerous concerns were voiced regarding 
the many family members, friends and acquaintances who were taken there 
and never returned.275 Apart from rampant abduction and kidnapping practised 
with impunity by the recruiters, the “decision” to move for some seemed to be 
a “short-term strategy” or even an “act of desperation” induced by an inability 
to make a living at home or honour their mounting debts. The generous 
advances made by the recruiter and the hope of earning and saving some 
money in Assam addressed to that immediate crisis. Unlike some other 
destinations, where labour often “circulated” in search of employment and 
                                                 
273 See chapter 2. 
274 S. Bhattacharya, The Labouring Poor and their Notion of Poverty: Late 19th and Early 20th 
Century Bengal (Noida, 1998); S. Bhattacharya, ‘Introduction’ in R.P. Behal & M. Linden 
(ed.) India’s Labouring Poor: Historical Studies, c.1600-c-2000 (Delhi, 2007) p.11. 
275 The idea and concern of non-return was very evident in the interviews conducted by the 
1906 commission in the recruiting districts. This was a process which started from the early 
phase of Assam migration. For instance, in the late 1860s, around ten thousand people left for 
Assam tea gardens from Midnapur district in Bengal and they as ‘…a rule did not return.’ Such 
a state of affairs continued well into the twentieth century. A colonial officer stationed in Bihar 
mentioned many cases of people coming up to him and saying ‘My wife, or daughter or son 
has been taken off to Assam. How am I to find him?’ Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.29, p.45, p.48, p.52, p.57, 
p.58, p.60; W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, vol.III: Districts of Midnapur and 
Hugli (London, 1876) p.52; Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on 
Labour in India, Bihar and Orissa Vol. IV, Part II (London, 1930) p.45 
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earning for varying degrees of time, cha-bagaan seemed to be a more 
permanent change: a point of no return.276 
This immobility, as already discussed, was induced by the contract regime in 
Assam and the assumption of magisterial roles by the managers, who 
“claimed” disciplining and punishing coolies as their “right”. Also repatriation, 
an integral feature of the overseas indenture contract, was never allowed to be 
made mandatory in the Assam contract.277 Often, the time-expired labour, even 
if they managed to get a discharge certificate (hathchit) or considered “useless” 
for future engagement by the manager, were left stranded with little means to 
make the journey back home, even if they wished to.278 There were fears of 
people being forced and kept against their consent and will. Renewal of 
contract was particularly perceived to be made under duress and threat. Many 
futile attempts were made by family members to establish contact with their 
kin in Assam. The repeated assurances of the local tea agents affirming that 
their relatives were leading a good “settled” life in Assam, rarely calmed 
apprehensions.279   
 The hope of establishing contact in some regions of coastal Orissa came to be 
expressed in a faith that the God of Wind (Ringesum) would blow pieces of 
bones of those who were “lost” and died in Assam back to their villages.280 A 
rumour, circulating in the district of Sambalpur (Orissa), visualised the Assam 
                                                 
276 Saurabh Dube makes a distinction between seasonal and long term migration in 
Chattisgarh. Assam migration was perceived as if the individual has '…passed beyond their 
kin.’ S. Dube, Untouchable Pasts: Religion, Identity, and Power among a Central Indian 
Community, 1780-1950 (Albany, 1998) p.256. 
277  Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the Duars of Bengal, in Madras and in 
Ceylon. The position at the turn of the century was stated by the Secretary of State for India 
(George Hamilton). He categorically suggested that ‘...the contracts entered into by emigrants 
to Assam have never included any stipulation for repatriation, and none is considered 
necessary.’ House of Commons Debates, 23rd July 1903, vol. 126, c56. 
278 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.93. 
279 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.81. 
280 The anxieties of large scale migration from Orissa crystallised in a belief that the god of 
wind blew pieces of bones of those who died in Assam back to their villages. These pieces of 
bones took the form of whirlwinds which blew off house-tops and anyone encountering them 
would fall ill. V. Elwin, The Religion of an Indian Tribe (New York, 1955) cited in B. Pati, 
Situating Social History: Orissa, 1800-1997 (Delhi, 2001) p.9.  
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tea managers systematically tying up the coolies to trees, lighting a fire 
beneath, roasting and eating them. On being told by some recruiting agents 
about the “improbability” of such a practice, the locals reasoned that how 
could they explain the thousands being taken to Assam without anyone ever 
coming back and neither the province (Assam) ever “filling up”. 281 The 
rumour graphically connected the overlapping anxieties of the loss of family 
members and acquaintances and the insatiable demands for fresh blood in 
Assam.282 Another rumour from the district of Jabalpur (Central Provinces) 
portrayed coolies on tea-gardens being regularly boiled down for oil/oil being 
extracted from their bodies.283 The symbolism of extraction of oil from the 
coolie paralleled the sapping of the vitality of body and life on account of the 
grinding machine like work-regime on the tea-gardens. A common perception 
in the district (Jabalpur, Central Provinces) about the kind of work expected in 
Assam depicted coolies working in waist-deep water which usually resulted in 
their death in no longer than six months. 284 
The notion of “loss” in these rumours was also an allusion to the rampant 
sickness and death on the tea garden, agreeing with the idea of “unhealthy” 
Assam. In contrast to the colonial understandings of “unhealthiness”, which 
was framed almost exclusively in a climate/race/disease paradigm, these 
                                                 
281In 1901, almost twelve thousand persons from Sambalpur were enumerated on Assam tea 
gardens which was greatly facilitated by the completion of Bengal-Nagpur railway line. The 
settlement report of the district estimated a much higher figure of migrants (around thirty 
thousand) to Assam in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Proceedings of Assam Labour 
Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p. 37-38; L.S.S. O’ 
Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: Sambalpur (2007, Delhi) p.54; Report on the Land 
Revenue Settlement of the Sambalpur District Calcutta, 1908) p.12. 
282 A “version” of this rumour can be traced during the plague panic in the late 1890s, among 
the mill workers of Bombay. Here it was believed that colonial officials were getting hold of 
men and boys, hanging them head downwards over a slow fire and preparing a medicine drawn 
from the head. Another version is found in of the “vampire stories” from East and Central 
Africa which narrates the capture of humans by the agents of colonialism to be hung upside 
down, their throats cut and the blood drained into buckets. See D. Arnold, ‘Touching the Body: 
Perspectives on the Indian Plague’ in R. Guha and G. Spivak (ed.) Selected Subaltern Studies 
(New York, 1988) p. 407 and L. White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in 
Colonial Africa (Berkeley, 2000). 
283 Two versions of this rumour were narrated. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.55, p.57. 
284 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.58.   
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stories hint at the complicated yet connected repercussions of an exacting 
work-regime and gruelling conditions of life to account for it. The symbolic 
visualisation of “roasting” and “boiling”, further stressed the excessiveness and 
unreasonableness of the practices of discipline and work of cha-bagaan, were 
expressed in cultural idioms describing “exceptional” circumstances. 
3.3 Problems of Life and Work on the Tea Gardens 
The nuanced symbolism of the stories about Assam found resonance in the 
anxieties of dukh (State of unhappiness) and taklif (Problems) that animated 
the various anecdotes about the life on the Assam tea gardens and the 
“experiences” of people who had been there.285 Such accounts do unravel any 
unmediated subaltern/coolie perspective of plantation life, but indicate to a 
deepening anxiety in these regions, that the conduct of everyday life was 
outraged and rendered difficult on the tea gardens. Dukh and taklif, as the 
perceived condition of life on the tea garden, was not just informed by the 
“alieness” of Assam but also induced by the strategies of work, life and 
discipline in place on the plantations. 
 There were specific issues which were brought about by the circumstances of 
a new place and the changed climate, as expressed by some time-expired 
coolies from Chota Nagpur. Unlike a usual practice, they were unable to 
consume the rice cooked overnight for their morning meal. They found the 
water to be ‘different’ and saltish and believed it to be the reason for the 
frequent bowel complaints.286  There was some anxiousness about the 
persistent rains and excessive fever affecting their health. The leeches were 
                                                 
285 The expressions of dukh and taklif were apparently made by individuals having spent time 
in Assam and narrating the circumstances of work and life there. Here, common cultural codes 
of pain and anxiety were invoked to communicate a common sense of despair. Proceedings of 
Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) 
p.32, p.74. 
286 The notion that Assam had bad water was the unanimous opinion of two hundred odd 
workers interviewed by the Sonthali deputation of 1894. One member of the deputation, 
Sidhanta Desmanjhi attributed a reason to this inferiority where he noted that in Assam people 
drank well-water whereas back home they preferred water of river or streams.  Proceedings of 
Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) 
p.32. Translation of Deputation’s Report, Revenue & Agriculture, Emigration B, nos 1-4, NAI.  
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often seen as a nuisance and interference in the field work and there were 
demands of boots for protection.287 
 Dukh and taklif, induced by the changed context of place and climate, were 
compounded by the certain practices of the cha-bagaan being interpreted as a 
threat to social/cultural norms. For instance, the common boarding and dining 
between members of different caste/community during the long journeys to 
Assam (depots and steamers) and on the cramped residential quarters of the tea 
gardens (barracks and lines) were perceived as conducive for a potential “loss” 
of status. 288 There were stories circulating in United Provinces about this lack 
of “caste-consciousness” of cha-bagaan—where a single individual was 
delegated to cook their food during steamer journeys and that “outsiders” were 
allowed free access to their kitchens on the gardens. The colonial state 
“responded” by legislating dry rations for some steamer routes; but this did not 
put an end to these apprehensions. Such fears were primarily but not 
exclusively voiced by the “upcountry” migrants, who held similar objections 
during their service in the army and the journeys to the overseas plantations.289 
The threat of social ostracism, due the transgressions in Assam, often had to be 
mitigated through the performance of purification rites. For instance, a ritual 
called Jati mandi among the Ho tribe (Chota Nagpur) was marked by a 
communal feast arranged by the members of the tribe who had been to Assam 
to regain their lost status.290 
The nature of tea garden had other possible implications on the conduct of 
everyday life. Some returnees noted that, on the tea-gardens, they usually had 
very little time for mid-day meals, except during chaith and baisakh (i.e. cold 
                                                 
287 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.32, p.34, pp.64-65. 
288 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.64, p.66. 
289 Carter cites instances of high caste emigrants refusing cooked food on board to Mauritius. 
They were given ‘dry rations’ instead.  M. Carter, Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in 
Mauritius, 1834-1874 (Delhi, 1995) p.102; S. Alavi, The Sepoys and the Company (Delhi, 
1995). 
290 L. Burrows, Ho grammar, with vocabulary (Calcutta, 1915) p.164. 
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season/ non-manufacturing season).291 Others had to subsist on a single meal 
against the customary two meals, as they were regularly put to tasks at end of 
the day.292  
 Kamjari, or the daily work routine (literally translated as continued work), of 
the tea-gardens systematically flouted the “legally” stipulated nine hour work 
day with an hour of rest in between.293 There were instances of work being 
carried from six in the morning till five in the evening, especially in the busy 
manufacturing season. During this period, the working day in the tea factories 
usually stretched well into the night, due to the increased pressures of meeting 
the stipulated production targets.294 Another peculiar “invention”—garden 
time—found in many tea-gardens of Upper Assam, extended the kamjari by 
fixing the garden clock ahead of the normal clock.295 The practices of 
prolonging the work day and intensifying the work process, integral to the 
plantation economy of the late nineteenth century, were generating instances of 
interference and potential breakdown of “customary” functions (eg.  Meals) of 
everyday life. 
Wages and remuneration on the cha-bagaan raised other concerns pertaining 
to life and work. The common practice on the tea-gardens of a combination of 
‘task-rate’ assessment (daily tasks) and ‘time-rate’ payment (weekly/monthly 
payment) generated a degree of confusion, and many returnees felt that they 
                                                 
291 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.64 
292 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.87 
293 See Chapter 5. 
294 A planter’s composition titled ‘The Teahouse Bloke’ is suggestive in this regard: ‘the 
factory starts at 4 a.m., Oh Lord! Why ever did I come to this wretched job in tea…I have just 
to carry on and work right up to ten, and start the morning after, at 3 A.M. again’. W. M. 
Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935); M. P. Hanley, Tales and Songs on 
an Assam Tea Garden (Calcutta, 1928) p.95. 
295 An Assam planter from the early twentieth century referred to  “Deundi Time” – where he 
operated the clocks of the garden (Deundi) one hour ahead of the rest of the tea districts, ‘…so 
that the labour force could work their first hour in the cooler period of the day, before other 
garden’s labour had roused themselves from bed.’ W. M. Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea 
Planter (London, 1935).Also see S. Jain and R. Reddock (ed.) Women Plantation Workers: 
International Experiences (Oxford, 1998) p.127; R.P. Behal, ‘Power Structure, Discipline, and 
Labour in Assam Tea Plantations under Colonial Rule’ in R. Behal & M van der Linden (ed.) 
Coolies, Capital and Colonialism: Studies in India Labour History (2006, Delhi) p.159. 
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had been “duped”.296 The task-work, in particular, open to different 
“interpretations” was seen with apprehension, and some colonial officials even 
realised its “unpopularity” during famine-work.297 Many time-expired 
labourers narrated their experience of task-work on cha-bagaan, describing the 
amount of work required to achieve a daily wage as “excessive”.298 An upward 
revision in tasks, for being much higher than in the past, was also felt by some 
with the result of a decline in their earnings.299 Sometimes, tasks were hiked as 
a mode of disciplining coolies.300 The penalties for falling short (short-work) 
and even for minor delays in attendance (muster) led to many deductions. 301 
There were other apprehensions of being left with hardly any cash after the 
costs of “rice-benefit” (5 seers of rice per week) was charged from their 
wages.302 At times of absence, due to illness, they were completely deprived of 
their “cash earnings” being just given a subsistence allowance or diet without 
any payment. But such periods of absence (kuthia) were added to the contract 
terms.303 Also the cost of recruitment was often recovered from the wages. 
                                                 
296 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.22, p.64.  
297 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.58. 
298 A contractor from Jubbulpore mentioned that some returnees told that the hoeing tasks on 
the garden—20 to 25 nals of 12 feet—are excessive. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.57. 
299 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.18. 
300 In Santhali language the origins of the word Dalil which connoted extra work as 
punishment was traced to the tea gardens. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in 
the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.57; A. Campbell, A Santali-English 
dictionary (Pokhuria, 1899) p.117. 
301 The members of the deputation that if the daily work was not done, a day’s wage (25 annas) 
was inflicted. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour 
Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.57, p.87. 
302 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.69.  
303 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.64, p.68. Practices of prolonging the term of agreement (as reported by 
officers in recruiting districts) by addition of kuthia days, or periods of absence was taken by 
Chota Nagpuri and Santali workers as a breach of faith. 
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These isolated instances indicate to the doubts and concerns about the 
“legitimate” possibilities of earning sufficient incomes that the cha-bagaan 
claimed to offer. Not only was the mode of assessment and payment  perceived 
as “puzzling”, but also the work demanded to earn that wage was deemed as 
“excessive”. Again, such assessments were open to multiple interpretations and 
further enhancements. A general trend of increase in tasks with stagnant wages 
marked the intensifying Assam plantation economy in the late nineteenth 
century.304 Such limitations in the possibilities to earn were further constrained 
by the standard practices of deductions in place on the plantations. This only 
corroborated to the perception of the condition of life and ability to earn on 
cha-bagaan was difficult. 
The “extraordinary” nature of the life on the plantations, as particularly 
induced by the practices of policing/disciplining, formed the substance of the 
“experiences” about the cha-bagaan. Various instances of confinement and 
extreme disciplining, even for “irrelevant” and “unjust” transgressions, raised 
anxieties and fear about the exceptional place. There were concerns of life 
being circumscribed in a compound system from where no one was ever 
permitted to leave. 305 People were arrested and beaten for leaving the 
“compound”, even when they just wished to visit acquaintances and relatives 
on other gardens. 306 The flogging and corporal punishments meted out by the 
manager and the native subordinates was inflicted even for trivial offences.307 
                                                 
304In the year 1900, the Chief Commissioner of Assam demonstrated that the average wages 
paid (including benefits and overtime) were substantially less than what was prescribed by the 
inaugural contract Act (1865). The statutory wage at that point (Rs 5) was in fact half of what 
the daily labourer earned in Assam. Again between 1870s and 1890s, the tasks on tea gardens 
had generally increased from around twenty five to thirty percent. H. Cotton, India and Home 
Memories (London, 1911) pp. 261-262; D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and 
manufacture (London, 1897) p.49. For a discussion of wage trends in the twentieth century see 
R. Behal, Wage Structure and Labour: Assam Valley Plantations, 1900-1947 (Noida, 2003). 
305 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.69. 
306 A report investigating the conditions of labour in Duars tea plantations noted that ‘...there 
can be no doubt that inter-garden movement of coolies are much commoner in the Duars than 
under the Assam system of indentured labour.  Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.76. Report of the Duars 
Committee (Shillong, 1910) p.24. 
307 The members of the Sonthali deputation noticed a new woman worker being beaten by the 
assistant manager because she plucked four leaves instead of three. Proceedings of Assam 
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The life and activities of coolies were said to be at the complete disposal of the 
manager/tea-garden. Coolies were compelled to labour even when they felt 
unwell, and had to turn out for work during heavy rains.308 The female-coolies 
were not permitted to stay longer than four to five days at home after child-
birth.309 During longer periods of illness coolies were encouraged to leave for 
the nearby basti to be tended by their caste/tribe people, but on recovery the 
managers compelled them to return to their “original” gardens.310 Some 
expressed a sense of helplessness in their inability to leave the garden for 
which they had been contracted, even when they disliked it.311  
 The practices of control and immobilisation, critical to the production of cheap 
disciplined labour, were registered as infringements in the conduct of everyday 
life. The life of a coolie, as depicted in these experiences, entailed a loss of 
control over personal mobility, choice, well-being and a potential breakdown 
of relationships, interactions and social obligations.  Coolies, in effect, were 
seen as not able to move as they wished, could not rest if they felt unwell, and 
were unable to keep in touch with friends and relatives.  This sense of loss was 
induced and heightened by the practices of physical disciplining (even for 
irrelevant/minor transgressions) making it “exceptional”, “excessive” and 
generally “illegitimate”.  
3.4 Songs and Oral Traditions of Tea Workers 
The perceptions and anxieties about Assam tea gardens were also becoming a 
part of wider constructions of cha-bagaan as a site of “oppression” (places of 
                                                                                                                                
Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.87, p.64, 
p.17. 
308 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.13, p.87, p.64. 
309This was again brought up by the Sonthal deputation where they were required to work 
within six days of birth. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting 
and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.64. 
310The missionary Dowding observed that contracts were cancelled when it was ‘…more 
profitable to send them home than treat them and give subsistence allowance.’ A transport fund 
instituted in the 1870s for such purposes was hardly enough and could fund the repatriation of 
only a few. C. Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies in Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.32. 
311 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.74, p.29. 
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dukh and taklif) articulated in other narratives sketching the life on the tea 
gardens.312 Jhumur songs, an important element in the oral/cultural traditions 
of tea labourers in Assam, indicates to one of the imaginings of the tea-garden. 
The nature of these songs can be illustrated through some extracts:313              
1 
 
  Assam Desher 
Chah Pat 
Pani Boli Bar Mitha 
                      
                       Chal Sakhi Chal Jabo 
Bagane Tulbor pata 
anand mane 
 
Assam, the land 
of tea 
Where the water 
is supposed to be 
sweet 
Friends! Let’s go 
We will pluck 
leaves on the 
gardens with joy 
         
 
2      Chal Mini Assam 
Jabo 
    Deshe baro dukh re 
  
Assam deshe re Mini 
cha-bagaan horiyal 
                 Kodal 
mara jemon temon 
                 Pata tula 
Mini, let’s go to 
Assam 
Our land is full of 
sorrow 
Mini, Assam is land 
of greenery and tea 
I somehow could hoe 
the fields 
Oh! The Plucking 
work 
                                                 
312 Y. Chattopadhyaya., Cha-kulir atmakahini. The Experiences of a Coolie in a Tea garden in 
Assam. A tale founded on fact (Calcutta, 1901); R. Bidyaratna, Kuli Kahini (Sketches from 
Cooly Life) (Calcutta, 1888). 
313  The Jhumur songs represented here are compiled from varied sources. This is particularly 
drawn from, S. Sengputa & J.L. Sharma, Jhumur: Folksongs and Dances of Tea Garden 
Labourers of Assam, P.P. Mahato, World View of the Assam Tea garden labourers from 
Jharkhand in S. Karotemprel, B.D. Roy (ed.) Tea Garden Labourers of North East India 
(Shillong, 1990) pp.131-142, pp.214-226; P.P. Mahato & K.C. Mahato, The Collective 
Wisdom and Excellences related to world views on Forest, Biodiversity and Nature-Man-Spirit 
complex of the indigeneous people of Eastern India in C.K. Paty (ed) Forest, Government and 
Tribe (Delhi, 2007) pp.36-47. Some of these songs were collected by Kali Dasgupta (1926-
2005)—a singer and folk song collector, which was later released in an audio volume. Folk 
Songs of North-East India (Calcutta, 2003). 
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kam go 
                 Hai 
Jaduram  
                 Phanki 
diye pathali Assam 
 
Oh! Jaduram 
You deceived me to 
Assam 
 
3                   Paka 
khata lekhaeli naam 
                  Re 
Lampatiya Shyam 
                  Phanki 
diey bandu chalali 
Assam 
                  
Depughare maritari 
                  Uttaiele 
terene kari 
                  Hoogly 
sahare dekholi 
Akash 
 Mane kari Assam 
jab 
                  Jora 
Pankha tanab 
                  Sahab 
dil Kodaleri Kam 
                  Dina 
Udaya bhane 
                  Akale 
peter tane 
                  Tipki 
Tipki parhe gham 
 
Putting my name 
down in the 
(Contract) 
Oh nasty Shyam 
You deceived me to 
Assam 
Depots were 
marked by 
commotion 
Had to swim to 
come to the shore 
In Hoogly 
(Calcutta) could I 
finally see the sky 
When I wished to 
go to Assam 
I thought I had pull 
the fan 
But Sahab gave me 
hoeing job 
So says poor Udaya 
(poet) 
For the sake of the  
stomach 
I sweat in this heat 
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4                   Sardar 
bole kam kam      
                  Babu bole 
dhori an         
                  Sahab 
bole libo pither chan 
                  Re 
Jaduram  
                  Phanki 
diye bandu pathali 
Assam 
 
Sardar says work 
work 
Babu says nab the 
fool 
Sahab threatens to 
peel the skin of my 
back 
Oh Jaduram 
You deceived us to 
Assam 
 
 The songs, in a sense, map the transition of the Assam tea garden from being 
imagined as sites of hope to becoming the sites of despair and difficulties. 
During the course of the late nineteenth century, tea gardens had also become a 
major avenue and opportunity for work and survival for societies during 
periods of acute scarcity and conditions of deprivation. Large scale migration 
to tea-gardens during the famine years attests to that process.314   
 Song 1 captures this optimism regarding Assam—as a land of hope, 
opportunity and work. The positive mood is again recreated in the opening 
lines of Song 2, where the narrator contrasts the greenery of Assam cha-bagaan 
to the miseries (dukh) at home (desh). These hopes are shattered when the 
“reality” of life on the tea garden is found to be harsh and oppressive. A 
painful scene is recreated in Song 3—which narrates in graphic details the 
tortuous journey of a fresh recruit from home through depots, steamers, 
Calcutta and arrival on tea garden. Again the individual’s experience of life 
                                                 
314 A tour of a famine affected Bilaspur in the late 1890, an observer found that a standard 
answer to the whereabouts of the husbands of many destitute women was, “…he has gone to 
Assam to the gardens.” On further enquiries he learnt that the civil doctor of the station was 
passing around sixteen hundred people per week (for Assam). F.H.S Merewether, A tour 
through the famine district of India (London, 1898) pp.130-131; Resolution on Surgeon-Major 
Campbell’s Report on the Arrangements for Transit of Emigrants to Assam. Revenue and 
Agriculture, Emigration A, June 1897. NAI. 
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and work is at variance to what s/he was made to believe. Song 4 harps on the 
agony of the coolie—who is entrapped in the regimented disciplinary regime 
of the tea garden. 
Life on the tea garden, as depicted in these songs, hints at the dukh and taklif 
of the coolie. This was often the realisation of the nature of the work being 
different from what was anticipated. In song 3, the person was under the 
impression that he will have to pull fans (Pankha tanab), which was relatively 
easier than the hoeing work (Kodaleri kam) that he was assigned by the 
manager (Sahab) in Assam.315 The perception of relative “easiness” of 
plantation work was often associated with the plucking of the tea leaves (Pata 
tulna), the primary occupation of women workers on the plantations, as 
expressed by the narrator of the Song 1:  ‘Bagane Tulbor pata anand mane’ 
(We will pluck the leaves on the gardens with joy). This alludes to a persistent 
notion of plucking being “effortless” and “natural” to women as they 
biologically possessed the ideal nimble fingers essential for it. This 
essentialisation and feminisation of plucking work devalued the female labour 
and legitimised the hierarchical/patriarchal authority and wage structure. 
Contemporary visual representations of tea plucking show the dominance of 
such perceptions in the colonial capitalist imaginations. 
 
                                                 
315 For such “task anxieties” in the plantations of 1860s, see chapter 2. 
129  
Fig 3.1 Photograph of a tea plucker. 316 
  
Fig 3.2 Visuals of women tea pluckers.317 
These images unabashedly celebrate the “joy” of plucking tea leaves by 
creating an illusion of it being as simple/pleasurable as picking flowers from a 
garden and therefore ideal for the women. Apart from the 
romanticisation/feminisation of work, the sexualisation of female labour, by 
constituting the work in terms of a gendered social identity, indicates to the 
marginalisation of the female labourer’s position in the plantation work/life 
hierarchy.318 Such images were particularly influential in conditioning the 
perceptions about life and work on the Indian plantations of the metropolitan 
audience and have become the recurrent themes in tea advertisements.319 
                                                 
316 The photograph was taken by the “professional” studio Bourne and Shepherd titled 
‘Assamese Woman in costume, Picking Tea leaves in a field’ was taken at the end of the 
nineteenth century. DOE Asia: Assam: General: NM 40922 04423800, National 
Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution; M. P. Hanley, Tales and Songs on an 
Assam Tea Garden (Calcutta, 1928).  
317 The image of the left is a cover illustration from a book published by a tea manager and the 
image on the right is a graphic of a tea advertisement. M. P. Hanley, Tales and Songs on an 
Assam Tea Garden (Calcutta, 1928).  
318 For a detailed discussion and criticism see P. Chatterjee, Time for Tea: Women, Labor, and 
post/colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation (Durham, 2002) pp.112-113. 
319 A. Ramamurthy, Imperial Persuaders: Images of Africa and Asia in British Advertising 
(Manchester, 2003) esp. the section ‘The Orient as female and the representation of the Tamil 
woman tea picker’ pp.119-125. 
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  In contrast to this romantic perception/construction of plucking and woman’s 
work, the nature of the work becomes evident in practice (Song 2). This 
everyday grind of work in the heat and sweat (Tipiki Tipki parhe gham) had to 
be endured because of the necessity to make a living (Song 3). This intensity of 
work (kam kam) was driven by threats and systematic physical disciplining by 
the authorities—Manager-Native Assistant-Overseer (Sahab-Babu-Sardar) in 
the plantations (Song 4).320 
3.5 Deception of Recruiters and the Fear of Assam 
The dukh and taklif on the tea gardens, evocatively pictured in these songs, 
premised on a narrative strategy where the path to the sites of ‘oppression’ was 
induced at some stage due to  the deception (Phanki) of the recruiter 
(Shyam/Jaduram), who lured them to contract (Paka khata)  and facilitated 
their passage to Assam in the first place. In anecdotes, stories and experiences 
about Assam tea garden recruitment, deception (Phanki) and the act of luring 
(Phuslao) figures, prominently, to characterize the practices of the recruiter.321  
The strict distinction in the colonial and planter discourses regarding the 
practices of the recruiters, i.e. the professional (Arkatti) indulging in corrupt 
practices and the non-professional (Sardar) working through familial and kin 
networks, is not sustained in these narratives. Though the arkatti had earned a 
“historical” reputation of fear and hatred built on indiscriminate phankis and 
phuslaoing compounded with physical threat, kidnapping and other abuses; the 
sardar hardly aroused any real confidence and there was a persistent feeling 
that he always spoke with a “purpose”.322 The exaggerations of the sardar, as 
narrated by many returnees, could have only reinforced that perception. In 
                                                 
320 For a detailed discussion of the work practices and authority structure during field 
operation, See Chapter 5. 
321 The practices of deception was associated with recruiters for other destinations. The 
Surinam arkattis allegedly pronounced it as Sri Ram (Lord Ram) or srinam (‘sublime name’) 
thus suggesting that the trip was in honour of the almighty. R. Hoefte, In Place of Slavery: A 
Social History of British Indian and Javanese Laborers in Suriname (Gainesville, 1998) p.36; 
C.E.S. Choenni, ‘From Bharat to Sri Ram Desh: The Emigration of Indian Indentured 
Labourers to Surinam’ in R. Rai & P. Reeves (ed.), The South Asian Diaspora: Transnational 
networks and changing identities (2009) p.112. 
322 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.54. 
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effect, fixing the identity of Shyam and Jaduram in these narratives of being an 
arkatti or a sardar, with absolute certainty, could be a futile exercise. 
 Apart from the deceptions and exaggerations of the recruiter, the lurking 
threats of being kidnapped by them were eliciting extreme “pre-emptive” 
responses. There were stories from the district of Sambalpur (Orissa) of 
families sleeping roped together to prevent the recruiters from “carrying them 
off.”323 Also unwilling/kidnapped recruits were reported to have jumped off 
running trains to liberate themselves from the shackles of the 
recruiter/abductor.324 Such “extraordinary” responses starkly underlined a deep 
sense of desperation in face of the rampant abusive recruitment practices, and 
further, accentuated the aversion for Assam recruitment and the “oppressive” 
cha-bagaan. This fear of Assam recruiter, remarked a magistrate of Hazaribagh 
district (Chotanagpur), was so acute that people became apprehensive of even 
visiting their haats and bazaars. He compared the paranoia to the ‘days of 
thugee’, when there was such ‘widespread fear of travelling’.325 The late 
nineteenth century India was gripped with this lurking concern to the 
threat/idea of being taken to the tea-garden. The already cited instances of 
workers from Duars tea gardens, the upcountry labourers working on railway 
extensions in Assam and the Gandas lodged in the Sambalpur prison, 
articulating their deep reservations of going to the tea-gardens, becomes 
intelligible in this light. Three other cases can be cited in this regard.  
  First, a “widespread” fear raged in the tribal districts of Bengal in the 1880s 
during the enumerative drives of the colonial census.  The numbering of 
people, according to some rumours in circulation, was merely a “preparatory 
stage” for the wholesale deportation of women to work as tea pluckers on the 
                                                 
323 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.89, p.61. 
324 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.61. 
325 R. Behal and P.P. Mohapatra,‘Tea and Money versus Human Life: The Rise and Fall of the 
Indenture System in the Assam Tea Plantations, 1840-1908’ in Plantations, Proletarians and 
Peasants in Colonial Asia, Special edition, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, no. 3&4 (1992) 
p.155. 
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Assam tea gardens.326 The perceived threat of being taken to Assam in large 
numbers, and the complicity of the colonial state in that process, was also 
informed by the gendered nature of that demand. In very particular ways, the 
rumour grasped the grammar of Assam recruitment during the period, where 
the colonial state was “organising” and “encouraging” large scale emigration, 
and the tea planters were stepping up the demands for workers, in general, and  
women workers, in particular, to rectify the “sexual imbalance” of the work 
force.327    
 Again, in the late 1890s, a district commissioner of Chotanagpur (Chaibassa) 
was unsuccessful of getting hold of anyone to draw his pankha (fan) during a 
stopover at a local railway station. An individual offering his services after 
much persuasion refused to wait for payment. On being asked to explain his 
strange actions, he said that ‘the sarkar would chalan him to Assam’.328 
The invocation of “Assam bogey” sometimes became part of a larger political 
strategy to “mobilise” popular support, as evident during the Swadeshi activity 
in the early twentieth century.  Addressing a peasant gathering in rural Bengal, 
some local politicians hinted at the ulterior motive of the British government of 
introducing “Assam laws” to take over their lands and transport a large number 
                                                 
326 The men were believed to be sent to Afghanistan as camp-followers for the British army. 
There were several census induced rumours fears expressed in North Bihar during Census 
operations of men being taken to foreign country, often Afghanistan. New York Times, June 1st 
, 1890; A. Yang, ‘A Conservation of Rumours: The Language of Popular “Mentalities” in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Colonial India’ Journal of Social History 20, no.3 (Spring 1987) pp.485-
505. 
327 The threat of the single woman being decoyed to the Assam cha-bagaan became a powerful 
social anxiety provoking various responses in the late nineteenth century. See, S. Sen, 
‘Questions of consent: Women’s recruitment for Assam tea gardens, 1859-1900’ Studies in 
History 18, no.2 (2002) pp.231-260; S. Sen, ‘Without his consent?’: Marriage and Women’s 
Migration in Colonial India’ International Labor and Working-Class History 65 (Spring 2004) 
pp.77-104; S. Sen, ‘Unsettling the Household: Act VI (of 1901) and the Regulation of Women 
Migrants in Colonial Bengal’ International Review of Social History 41 (1996) pp.135-156. 
328 A local missionary noted ‘…a fear (very strong in this district) that they will be transported 
sooner or later to the tea gardens of Assam. The popular ignorance is very great and no 
arguments can overcome it.’ Hoffman Note, Emigration Dept., Financial Branch nos 62-128, 
April 1899,WBSA cited in I.S. Das Gupta, ‘Agrarian Expansion under Colonial Rule and its 
impact on a Tribal Economy’ in E. Basile and I. Mukhopadhaya (ed.) The Changing Identity of 
Rural India (Delhi, 2009). Appendix to the report of the Indian Famine Commission, Vol IV. 
Central Provinces and Berar (London, 1898) p.90. 
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of them to tea-gardens to serve as coolies.329 Raising the latent concerns of a 
population extremely wary of being “recruited” for Assam, a choice offered to 
them was clear: of either waiting to become the coolies of the colonial 
plantation or participating in the struggle for becoming the citizens of an 
emerging nation.330  
The idea and practice of recruitment for tea gardens was registering in other 
complicated ways in the migrating societies. “Selling” came to be 
synonymously used for Assam recruitment is some regions. A recruiter in 
Chotanagpur mentioned this in the context of female migrants being hired for 
tea gardens:  
Suppose that a young woman wishes to go to Assam and I produce her father and 
prove by two witnesses that he is her father and he gives his consent to emigrating, 
when he goes back to his village he will be reproached by everyone with having 
“sold” his daughter.331 
Many others mentioned this “loss of respectability” and the disapproval by the 
community.332 In some regions, it was seen as a prelude to bondage.333 In 
Mundari language, the word Chalan came to simultaneously signify the act of 
being taken to a depot (to be recruited for Assam) and being imprisoned.334 
                                                 
329 In a memorial from some residents of the district of Mymensingh addressed to the Governor 
of Bengal protesting the proposal to transfer the district to the Administration of Assam they 
mentioned the existence of “wild rumours” that ‘…ordinary raiyats will be taken away from 
their fields and made to work as coolies on the tea gardens of Assam; that they will lose the 
Bengal Tenancy Act or that the local road cesses of Bengal will be filched away and devoted to 
making roads in the jungly parts of Assam’. S. Bandyopadhyaya, Caste. Protest and identity in 
Colonial India (Richmond, 1997) p.68. Further Papers relating to the Reconstitution of the 
Provinces of Bengal and Assam (London, 1905) p. 109 
330 Such a rhetoric becomes even more articulate in the case of Assam plantations in the 1920s. 
See Chapter 7. 
331 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.44 
332 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p. 15, p.17, p.75, p.44. 
333 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.70, p.18. 
334 Anderson notes that colonial enquiries into labour recruitment in north India during the 
1880s referred to batches of labourers as chalan, which mirrored the use of the word during the 
first half of the nineteenth century as a mode of reference to chain gangs of transfer prisoners 
and transportation convicts. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the 
Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.21; C.Anderson, ‘Convicts and Coolies: 
Rethinking Indentured Labour in the Nineteenth Century’, Slavery and Abolition 30, no. 1 
(2009). 
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There was an unmistakable connection made between contract and condition 
of being bound (in Assam) in the Chotanagpur region, which was one of the 
“oldest” migrating region for the Assam cha-bagaan. The refusal of the 
Chotanagpuri labourers of Duars tea garden was on the grounds that it was a 
place of agreement/contract (Agreement ka jagah). In the district of Ranchi 
(Chotanagpur), the local police encountered a “popular” reluctance in hiring 
constables because the obligatory three year contract made the people 
“suspicious”—as it was strikingly reminiscent of the Assam contract.335  
3.6   The ‘Choice’ of Assam 
 The notions about migration and work on Assam cha-bagaan were not always 
conditioned in “isolation”, but also framed through the changing and emerging 
possibilities for employment and earning available near “home” and at a 
“distance”.336 Chotanagpur, the primary recruiting ground for Assam tea-
gardens, witnessed a particular trend of some migrant streams moving towards 
the tea plantations of Duars (Bengal) during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.337 The Duars Report claimed that tea gardens of the district‘…hold a 
monopoly of the best class of labour from Chota Nagpur and Sonthal Parganas, 
having beaten Assam out of the market for that class’.338 This shift could be 
attributed to the nature of the labour demand in Duars, where people could 
leave after harvest to return back in the rainy season after earning some 
money.339 The “seasonal” nature of migration allowed some individuals to 
participate in the agricultural process and accommodate wage-work on the tea-
                                                 
335 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p. 12, p.20.   
336 R. Dasgupta, ‘Factory Labour in Eastern India: Sources of Supply’ in Labour and Working 
Class in Eastern India: Studies in Colonial History (Calcutta, 1994). 
337 In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, around 46% of the recruits came from the 
Chotanagpur. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour 
Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.235. 
338 Report of the Duars Committee (Shillong, 1910) p.26 
339 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.14 
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plantations in the non-agricultural season.340 Such “other” opportunities of 
work in tea-gardens created a comparative impression of the two work-sites. A 
local labour agent from the Chotanagpur mentioned that when ‘you mention 
“Assam” to a villager it conveys the idea of hardship (dukh)…the Duars have 
no such name’.341 A “favourable” idea about Duars was noted by a missionary 
who said that a strong opinion was that in Duars one stays ‘as long as they 
like’, and further, ‘one can go to another garden if they wish to’.342 Such a 
comparative view was also narrated by another missionary who said that 
Assam was not as healthy as Duars and that they are ‘better treated on the 
Duars garden’.343 A tea manager having experience of working in Assam and 
Duars tea plantations mentioned that ‘…coolies come to Duars because they 
have no fear that they may be placed on contract’.344 
The choice for Duars plantations, as being apparently expressed by the people 
of the region, cannot be simply read through the dichotomy of Freedom 
(Duars)/ Unfreedom (Assam), as the plantation labour regime of Duars was 
also characterised by various excesses, coercion and strategies of 
immobilisation. Such dichotomies simplify the fluidity and complexities in 
which such migrating decisions were made. The difficulties induced by the 
Assam labour regime of contract(s) and the abusive practices of recruitment to 
sustain it, more seriously, threatened the conduct of individual and social life, 
and generated a comparatively “favourable” notion about the Duars 
plantations. Dukh of Assam was greater than the dukh of Duars. Such choices 
did not exclude different work situations within the province of Assam. A 
labour agent in Calcutta summed up this sentiment: 
                                                 
340 Emigration to Assam were of a more permanent nature, but from the Duars about 10,000 
people returned every year, bringing back a saving of approximately 1 lakh rupees. Dufferin 
Report, no.351R, Ranchi, 31 May 1888. 
341 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.30. 
342 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.13. 
343 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.14. 
344 Report of the Duars Committee (Shillong, 1910) p.63. 
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 In a few cases I have offered coolies a choice between the Assam railway and 
Trading Company’s one-year contract for its coal mines (in Assam) with Rs. 7 wage 
and a four year contract on Rs. 5 on a tea garden. The coolies invariably chose the 
former, and I understood that the choice was determined as much by the shorter term 
as by the higher wage.345 
3.7 Conclusions 
The “popular” constructions of the cha-bagaan was premised on an 
“awareness” of the plantation system in the recruiting regions, stemming from 
personal/familiar experiences and the wider circulation of information— 
through rumours, stories and anecdotes about Assam. This, again, alludes to 
the ways the cha-bagaan was being comprehended and “negotiated” in the 
recruiting regions, where the strategies and practices mobilised in the 
production of coolies (for the tea-gardens) came to be perceived as disruptive, 
excessive and unreasonable; engendering various anxieties. Such negotiations 
did not necessarily imply that the exploitative practices and abuses, integral to 
the “free” labour system, were collectively “resisted” and eliminated or 
“voluntary” migration to Assam tea-garden completely ceased over time. It 
rather undermines the notion of ignorance and gullibility of the social groups 
migrating to Assam, emphasising on how the “knowledge” of tea garden— 
recruitment practices, conditions of life and nature of work in plantation, were 
being registered and articulated in the context of their lived realities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
345 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) p.89. 
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4. Changing Work Organisation of Plantations, ‘Drink 
Problem’ and Working Culture 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The notions of unpopularity of Assam was not just premised on the excesses 
in recruitment, but articulated as a deepening concern about the nature of 
plantation work and the ways in which it was intensified. Such processes were 
apparently facilitated by a growing number of coolies made available by 
“relaxation” in recruitment and further alterations in the nature of contracts. 
 In this backdrop, consider a “curious” letter published in the May 31st, 1880 
edition of the daily Englishman termed as ‘The Planter’s Grievance’. In this 
piece, the writer (planter) voiced grave concerns regarding the “grog shops” 
sprouting up near the proverbial ‘gates of every tea garden of Assam’, resulting 
in the ‘introduction of drunkenness, crime and disease in factories, collecting 
bad characters in the neighbourhood of tea-gardens, attracting coolies away 
from their work, increasing sickness and a general difficulty in the 
management of labour’. The text of letter goes: 
…grave and serious evils resulting from some measures lately taken here by the local 
govt. for the encouragement of drunkenness, by the forced establishment of shops for 
the sale of native spirits in the immediate vicinity of all important tea gardens. I 
suppose our mission in no heathen country is complete till we have taught the 
benighted native the delights of drunkenness; but I think the sacred imported labourer 
might have been spared the enlightenment. Since the commencement of the tea 
industry, the bodily welfare of the imported labourer has been the chief delight of the 
Bengal Government …for years the blameless coolie has led a sober, peaceful and 
industrious existence, drinking harmless fermented liquor manufactured by himself, 
only getting drunk on proper occasions, and beating his wife in a reasonable and 
moderate degree…In an evil moment it occurred to the Chief Commissioner that more 
money might be raised by the sale of spirit licenses.346  
 Such serious concerns about the consequences of “coolie drinking” did not 
square up with an assertion made by another tea planter named George Barker. 
In his long experience of managing a tea garden, Barker notes ‘(that) at times 
of a heavy flush, or backward state of cultivation, when something must be 
                                                 
346 Increase in the number of liquor shops in the immediate vicinity of the tea-gardens in 
Assam, and the consequent increase in drunkenness among the coolies employed therein. 
Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration Branch, June 1881, Nos. 7-8, Part B. 
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done to increase the labour power of the garden, brandy or rum—the more the 
better—is the only inducement’.347 Barker’s assertion was reiterated by a 
colonial excise official writing in the 1880s. He remarked that it had become a 
custom (dustoor) with coolies to get rum as bakshish for extra work, and also 
for good and satisfactory work.348 This seems to go in the direction of a 
“strategy” proposed in the 1850s by Assam tea planters: of inducing the 
reluctant “opium smoking Assamese” for plantation work through a control 
over opium purchase.349 Here, rather being a detriment, the stimulant and even 
the addictive attributes of alcohol/drugs are mobilised to encourage social 
groups to participate in the work process of plantations. That alcohol/drugs 
were perceived as stimulating or, even, inducement to work (especially under 
trying adverse circumstances) was not a colonial or even capitalist invention, 
and references to this can be found in a range of settings across time and 
space.350 
   Taking this contradiction as an entry point, this chapter will contend that the 
conflicting positions on coolie drinking was rooted in the shift from the 
“unsettled” plantations of 1860s—disciplined (by planters) through violence 
and coercion—to more “systematised” plantations taking roots from the late 
1860s and early 1870s. This further reveals how new forms of organisation of 
life and work of the plantations were generating new concerns for the control 
on the work process and workers.  
                                                 
347 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) pp.174-75. 
348 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1884-85. 
349 See Chapter 1. 
350 Jankowiak and Bradburd argue that historically, stimulants have been used to enhance 
physical and mental performance by increasing endurance, concentration, and the intensity of 
physical and mental work. That labour-enhancing drugs (including alcohol) were employed 
well before the advent of merchantilism or market capitalism and are by no means a European 
contribution to world culture. Even the upcountry coolies (from North-west Provinces and 
Bihar) working in the tea gardens of Assam, claimed that they could not keep their health in 
these eastern districts without Ganja. The drug they argued improved digestion, the use of it 
kept off coughs and colds, and for those who had to work outside in the rains it is invaluable, 
as it prevented rain and exposure from affecting the body. See ‘Drugs, Desire, and European 
Economic Expansion’, by Daniel Bradburd and William Jankowiak in Bradburd and Jankoviak 
(ed) Drugs, Labour and Colonial Expansion (Tucson, 2003) and Report on the Excise 
Administration in Assam, 1882-83.  
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4.2 Colonial Policy and Taxing the “Coolie Drink” 
The genesis of the debate has to be situated in the changing colonial excise 
policy of the province.  Assam, till the year 1874, when it was made a separate 
province, formed a part of the province of Bengal and the Excise revenue was 
raised on the principles applicable to Bengal. Until the year 1868-69, the 
excise revenue amounted to just over 8,000 rupees yearly. After 1868-69, 
revenues increased with surprising rapidity. Collections in 1869-70 were half 
in excess of of the previous year, while in 1873-74 the collections were double 
of the 1870-71 figures.351  
This “spectacular” growth mirrored the rise of the tea industry in the wake of 
the 1868 crisis —showing a pattern of steady growth of working population on 
more “settled” plantations. But these figures of excise growth did not impress 
the colonial administration and they consistently maintained that they were 
“meagre” considering the large and growing drinking/working population in 
the province. The relatively high consumption of the home-brewed rice beer–
Pachwai, by the plantation coolies was the major object of their concern. Their 
policy, throughout the late nineteenth century, was geared to “check” the 
consumption of this “illicit” liquor (home brewed rice beer) and offer 
opportunities for the coolies to buy the “licit” liquor (country liquor from the 
licensed shops) instead. 
    The inauguration of the outstill system in Assam in the late 1870s grew out 
of such concerns. Under the terms of this system, the manufacture and sale of 
country spirits was auctioned out to the highest bidder, for individual liquor 
shops.  The initiation of such an excise policy anticipated a change in the 
coolie’s drink of preference, from beer to country spirits, or more specifically, 
from untaxed alcohol to taxed alcohol. These figures of growth became a 
major source of criticism, and planters took this as an evidence of facilitating 
and promoting the “disease” of drunkenness among the coolie population—
they being the primary consumers of country liquor in the province.  
4.3 Drink as Work Stimulant 
                                                 
351 Report on the Excise Administration of British India (Simla, 1882) p.22 
140  
The association of drink and hard manual work in trying circumstances, a 
prevalent idea in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, was not lost upon 
the Assam tea managers of the 1870s. In fact, the planters of Assam were one 
major importers of Rum into the province for their coolies.352 There was a 
general belief that Rum was essential for the health and stimulation of the 
coolies in the ‘unhealthy and feverish’ province of Assam. In the words of a 
doctor of a tea garden: ‘little stimulating drink after a week’s hard toil is 
beneficial to the health of coolies in damp, moist and malarial climate in 
Assam’.353 The findings of the enquiry into the excise administration in the tea 
districts of Assam and Bengal in 1889 made an observation extremely 
instructive in this regard: 
…it is remarkable fact that 31 out of 35 planters admit that they distribute rum to 
coolie’s after a hard days’ work or a long journey. Even many of those who are 
strongly opposed to their coolies getting any liquor supply them with rum, saying it is 
good for them, makes them work better and more cheerfully, gives them heart during 
epidemics of cholera and sickness, such as fever. It is curious that the enquiries made 
by the Excise Commission in 1884 showed that there was a widespread belief that rum 
and spirits made by European process of manufacture did not generally agree with the 
people of this country. Be this as it may, it is odd to find planters who virtually oppose 
the consumption by their coolies of outstill liquor, yet freely giving as a substitute on 
occasions strong and raw spirit like rum.354 
Alcohol and specifically rum started appearing and acquiring a new function in 
the plantation life and work process. It has been argued that linking sanctioned 
access of alcohol to labour (like giving alcohol at the end of communal labour 
and at particular significant moments) was a powerful incentive to participate 
                                                 
352 Upto the year 1878-79, all rum consumed in the Province was obtained from Calcutta, 
where duty was realised and credited to the Bengal government. In 1878, however, a distillery 
was opened at Dibrughar with a monopoly of manufacture within the Lakhimpur District for a 
period of five years. R Logan, Report on the Excise Administration of British India (Simla, 
1882) p.24 
353 There was also a widespread practice of giving ‘rum-rations’ to the British army in the 18th 
century, for it was widely believed and confirmed by the current medical opinion that  liquor 
protected the body against heat and cold alike and it was essential in situations that prompted 
fatigue or were thought to be unhealthy. Especially in America, considered to be a rough and 
tough terrain, the British soldiers were regularly provisioned with rum. Generally, the ration 
was about a gill of rum per day- about a gallon per month. An army officer stationed in 
America in the 1780s writes, ‘…This is a bad country, this America, where you always have to 
drink, either to get warm, or to get cool.’ Paul E. Kopperman, “The Cheapest Pay”: Alcohol 
Abuse in the Eighteenth Century British Army, The Journal of Military History 60, no. 3 (July 
1996) pp.446-448. 
354 Report to her Majesty’s Secretary of State of the results of the enquiry into the excise 
administration of the Tea districts of Assam and Darjeeling, Separate Revenue, October 1890, 
nos. 993-1020. 
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in the work process.355 However, this act of giving out rum by planters to the 
workers was not just a simple case of “monopolisation and manipulation of 
addiction” or creation of “liquor-debts” but, also, hinted at their participation in 
the circulation of a ‘cultural artefact’356 with great symbolic and ritualistic 
value. Such gesture, as we will argue later, alludes to the shifting authority of 
managers, which could no longer be premised exclusively on violent strategies 
of work and control.357  
  The dispensation of alcohol by planters points to the emerging transactions 
and new moments in the organisation of work and life on tea gardens. Planters 
gave alcohol as “reward” (bakhshish) for extra labour or a job well done. 
Renewals of contracts by workers were confirmed by a mark of thumb and a 
bottle of rum. The religious occasions on the tea gardens (Karam Puja and 
Holi) did not just mean some leave from work but also a supply of rum.358 
Such transactions of a “culturally valued” object appeared at moments in the 
rhythms of work (extra work, good work, end of work or renewal of contracts) 
and also at moments in the rhythms of life and culture being produced and 
reproduced on plantations (festival, marriage, birth etc.). These rhythms hinted 
                                                 
355 Michael Angrosino argues that such process of “monopolisation” and “manipulation” of 
addiction is evident in the case of Carribean planters, who compelled their Indian indentured 
workers to consume rum rather than marijuana, as their drug of choice, enhancing the 
economic return on their labourers as well as the intensity of their labour. ‘Rum and Ganja: 
Indenture, Drug Foods, Labor Motivation, and the Evolution of the Modern Sugar Industry in 
Trinidad’, by M. V. Angrosino in Bradburd and Jankoviak (ed) Drugs, Labour and Colonial 
Expansion (University of Arizona Press, 2003). 
356 This usage is derived from Mandelbaum’s seminal work on the relationship between 
alcohol and culture. He argues that alcohol is a cultural artifact because the forms and 
meanings of alcoholic beverages are culturally defined and consequently has cultural 
implications. Where alcohol is known, patterns for its use are prescribed usually in fine detail. 
Alcohol may be tabooed, it is not ignored. Traditionally, it has been most widespread 
‘intoxicant’ in use, the most widely valued as a ritual and societal artefact. In some languages, 
as in English and also in Hindi, ‘drink’ and ‘peena’ takes on the connotation of drinking 
alcoholic liquids. D. G. Mandelbaum, Alcohol and Culture, Current Anthropology 6, no. 3 
(June 1965). 
357 See Chapter 5. 
358 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1881-82, 1882-83 and 1884-85; Proceedings 
of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) 
p.177. 
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at patterns and routines of work and life culture taking some “form” on Assam 
plantations.359 
4.4 Industrial Tea, Intensification of Work and the Intoxicant 
Drink  
  From around the late 1870s and early 1880s, the growing relevance of 
Assam/Indian tea in the British market found resonance in several articles and 
books published in Britain and India.  
                                                 
359 These special circumstances of discharge of rum to coolies also baffled the provincial 
administration. In the late 1870s, there was a lot of debate in the official circles about the 
nature of this rum supply to coolies by the planters, which was said to be a loss to the excise 
revenue of the province. For the planters got this rum tax-free, under section 49 of Act XXI of 
1856, which exempted persons importing spirits for private use and not for sale. However it 
was felt that the circumstances of issue constituted a sale because it was issued for a 
consideration, which the planter received in the shape, either of more work, or in lieu of the 
additional wages it would otherwise be necessary to give. In the words of a District 
Commissioner in Assam valley, ‘…they (planters) do sell rum. They, of course, do not get 
cash for it. They give it in place of wages where they give it at all.’  However, in 1877 an 
application asking permission to make planters take out license for selling rum was rejected by 
the financial department. Rum supplied to coolies in Assam not subject to license duties. 
Separate Revenue, August 1877, Nos 27-28; Increase in the number of liquor shops in the 
immediate vicinity of the tea-gardens in Assam, and the consequent increase in drunkenness 
among the coolies employed therein. Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration 
Branch, June 1881, Nos. 7-8, Part B and Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1883-
84. 
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Fig 4.1: Comparative Consumption of Indian and Chinese Tea, 1867 and 1907.360 
In a book celebrating such a development, a colonial official firmly asserted 
that ‘no comparison can be drawn between tea manufacture as followed out in 
China and India (in this year 1881)’. He went on to elaborate his point: 
We (British) have done a great deal since the indigenous plant was discovered in the 
jungles of Assam, now nearly fifty years ago.. The Chinaman grows tea and makes tea 
as he taught us to do it twenty or thirty years ago. The pupil in this case has certainly 
beaten his master..but where we have left our teacher far behind is in manufacture. All 
is hand labour; machinery to them is unknown. The most primitive ideas in tea 
manufacture are still adhered to.. The former is as crude as it was two or five hundred 
years ago; the latter (though still far from perfection) in its many details, in its 
                                                 
360 J. Buckingham, A Few Facts About Indian Tea (London, 1910). 
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numerous machines cleverly contrived to save labour and better the teas, is a striking 
illustration of the activity, the energy, the inventive genius of the Anglo-Saxon race.361 
 
Apart from marking a shift in the discourse from civilised skilled Chinese art 
of tea making to the primitive handmade Chinese tea; the use of machinery in 
tea manufacture was now gaining greater currency. This process of 
mechanisation continued with great fervour till the end of the nineteenth 
century and until the beginning of twentieth century.362 This was also the 
period of unprecedented growth (both in terms of acreage and production), and 
by the turn of century Assam overtook China as the leading tea producing and 
exporting region in the world. A parallel trend to this was the rising 
productivity of the Assam tea plantations. 
 
 
Table 4.1: 
Productivity 
(Pound/Acre) 
1885-
1914.363 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
361 I. L Hauser, Tea: Its Origin, Cultivation, Manufacture and Use (Chicago, 1890) p.11 
362 This becomes evident from the scientific publications on tea compiled in this period. See, 
The Tea Cyclopedia (Calcutta, 1881); The Tea Planter’s Vade Mecum: A volume of important 
articles and information of permanent interest and value regarding tea, tea blight, tea 
cultivation and manufacture, tea machinery (Calcutta, 1885); E. Money, The Cultivation and 
Manufacture of Tea (London, 1883). Money’s book had four editions published in 1870, 1874, 
1878 and 1883. Only in the fourth edition the book had a separate section on tea machinery. 
363 H. Mann,'The Indian Tea Industry in its Scientific Aspects' , Journal of the Royal Society of 
Arts,Vol 79 No. 4089 (Apr 1931) p.475 
Period Productivity 
(Pounds/acre) 
1885-1889 316 
1890-1894 358 
1895-1899 361 
1900-1904 416 
1905-1909 477 
1910-1914 531 
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The rising scale of production and, especially, the substantial enhancement in 
“productivity levels” were not logical outcomes of greater use of machinery in 
manufacture or better methods of cultivation. The technological innovations 
and mechanisation, which transformed the nature and capability of tea 
manufacturing, did not comprehensively affect the cultivation methods.364 The 
field work and plucking of leaves were carried out manually and even required 
a greater human input to keep pace with the mechanising and quickening 
production process.365 A missionary stationed in a tea district described a 
‘machine like organization’ in the tea fields, which worked under extremely 
high pressure to supply leaves to the factory. Such an organization of work and 
increased demands work outputs was attempted to be achieved through a 
greater and closer supervision of work and life in a plantation context. 
Specialization and intensification of work became an integral part of this 
routinizing plantation regime. A planter’s account of the routines of work 
hinted at the ‘tyranny of the clock’ which seemed to have conditioned the life 
and work-discipline on the plantations: 
At six in the morning, and sometimes half an hour earlier, the gongs are beaten in 
different coolie lines…Steam whistle attached to the boiler shrieks out the unwelcome 
news that another day’s labour is to commence at once; and every one turns out to 
work—the women to pluck and the men to hoe and the skilled workmen and children 
to the factory…at noon the gongs and whistle are again sounded when the women take 
the leaf they have plucked to the factory.366 
In the same vein, a recent author calls this period as the beginning of 
“industrial tea”—where the ‘tea workers were assembled in lines and subjected 
to absolutely rigid time-discipline’.367 
                                                 
364 J. Weatherstone, The Pioneers, 1825-1900: The early British tea and coffee Planters and 
their way of life (London, 1986).  
365 E. Money, The cultivation and manufacture of tea (London, 1883) pp.222-271; C. 
Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies in Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.14.   
366 D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.60. 
367 A. Macfarlane & I. Macfarlane, The Empire of Tea; The remarkable history of the plant 
that took over the world (London, 2004) pp. 192-194.  
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  In this context of  formalisation and attempts for a strict enforcement of  time 
work discipline, the looming threat of liquor shops at the ‘gates of every tea 
garden’, where workers could theoretically buy alcohol whenever they wanted,  
became a new concern for planters. The stimulant in this shifting plantation 
context held the potential to become an intoxicant. 368   
 Such planter’s anxieties were manifesting at different levels. Apart from the 
‘Planter’s letter’ published in an English daily in the early 1880s, virtually 
opening the Pandora’s box, there were major criticisms and joint memorandum 
from the planters and the tea companies in the late 1880s and even a debate in 
the British House of Commons about the system of Excise in India in which 
the ‘drink question’ in Assam figured prominently. This was followed by a 
detailed enquiry into the systems of excise in the tea districts of Assam and 
Bengal. These planter’s concerns, was epitomised and, in certain senses, 
reached it apogee with the pamphlet published in 1903 entitled ‘Liquor Shops 
and the Outstill System in Assam’. In this pamphlet, also submitted as a 
memorandum to the government, the author, J. Buckhingham—the person 
chairing the Assam Branch of the tea association, made a scathing criticism of 
the system of excise in Assam. 369  Tea managers, doctors and missionaries 
were interviewed and the point emphatically made that the question of drink 
and the threat of drunkenness was detriment to the health of coolies/tea 
garden.370  
                                                 
368 In the context of Western Europe and United States, scholars have argued that the ‘drink 
question’ and growing wave of temperance becomes relevant in the socio-economic context of 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth century with the rapid pace of industrialisation and the 
growth of middle class as a social force. At one level there was “revolution” in the production 
of the distilled spirits further aggravated in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century with 
the ability of a modern industrialized chemical industry to isolate, mass produce and deliver 
large quantities of alcohol. At the same time the ‘…Champions of the larger processes of 
social change (the middle classes) with a material and moral stake in sobriety called traditional 
habits of consumption into question as they undertook the enormous task of  remaking popular 
traditions to suit their own values and interests.’ The stigmatization of beverage alcohol was 
set into motion, with coffee and tea increasingly seen as the more preferred socially accepted 
choices. See the Introduction: Temperance History in Comparative Perspective in James S. 
Roberts Drink, Temperance and the Working Class in 19th century Germany (Boston, 1984). 
369 In order to guage the medical opinion on this question Buckingham sent out a circular and 
got the response of around a dozen doctors, medical officers stationed in the tea districts of 
Assam and Surma Valley.   
370 Increase in the number of liquor shops in the immediate vicinity of the tea-gardens in 
Assam, and the consequent increase in drunkenness among the coolies employed therein. 
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  The anxiety of loss of labour (rising case of absenteeism, poor performance, 
sickness from drink, drinking brawls and injured coolies) and consequent 
difficulties posed to the work-discipline was the underlying theme of the 
planter representations.371 Summarising the nature of complaints made by the 
garden managers of Cachar, the District Commissioner writes: 
The complaints from garden managers were numerous, and came from all directions. 
…The nature of complaints is as follows:- (1) Coolies become unruly, (2) Assaults 
result, (3) Violent excesses on the part of the coolies, (4) much sickness, (5) 
temporary wildness verging on madness, (6) great drunkenness, (7) indebtedness as 
liquor is got on credit, (8) absconding when unable to pay these debts, (9) idleness and 
absence from work, (10) loss of labour owing to serious evil effects after drinking 
abominable stuff, (11) demoralisation of coolies who lie drunk outside the shops, (12) 
attempts to suicide when mad from drink, (13) constant rows on bazaar nights, (14) on 
pay days offensive.372 
These concerns for the loss of individual worker integral to a  more inter 
dependant work process  was more clearly revealed in the report submitted by 
one Winchester, Medical officer of the Assam Company, stationed in Sibsagar: 
Case 1. Boglai, male, age 32, got drunk at Sonari, and fell into a drain on August 19th, 
1901. From this accident he was unable to work until September 3rd, 1901. 
2. One Etawari, male, age 40, got drunk at Sonari on august 19th, 1901, and in 
consequence was off work till 21st August 1901. 
3. Tara, female, age 44, got drunk at Sonari on 18th August 1901 and was unfit for 
work for 6 days 
4. Chailton, male, age 28, got drunk at Sonari on 1st Sep 1901, quarrelled with some 
other coolies, and in the affray had his metacarpal bone broken. He was off work 
nearly 3 weeks. 
5. Rosona, female, was admitted into hospital on 8th Sep 1901, for injuries inflicted by 
her husband. She was ill ten days.  
6. Haroo, male, age 28, got drunk at Sonari, and got into a quarrel. He received a large 
incised scalp wound for which he was detained in hospital ten days 
                                                                                                                                
Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration Branch, June 1881, nos. 7-8, Part B, 
Correspondence regarding liquor traffic in Darjeeling and Questions in the House of Commons 
concerning the Liquor shops near tea gardens, Separate Revenue, March 1889, Nos. 204-218, 
Correspondence regarding the Liquor Traffic and alleged prevalence of drunkenness in Assam 
and the Tea districts of Bengal, Separate Revenue, March 1889, Nos 219-227, Report to her 
Majesty’s Secretary of State of the results of the enquiry into the excise administration of the 
Tea districts of Assam and Darjeeling, Separate Revenue, October 1890, Nos 993-1020. J 
Buckingham, Liquor shops and the excise administration in Assam, with medical reports and 
correspondance showing abuses of present outstill system (Shillong, 1902) 
371 All the references to the ‘loss of labour’ in the planter and medical discourses are drawn 
from the Buckhingham enquiry, unless otherwise mentioned. 
372 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1883-84. 
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7. Bhoondia, female, age 27, was admitted to hospital on 29th Sep 1901, for an injury 
to knee joint inflicted by her husband while drunk. She was off work 14 days.  
8. Dhanee, female, age 30, was admitted into Hospital on 6th December 1901, having 
been severely assaulted by her drunken husband. She was discharged on 
nineteenthOctober 1901.  
9. Horua, male, age 30, was admitted to Hospital on 21st October 1901 having been 
assaulted when drunk…He was unfit for work until 28th October 1901. 
10. Lohi, male, age 36, was admitted to Hospital 15th Dec 1901 suffering from a 
lascerated wound of the foot, received while drunk. He was discharged on 25th Dec 
1901. 
11. Gonga, female, age 18, off work 2 days from drunkenness 
12. Giridhary, male, age 35, was admitted into Hospital on 15th Dec 1901, suffering 
from choleraic diarrhoea which followed a bout of drinking. He was discharged on 
23rd December 1901. 
13. One Bhondoo, male, age 48, was admitted into Hospital on 15th Dec 1901, with 
Pneumonia following upon exposure while drunk. He is still in hospital (24th Jan, 
1902) 
14. Mongtin, female, age 28, was admitted to Hospital on 15th Dec 1901, having been 
assaulted badly by her drunken husband. She was discharged cured on 22nd Dec 1901. 
 
The mode of this reporting [Incident (drinking)—effect (state of 
drunkenness/accidents/quarrels)—consequence (individual absence from 
work)], and in some ways typical of this whole pamphlet.  For it is not just 
about drinking and its effects perse, but the ways in which it interfered with the 
specialising work process, which becomes the object of concern and enquiry. 
This becomes more apparent in the later part of this report, when the doctor 
discusses the case of Sooklal, who died after a drunken brawl with three other 
coolies. This case says the doctor resulted for the garden not just the ‘…loss of 
Sooklal but also …the loss of three other coolies who were sentenced to 4 
years imprisonment for causing the death to Sooklal’.  
 In a similar tone, Swinley, the manager of Kalapani tea garden in Assam 
valley, reports his ‘drinking losses’ to the Buckhingham enquiry: 
On Sunday, 18th August, owing to excessive drinking at the grog shop at Charali (a 
distance of 6 miles from the gardens in this division) a brawl took place which 
resulted in two men being killed…Two Kalapani coolies were found guilty and 
sentenced under Sec 304 to 12 months imprisonment. All were old hands and most 
well behaved and never gave any trouble. With the aid of a Government grog shop, 
however, I lose one cooly entirely, and the services of two for a whole year. 
 At the same time, the degree of complaints regarding the time-work-discipline 
at the work-place got shriller. Planters started complaining about a rising 
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degree of absenteeism, especially on Mondays, Saturdays (being the day of 
weekly payment) and Sunday (the day of weekly haats, where the coolies 
purchased their drink). The findings of the excise enquiries into the tea districts 
of Assam and Bengal indicated to a ‘…five to ten percent of absence after hat 
days, and this absence is in a great measure (were)…due to the effects of 
drink’. Certain managers interviewed claimed this figure to be as high as 20 to 
25 percent. Again the ‘St. Monday effect’373 was a recurrent grievance with the 
managers interviewed in the Buckhingham enquiry. For instance Evans, the 
Manager of the Suntok garden reported that on Monday, January 13th 1902, 
half his factory was off work from the effects of alcohol. Godfrey, another 
manager of one Dole Bagaun tea garden complained: 
This factory suffers very much by the liquor shop being only about 80 yards away 
from the coolie lines. Every Monday about 15 to 20 coolies are entirely off work 
being drunk, and about another 20 who go to work and cannot complete their full 
tasks, besides about 5 or 6 daily drunk and incapable: as for rows in the lines through 
drink there are several cases; some requiring medical treatment for two weeks. 
Another phenomena was noted  by a  doctor (Sital Chundra Ghosh)  of a 
garden in Assam Valley, where he claimed that ‘sick-list’ showed an alarming 
rise after the haat-days (Sundays), but infact starts going up after the ‘pay 
days’ (Saturdays). And on Monday mornings, ‘one in twenty comes to the 
hospital, pretending illness, after over drinking’.  Wright, the manager of a tea 
garden in Lakhimpur pointed out to, ‘(that) there is more sickness (among the 
coolie population) after a hat day or a coolie festival’. This practice was 
confirmed by Dr. Price in the case of Nowgong tea gardens, ‘..(where) there 
are usually more application for sick leave after hat day than any other day 
during the week. The bulk of these cases are due to the consumption of 
alcohol’. 
                                                 
373 St. Monday, a practice of taking Monday off to recover from the weekend was almost 
universally observed among the English working people, until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, and probably survived into the second half of the nineteenth century and even into the 
twentieth century, in several specific work situations. However, with the rise of capitalism with 
its changed notions of time and the concomitant rise for the work discipline, such practices 
were disciplined in a larger attempt to discipline labour and the production process.  See, E..P. 
Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’, Past & Present 38 (December 
1967)  pp.72-76 and D. A. Reid, ‘The Decline of Saint Monday’, Past & Present 71 (May 
1976) 
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It was not just the low muster on Mondays which concerned the managers, but 
also the inefficiency arising at the work-place, out of the after-effects of the 
drink. It was generally observed that the majority of coolies were not able to 
complete their prescribed daily tasks (nirikh) on Mondays.374 Fitzgerald, the 
manager of Chubwa tea garden in a reply to a circular regarding the working of 
outstill system in Assam in 1888, observed that, ‘…On Mondays the coolies 
take longer over their work, and some of them fail to accomplish their 
moderate tasks at all’. The unvarying and stereotyped excuse of the Mohurirs 
(native work supervisor) to this was, ‘They were drunk yesterday, they are 
feeling it to-day’.  The manager of Suntok tea garden in his testimony also 
attests to this fact: 
…I have to report that on Monday last only 111 men out of 151 on hoeing were able 
to do full tasks. This shortage was entirely due to drunkenness on the previous day. 
On Saturday evening I paid the factory, and on the following day a quantity of liquor 
was brought at the grog shops and brought into the lines. Some of the men were still 
drunk when they went to work on the Monday morning, and incapable of any attempt 
at work whatever. 
Stewart, the manager of Athkel tea garden relates to a similar incident in his 
garden: 
…Last Tuesday morning, I had brought up to me no less than 25 good strong healthy 
coolies, who were unable to finish their nirikh at hoeing on the previous day, owing to 
the after effects from drinking on Sunday. All these coolies are good workers and as a 
rule finish their nirikh  early in the day and the majority of them owned up to the fact 
of not being able to finish their nirikh on account of having been drunk on Sunday. 
 The new  anxieties of ‘work stoppages’, ‘absences’ and ‘general inefficiency’ 
of labour was apparently magnified during festivals, said to be marked by 
prolonged drinking bouts and the coolies not joining work in time. Begg, the 
Manager of Hoolungooree in a graphic description of the celebrations during 
the Durga Puja writes, ‘…the entertainment started this year (1901) on 
Saturday evening the nineteenth October’. On that evening his line chowkidar 
                                                 
374 In order to earn their daily wage (hazira) the coolies had to complete a standard daily task 
(nirikh) the payment for work over and above the standard task, amounted to what was called 
as ticca (or overtime work). The nirikh was not determined by a fixed amounts of hours put in 
daily by the coolie, but by the work assigned by the supervising authorities as constituting a 
reasonable day labour. There was an understanding in the planter-official circle that the coolies 
worked on a primitive, natural notion of time which effected this shift from a time-wage to a 
task-wage. The 1865 labour act fixed a minimum wage, subject to the completion of 9 hours 
daily and 6 days work in a week. But the 1882 Act, made the payment of wage subject to the 
completion of a daily task. 
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reported, ‘We are unable to tell correctly who are in the lines and who are not, 
as many have gone to Moriani and Debrapur’ (the places with liquor shops). 
On Sunday evening the report was, ‘We have not the least idea who are in the 
lines and who are not, but there are fewer people in the lines than out of them. 
We trust, however, they will all return in due course’. But the coolies did not 
live up to their ‘trust’ and on Monday (the supposed day of joining work) at 11 
o’ clock AM, the report went ‘Many have not returned yet, but are coming in 
gradually and many are drunk and unfit for work’. At 5, the same evening the 
report was ‘All have returned barring 3 (2 women and a man). They were last 
seen at Moriani. The two women were sober, but the man was left lying drunk 
in a drain’.  
Again, Grimston, the manager of Balijan tea garden in Dibrugarh district 
recounts his ‘horror-story’ experience on giving leave on a major religious 
festival: 
There have been various minor cases of drunkenness at various times, which have 
temporarily incapacitated coolies from work…I may also mention that, for three 
years, at the request of the native establishment of the garden, I gave leave for the 
Doorga Poojah festivals, to enable them to hold a big festival on the garden, but a 
good proportion of the coolies, owing to drunkenness, were unable to turn out to work 
the day following that on which their leave expired, and some of them were absent for 
several days.  
This practice, claimed Grimston, ‘…disorganised the labour force to such an 
extent that I had to stop giving leave’. That drink facilitated such indiscipline, 
so crucial to continuation of the authority structure is attested to by a planter: 
…While apart from the moral detoriation that ensues, from the Planters’ point of 
view, there is an equally serious result, namely, that this demoralization nullifies the 
effect of “moral persuasion” and “personal respect,” on which a Manager of a Tea 
Estate has in a great measure to rely to secure obedience, and the due observance of 
garden discipline and control, on which the existence of the estates as such depends. 
That such controls were desired by the planters becomes evident from the 
‘Westland note’: 
…they (managers) often prefer that the shops (liquor shops) should be near their 
gardens rather than far away. In the first place, they can often in this way secure some 
sort of control over the shop and its doing; in the second place, they disapprove of 
their coolies going away to a distance, both because it involves loss of time, and 
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because it sometimes gives opportunities for their being tempted away to other 
employers.375 
 
A colonial official of a tea district, writing in the late 1880s makes a very 
interesting observation about the growing criticism of the planters: 
Their (planters) objection to liquor shops near their gardens are in no way based upon 
moral grounds, and there is no reason to suppose that they have any sort of regard for 
the spiritual welfare of the cooly, or take the smallest interest in temperance 
propaganda. What they do dislike is interference with their work, and the disturbances 
in the local bazaars, which many estates have established with the object of retaining 
coolies.376 
This managerial discourse of ‘indiscipline and inefficiency’ and the attendant 
‘loss of labour’ increasingly drew upon the growing moral (missionaries/ 
temperance societies) and medical scientific discourse (doctors of tea gardens) 
emphasising the injuriousness caused by alcohol to the body and soul of the 
coolie/tea gardens. The doctor-medical discourse as the planter-managerial 
discourse was primarily concerned about the problems posed by drink and 
drinking to the process of work and its ability to extract surplus labour. This is 
made evident in a statement of a tea manager of Assam, where he says , 
‘…Work (in the tea gardens) is often impeded by coolies being incapacitated 
for labour by the over indulgence in these spurious spirits, thereby rendering 
an injury not only to the coolies but to the planter (also)’.377 It was not the 
health (physical/moral) of the coolie perse, but the uninterrupted reproduction 
of the intensified labour process of the late nineteenth plantations, which 
underpinned these anxieties. 
                                                 
375 Westland was the Chief Commissioner of Assam in the late 1880s, and in a official reply 
called the Westland note written in August 1889, discussed the various issues regarding the 
excise administration of Assam, in context of the specific charges brought by the planters. 
Report to her Majesty’s Secretary of State of the results of the enquiry into the excise 
administration of the Tea districts of Assam and Darjeeling, Separate Revenue, October 1890, 
Nos 993-1020. NAI. 
376 Correspondence regarding liquor traffic in Darjeeling and Questions in the House of 
Commons concerning the Liquor shops near tea gardens, Separate Revenue, March 1889, Nos. 
204-218. NAI 
377 W. Henderson, a tea manager (Assam valley) in a letter dated 8th October, 1888 to Messrs. 
Finlay, Muir & Co. In Correspondence regarding the Liquor Traffic and alleged prevalence of 
drunkenness in Assam and the Tea districts of Bengal, Separate Revenue, March 1889, Nos 
219-227. Emphasis mine. NAI. 
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4.5. Drink and the Emerging Working Culture 
 From the last decades of the nineteenth century, the change in the policies of 
excise and nature of the plantations in Assam had a bearing on the meanings of 
drink and its relation to work organisation of plantations. The culture and 
meaning of drink, for the plantation coolies also showed signs of dynamism in 
this changed context of life and work in the colonial plantations of Assam.  
The tea gardens of Assam from the middle decades of the nineteenth century 
had relied entirely on an immigrant labour population recruited through the 
agency of contractors and sardars and ‘settled’ on the plantations by contracts.  
The imported workers from the tribal regions of Chotanagpur and Central 
Provinces soon assumed a particular importance and preference among the 
employers in Assam tea gardens. . Like in other tribal societies, alcohol for the 
tribal coolies (Mundas, Santhals, and Oraons etc) had a particular social, 
cultural and religious signification. Drinking formed a crucial part of festivals 
and religious occasions. The Bengal excise commission of 1884, made detailed 
observations of the festivals and rituals of the tribals of Chotanagpur. Talking 
about six major festivals (Bandua, Sarul, Horul Charok, Bhansing Puja, Chhata 
and Kuramgar), it observed that it was a ‘religious duty’ for all persons, male 
and female, to drink the home-brewed handia. Libations of handia were 
offered to the gods, followed by dancing and celebration in which ‘both sexes 
indulge freely in handia’. Again drink was said to important during social 
occasions of birth, marriage and death: 
…In social ceremonies also drinking takes an important place. In marriages the 
bridegroom’s party come to the house of the bride and bring with them provisions 
consisting of rice, fowls, kids, and about 4 seers of handia a head…A few days after 
the death of any person a ceremony is observed, the principal feature in which is a 
feast of the relatives, the same takes place at a birth, and about 4 seers of handia to 
each person is considered a fair allowance…The operation of brewing is carried on 
solely by the women.378 
                                                 
378 In a an anthropological survey of the alcoholic beverages among tribals in India, J.K. Roy 
argues that not only are the alcoholic beverages (especially home-brewed rice beer) important 
in social, cultural, occasions, but also that it formed a part of the diet, having significant 
nutritive value. He cites the case of the tribals from certain regions of north eastern India, 
Madhya Pradesh and in Great Nicobar, who meet 5 to 10% of their requirements of essential 
nutrients like calories, protein, calcium and vitamin B-1 from home fermented beers or from 
the fermented toddies. See Report of the Commission appointed by the Government of Bengal 
to enquire into the excise of country spirit in Bengal, 1883-84. Vol I. (Calcutta, 1884) p. 340 
and J..K. Roy, Alcoholic Beverages in Tribal India and their Nutritional Role. Man in India 
(December, 1978.) pp.312-322. 
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The home brewed rice beer (pachwai) was the drink of preference, and 
absolutely essential on moments of cultural and religious significance. This 
was confirmed to by a religious missionary, Stevenson, stationed in 
Chotanagpur, in his testimony to the Bengal Excise Commision, when he 
commented on the drinking behaviour of Santhals (a prominent tribe in the tea 
gardens of Assam): 
 Sonthals are a drinking people, but did not as a rule drink distilled liquor, their drink 
being rice-beer…Pachwai is used by Sonthals at their feasts, when they would not use 
spirits.379  
The commission made this observation: 
They (Sonthals) prefer handia, but when they cannot get it they will drink shop-made 
pachwai, and even in some cases outstill spirits; the women, however, who observe 
their tribal customs more strictly than the men, will not drink anything but handia 
home-brewed.380 
 The patterns, occassions and meanings of drink of tribal coolies were alive to 
the changed context of life and work in the tea gardens of Assam. Home-
brewed rice beer remained the drink of preference of the tribal coolies in the 
plantations of Assam throughout , and the administrative to ‘assess’ ‘check’ 
and ‘tax’ it met with little success. But there was also a growing trend of not 
always brewing the beer at home but also buying it.  But, at least from the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the consumption of distilled spirits by the 
coolie population showed a pattern of steady growth. One could not miss the 
close correlation between the increasing number of coolie from the tribal 
districts of Chotanagpur and Central Provinces and the rising excise revenue 
from country spirits in the province of Assam.381 
 
 
 
                                                 
379 Report of the Commission appointed by the Government of Bengal to enquire into the excise 
of country spirit in Bengal, 1883-84, Vol II, Evidence of witnesses (Calcutta, 1884) p. 183. 
380 Report of the Commission appointed by the Government of Bengal to enquire into the excise 
of country spirit in Bengal, 1883-84. Vol I (Calcutta, 1884) p. 340 
381 Papers relating to the excise administration in Assam (London, 1904) p.2. 
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gration from Central Provinces and Chota Nagpur related to growing Excise revenue 1881-
1900 
This pattern argued a colonial official, was borne out of the shift in the setting 
of life and work (agricultural sector to plantations) of the coolies: 
It is, no doubt, probably true that coolies generally drink more distilled spirit after 
coming to Assam than they did before they left their homes, and the reason is not far 
to seek. While rice-beer can be prepared by the aboriginal labourer or peasant without 
difficulty in his home, the only apparatus required being a earthen pot, and the only 
materials rice,- his staple food, -and some herbs, distilled spirit if not illicitly prepared, 
must be purchased with cash, and, whatever may have been the condition of life of the 
coolie before he was recruited, there can be no doubt that more cash passes through 
his hands after he has taken service on a tea garden than before. If he was an 
agricultural labourer in his native district, he probably received a large portion of his 
wages in kind, or if a peasant farmer, he subsisted partly on the produce of his 
fields.382 
Generally, he argued that, ‘…it would probably be found on enquiry 
throughout India that coolies employed in factories, mills, and mines consume 
more spirits than they did before they left their native districts to take up such 
employment’. 
 It was not just the type of alcoholic drink which was undergoing a process of 
change (home brewed beer to distilled country spirits) but  the rhythms of 
drink was also responding to the changed circumstances. Drinking, and the 
occasions for a drink, now was not just dependant on rhythms of tradition and 
                                                 
382 Papers relating to the excise administration in Assam (London, 1904) p.2. 
Year Average 
annual 
importatio
n of 
coolies 
from the 
Central 
Provinces 
and Chota 
Nagpur 
Average 
annual 
increase in 
excise revenue 
from country 
spirits 
1881-85 10,704 … 
1886-90 16,967 22,101 
1891-95 20,121 30,146 
1896-
1900 
32,002 38,779 
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culture (religious ceremonies, festivals, marriage, birth and death) but also to 
the emerging rhythms of work.  
  This has to be situated in the context of the establishment and systematisation 
of routines of life and work on plantations observed in this period. There was a 
greater incidence of plantations working on a 'weekly-cycle' of work from 
Monday to Saturday, with Sunday being the weekly holiday.  Salaries (hazira), 
assessed on the basis of daily work, were also paid on a weekly basis (on 
Saturdays generally), in time before the weekly markets (haats). The culture of 
'weekend drinking', therefore gradually assumed a frequent practice in the 
plantations of Assam. Workers at the end of their weekly toil, with cash in 
hand, indulged in long drinking sprees with their fellow workers.  
 The low muster on Monday, the very general complaint of managers, was the 
after effects of these long drinking bouts. Garden Haats, from where the 
coolies purchased their weekly necessities, and often where the liquor shops 
were located, became the site of these weekly drinking occasions. Drink, and 
the weekend drinks in particular, became a crucial axis of sociability of 
plantation workers, cutting across lines region, language and ethnicity.383 It 
assumed all the more significance because the patterns of work and life within 
the plantation were attempted to be drawn on the lines of race and ethnicity.384  
The gendering of such spaces and especially of drink, a feature of the 
contemporary plantations, was not so evident during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The tribal practice of communal drinking did not make 
a distinction between men and women, and this was continued in the 
plantations also. However, the gendering of work in the plantation where the 
                                                 
383 A recent anthropological/sociological study of  the plantation workers in Assam argues that, 
‘…though they (plantation workers) are ethnically different in their homeland yet by virtue of 
their sharing common world-view, folklore, songs, dance, food and drink, like ‘Handia,’ these 
scattered people formed ‘drinking clusters’ which ultimately lead to form social clusters, again 
in Assam tea gardens. ‘World view of the Assam Tea garden labourers from Jharkhand’ by 
P.P. Mahato in In Tea Garden Labourers Of North East India: A Multidimensional Study on 
the Adivasis of the Tea gardens of North East India (Shillong, 1990) p.133. 
384 That such patterns and rhythms of drink in the tea gardens of Assam, survive till this day, is 
confirmed by the findings of an anthropological survey in the tea gardens of Assam under the 
People of India series. See K.S. Singh (General ed.) and B.K. Bordoloi and R.K. Athaparia 
(ed.) People of India, Assam, Vol XV (Part I and II) (Calcutta, 2003) pp.143, 565, 573, 651, 
658, and 678. 
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males did the ‘hard’ manual work of hoeing, digging, clearing etc and the 
females ‘nimble’ plucking and the related construction of drink as source of 
stimulation and masculinity had its implications on drink and drinking patterns 
in the late twentieth century.385 
4.6. The Controls of Drink and Drinking Workers 
 Colonial state was alive to such changed circumstances of drink on the tea 
gardens and the new critiques of drinking (planters, doctors, missionaries and 
the native middle class). It attempted a balancing act between its right to tax 
the drink and the manager’s right to control the drink. Acknowledging to such 
changed concerns of the planters, the Chief Commissioner of the province in 
the late nineteenth century writes:  
When there is a shop in the neighbourhood the men drink when they like, and their 
time is often a very inconvenient time to the person who has to make them work. 
When rum is issued by the planter, he takes care to issue it only when he thinks it is 
wanted for health or as a stimulant to work.386 
There was a distinct policy from the 1880s to offer the manager’s the licenses 
of country liquor shops in tea districts at reduced rates. Also the sites of liquor 
shops in the tea districts were often reviewed and changed when the local 
opinion (read planter opinion) went against it.387 Such ‘privileges’ bestowed on 
                                                 
385 In the contemporary tea gardens of Dooars (West Bengal) Piya Chatterjee, locates the 
presence of the alcoholic worker- Matal, as typically male and as an archetype of working 
class masculinity with its proclivity to alcohol.  Also she argues that it justifies the gendered 
order of the plantations’ regime, where this figure is pitted against the docile, disciplined 
feminine labour. P. Chatterjee, An Empire of Drink: Gender, Labor and the Historical 
economies of Alcohol. Journal of Historical Sociology 16, no. 2 (June 2003) 
386 Increase in the number of liquor shops in the immediate vicinity of the tea-gardens in 
Assam, and the consequent increase in drunkenness among the coolies employed therein. 
Revenue and Agriculture Department, Emigration Branch, June 1881, Nos. 7-8, Part B. 
387 Till the late 1870s, the provincial administration keen on increasing its low returns on 
excise was against such policies of closure. In a circular dated July, 1877, from the Excise 
Commissioner, Williamson to all the District Commissioners of the plain districts, it was 
mentioned that, ‘…  (the administration) can see no sufficient reason for the sacrifice of the 
excise revenue in closing or removing the shops under such circumstances(of complaints by 
tea managers)…If it should appear that, owing to any breach of the conditions of the license, 
annoyance is caused to the planter, or greater facilities are given in any way than those 
sanctioned by law for the sale of liquor to garden coolies, the Deputy Commissioner should 
take measures to punish the license-holders in the prescribed manner…Shops cannot be closed 
merely to suited the convenience of neighbouring land-owners.’ This policy was reworked in 
the 1880s, and the planter’s opinion was invariably sought. Increase in the number of liquor 
shops in the immediate vicinity of the tea-gardens in Assam, and the consequent increase in 
drunkenness among the coolies employed therein. Revenue and Agriculture Department, 
Emigration Branch, June 1881, Nos. 7-8, Part B. 
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the managers became as a new avenue of making some ‘fast and easy money’. 
Attempts at monopolisation and killing competition, something they were so 
used to, and at times even subletting was blatantly practiced. Importantly, such 
practices were not just was not profitable from the monetary sense, but allowed 
new controls for managers over their working population, which the new 
system was so obviously threatening.   
 In 1883, the District Commissioner of Cachar in his report complained that the 
managers were refusing to allow any liquor shops within their grants, and in 
four cases the licensees had to resign their licenses to the garden muharrir.388 
Again, in the year 1885, a manager of the Assam valley tea garden made 
objections to the location of a liquor shop and got it cancelled. Subsequently, 
he himself took up the license at a reduced fee (The licensee had got the 
license for Rs. 125, while the manager paid only Rs. 100 for the same).389 That 
such objections made by the planters regarding the location of liquor shops 
were often motivated, can also be illustrated from the case of a Cachar tea 
manager who made a similar objection. The shop in question was located for 
several years on the estate any complaints.  Infact the license to the shop till 
the previous year was held by the manager and was only cancelled, when he 
was found to have sublet the shop to a local firm of liquor dealers. His 
objection initially was not entertained by the local administration. But on a 
further objection received from the manager of a neighbouring garden, the 
shop was closed.390 
There were reports of planters demanding exorbitant fees from licensees for 
‘prime location’ (haats) within the tea gardens.391 Cases of getting licenses at 
reduced rates and subletting it to the liquor dealers at a higher rate were also in 
abundance. For example in year 1902, in Cachar, out of the five liquor shops 
settled by the local administration with the planters, four were sublet to the 
very people they were initially objecting to. The Deputy Commissioner of the 
                                                 
388 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1883-84. 
389 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1885-86 
390 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1902-03. 
391 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1884-85 and 1888-89 
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district from his experience was of the opinion that, ‘unless the shops are not 
taken over by the respective tea companies and worked as a part of their 
business, settlement should not be made with planters, as most of them are 
quite incapable of resisting the combined temptation of being freed from 
trouble and responsibility and making a handsome profit by subletting’. 392 
 In his enquiry into the excise system of Assam in 1889, the Excise 
Commissioner talked about such tendencies of the plantation managers 
regarding liquor shops: 
In districts of Sylhet and Cachar, and more particularly so in the latter district, many 
shops are situated on tea-gardens, and the abkars are under the patronage of the 
managers…they pay comparatively large sums as rents to the managers for small 
plots…managers are naturally anxious to support, and are urged by their native 
employees (sometimes these are interested in the shops) to support. If a new shop is 
opened, or any attempt made to open one, and there is a probability of any of the 
customers of the old shop being induced to patronize it, strong objections are urged, 
and every possible ground is brought forward, and the matter is then looked at from a 
moral aspect, and the charge is made that we are augmenting the number of shops and 
inducing coolies to drink by putting temptation in their way. The question of the loss 
to the existing shop is kept back…as a rule, planters do not object to liquor shops, but 
to any act that will injure the shops which they are interested in maintaining.393 
 The attempts to control the drink gained a particular urgency and purpose in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. There were reports of managers 
strictly controlling the issue of rice to the coolies.394 A concept of the ‘ticket 
system’ was mooted by some planters and even recommended by the 
Buckhingham enquiry. It suggested that the sale of liquor from the shops to the 
coolies should be made only on the production of ‘liquor tickets’, issued by the 
garden management. The idea of ‘canteen system’ floated by a superintendent 
of a tea company in Jorhat (Mr. Showers) in 1902, attracted a lot a attention in 
the planter-official circles, as an innovative idea of controlling the coolie drink. 
The man in question, in consultation with the managers of neighbouring 
garden took out the license for the local liquor shop (at a much reduced rates), 
and opened a liquor canteen in each of the five garden served by this shop. 
This made the controls on the timing and amount of the drink in accordance 
                                                 
392 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1902-03 
393 J.J.S. Driberg, Report on the Special Enquiry into the Excise on Country Spirits in Assam 
(Shillong, 1890) pp.24-25. 
394 Report of the Indian Excise Committee, 1905-06 (Madras, 1907) p.73. 
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with the work schedule of the plantations possible. The shops served by this 
canteen were open only for two hours in the afternoon on week-days and in the 
mornings on Sundays.395  
4.7. Conclusions 
 The drink question in the tea gardens of Assam, as it were, was a product of 
convergence of various processes and changes undergoing in the colonial 
context of the late nineteenth century. The colonial state claiming to work 
under the policy of ‘maximum revenue from minimum consumption’ asserted 
its right of taxing the ‘coolie drink’, by checking his home brewed stuff and 
offering them with opportunities to buy the ‘legal liquor’ instead. Again a 
stabilization of plantation since had several implications. A degree of 
mechanization of the production process necessitated the work process in the 
fields to be reconstituted. Specialization of tasks and closer supervision of 
workers attended the changing work organization in search for an ever greater 
efficiency and productivity. This suggested a move from an exclusive violent 
strategy of work intensification rampant in the 1860s; but it did not mark a 
clear departure from these disciplinary practices. The problem of drinking was 
rooted in this shift where a new demand for ‘time work discipline’ produced 
the anxieties of plantation capitalism of drinking coolies. Yet the stigma of 
drink was not desired to be eradicated, for planters knew its ritualistic and 
stimulative roles in a working population which valued it socially and 
culturally; but had to be controlled and channelized to fuel the engine of 
plantation capitalism.  
  Again the planter concerns and strategies alluded to the cultures of work and 
leisure of coolies being produced and reproduced in a changing and stabilizing 
plantation context.  From a ritualistic, religious, it now also conveyed other 
purposes and meanings in a changed context of life and work. Such a changed 
manifested not just in what one drank (home made rice-beer / distilled spirits 
from shops) but also when one drank. The occasions to drink were now not just 
contingent on the social and cultural rhythms (religious occasions, festivities, 
                                                 
395 Report on the Excise Administration in Assam, 1902-03, 1903-04 & 1904-05. 
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birth, marriage, death) but also on rhythms of work (weekend drinking). 
Drinking became a crucial axis of sociability and haats, the sites of such 
consolidations. 
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5. Towards a New Contract on Plantations: Dustoor 
and Protest 
5.1 Introduction 
A process of “stabilisation” of the plantation structure in Assam (since the 
1870s) marked a shift from the isolated and unsustainable clearance sites (of 
the early 1860s). The early sites characterised by a remarkable degree of labour 
“unsettlement” and counteracted by planters through privatised arrest and 
violent disciplining—as made feasible by Assam contract.396 A relatively 
“settled” and “systematising” nature of plantations revealed other modes of 
intensifying the specialising work process and controlling the workers but, at 
the same time, there was no clear break from earlier modes of labour 
settlement and control.397  
Such “novel” strategies seemed to have occasioned the change of managers of 
Jellupur (Cachar), Bhagaicherra (Sylhet) and Barjan (Sibsagar) in the year 
1896.398 Within the space of a few days, there were assaults and organised 
attacks directed towards the new sets of authority. In one instance, the 
bungalow of the manager was torched. In an incident reported from 
Madhabpur garden (Sylhet, 1902), the workers attacked the manager who had 
come to their residential lines to take their hoes, which they were used to 
retain.399 A more glaring instance of “reaction” occurred on the Rowmari tea 
garden (Lakhimpur, 1903). Workers of this garden used to umbrellas while 
working in the rain, were being compelled to switch to Jhampis (a kind of wide 
                                                 
396 For details see Chapter 2. 
397 For instance, the question of coolie drinking was perceived an infringement to the work 
process was sought to be controlled and mobilised by the Assam planters.  This was 
reminiscent of the opium question of the late 1830s, where the perceived addiction of the 
Assamese was to be channelized to the plantation project through a ban of cultivation and 
making them available only through government shops. This planters believed would compel 
the Assamese peasant to offer services to tea gardens for cash payments, not only to pay their 
revenue but also to serve an addiction. Such a strategy did not find an approval of the colonial 
state at that point.  For details see Chapter 1 and 4. 
398 List of serious cases of assault on tea gardens of Assam, Assam Secretariat Proceedings, 
Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
399 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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brimmed hat). This followed a sequence of assaults targeting the management 
and a “mass walkout” of workers from the plantation.400 
These incidents of “coolie violence”, appearing with a greater frequency in the 
colonial archives of the late nineteenth century, hinted at the deepening 
colonial concerns about the “deteriorating” relationship between managers and 
coolies on the tea gardens.401 Like the “unpopularity” of cha-bagaan and the 
escalating incidence of coolie drinking, the overt “friction” within the tea-
gardens posed a threat to the plantation work process.402 Colonial reporting and 
reasoning had for long subscribed to the stereotype of the “ignorant” 
“primitive” coolies responding to their elementary instincts of passion and 
violence.403 One of earliest provincial labour reports, mentioning the ‘nature of 
                                                 
400 House of Commons question on a coolie riot at a tea garden in Assam as a result of which, 
42 coolies have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment 22nd July, 1903. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com. 
401 This was a change in language in comparison to the 1860s—seen exclusively through the 
prism of desertion/unsettlement. In the early 1870s, a manager from Cachar narrating the 
labour difficulties purely characterised the workers as ‘insolent, defiant and insubordinate.’ An 
exclusive concern with desertion/unsettlement and personalised defiance became untenable in 
light of the systematic “abuses” reported in recruiting and widespread “unpopularity” of 
Assam tea gardens. In the late 1880s, the colonial establishment in Fort William in a 
communication for preparation of  a special report on the workings of the 1882 Act instructed 
the provincial establishment in Assam to ‘supply more definite and fuller information on the 
following points…i.e. relations between the coolies and planters’. Reports on the Tea and 
Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874) p.47; Government of India Despatch, dated the 
22nd day of June 1889, with its enclosures, including Reports by Mr. Tucker; and of Memorial 
of the Indian Association of Calcutta, dated the 12th day of April 1888 (London, 1889) p.7  
402 According to a colonial communication circulated in 1897, the cases of conflict on Assam 
plantations had now to be “specially” reported. The colonial anxieties can further be gauged by 
the increasing volume of correspondence relating to “assaults” “collisions” and “disturbances” 
on Assam tea gardens in this period. Home A, Dec 1897, nos. 86-87, ASA ; List of serious 
cases of assault on tea gardens of Assam, Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-
117, Aug 1904, ASA; Collisions between Managers and Coolies on tea gardens of Assam. 
Home A, nos. 33-34, Sep 1899, ASA;  Investigation into cases of disturbances on tea gardens, 
Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Home A, nos.30-34, June 1903, ASA; Enquiry into causes of 
friction between planters and their coolies on tea-gardens, Assam Secretariat Proceedings, 
Home A, nos. 98-112, January 1904, ASA. The cases here are drawn from these sources unless 
otherwise mentioned. 
403 For instance, in the late 1880s, the Chief Commissioner of Assam (Dennis Fitzpatrick) 
reacting to the  reported cases of conflicts reasoned that ‘with about nine hundred  tea gardens 
employing upwards of 300,000 primitive ignorant coolies, such a state of matter was 
inevitable’. He was extremely critical of the native vernacular press for ‘sensationalising’ these 
minor instances and thereby ‘deterring’ the distressed people from going to Assam. 
Approximately a decade later, another Chief Commissioner (Henry Cotton) in a similar vein 
contended that ‘it can hardly be expected that such an enormous population of absolutely 
uneducated and in many cases, semi savage labourers, occasional instances of friction and 
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relations between managers and coolie’, framed the instances of conflict as 
purely “isolated”, which did not reveal any ‘determined or premeditated 
resistance’.404 The exceptional “brutal planter” perpetrating tough methods of 
disciplining was often seen as that provocation.405 
  Protest action assuming a collective form has a much longer presence on the 
Assam plantations. The Kacharis, who worked on the Assam company 
plantations in the 1840s and 1850s, exhibited a degree of concert and purpose 
around issues of wages, timing of payment and supply of rice—leading to 
several work stoppages and strikes. The initial reason for the planters to 
contract (through Act XIII) and introduce another class of coolies (i.e. the so 
called imported Bengalis) was deeply embedded in such labour difficulties.406  
The planter anxieties of “unsettlement” of migrant workers (in the 1860s) was 
not limited to the incidence of high mortality and individual desertions, but 
was informed by a degree of “collective” response to the deplorable conditions 
of work and life on the new clearances. There were several instances of 
                                                                                                                                
collision should not occur.’  Collisions between Managers and Coolies on tea gardens of 
Assam. Home A, nos. 33-34, Sep 1899. ASA. 
404 This view was shared by the Bengali investigator who argued that ‘…it is scarcely possible 
for ignorant and timid coolies to resist such oppression by organised opposition’. Assam 
Labour Report, 1884, p.4; The Bengalee 27, no.48 (Dec 11, 1886) p.569 reprinted in D. 
Ganguli, Slavery in British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972) p.35. 
405 The brutal planter image having strong lineages from the slave plantations came to be 
invoked in Assam plantations, when violence and especially flogging started being reported 
from the 1860s. The colonial invocation was individualised and purely seen as isolated and 
exceptional as was the case of Dunn—an Assam company manager who was found guilty of 
flogging the workers (See Chapter 2). This was in contrast to a more general representation of 
Assam planters as excessive and brutal—in the writings and literary productions of the local 
intelligentsia (especially Bengal). In a strong rebuttal to this growing trend, a planter writing in 
the early 1880s suggests that ‘…It (Brutal planter) has been sounded and maintained in India 
by people who were in English nurseries at the  time that the Indian press gave the preliminary 
howl; the howl, strange to say, that has been applied to the various communities of planters all 
the world over—West Indian, South American, Tirhoot, Wynaad….because, many years ago, a 
few isolated cases of ill-treatment came before the public notice in India, tea-planters have ever 
since been stamped with the mark of the beast, and officially looked upon almost in the light of 
quasi-slave-drivers.’ Such a line of reasoning was furthered by an ex-Chief Commissioner of 
Assam who claimed that, ‘…in the midst the many hundreds of managers that are employed 
there must be some who are unworthy, and scandals have not been unknown.’ Papers relating 
to coolie trade in Assam (London, 1867); N. Bhatia, Acts of Authority/Acts of Resistance: 
Theatre and Politics in Colonial and Postcolonial India (Michigan, 2004) pp.35-37; D. 
Ganguli, Slavery in the British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972); S. Baildon, The Tea Industry of 
India p.150; B. Fuller, The Empire of  India (London, 1913) p.204.  
406 See Chapter 2. 
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workers moving en masse out of these sites, making complaints to the 
magistrate stationed at the district headquarters for acts of abuse, difficult 
nature of work, misrepresentation of the recruiters, and non-payment of the due 
wages.407 The formalisation of Assam contract, with explicit powers for 
planters to privately arrest and implicit approval to privately discipline, was 
unleashed to counteract the responsiveness of workers to the circumstances of 
employment and life on the plantations. 
 Keeping such qualifications in mind, the present chapter does not intend to 
posit that worker protest only make an appearance at a given “moment” in the 
history of Assam plantations. It rather seeks to explore its shifting form and 
nature and how it was embedded in the changing practices of plantation life 
and work.  The first section will firmly situate the particular context of this 
interrogation. A major concern in such an exercise is to explore the idioms 
gaining currency like—dustoor (customary)—through which collective anxiety 
and action came to be framed and articulated. Dustoor, as elucidated by a 
provincial official, were ‘certain local practices varying from garden to garden 
and on particular points possibly even conflicting with rules…the details of 
which coolies are intimately acquainted’. Resentment and unrest on tea-
gardens, he went on to suggest, was the consequence ‘of departure from 
(dustoors) in a direction unfavourable to them (coolies)’.408 The episodes of 
“unrest”, cited at the outset, seem to confirm this observation.  The workers on 
the different gardens used to a dustoor—a particular manager, a particular 
                                                 
407 See Chapter 2. 
408 This statement was made in response to an assertion made in a provincial labour report. The 
report suggested that the ‘coolies have a degree of awareness that the conditions of their 
employment are regulated by rules, not by the bargaining of the market; the rules are 
unfavourable to them in some respects, but favourable to them in other and they resent any 
attempt to exact more labour than the rules warrant.’ The allusion to custom hinted at the 
domain beyond the strict framework of contract. This revealed the limitations of the 
overbearing contract and its rules in framing the conditions of life and work on the plantations. 
The ‘custom of the garden’ did not always agree with the ‘rule of contract’.  This goes in line 
with assertion made by Anderson who argues that in India contract did not become a common 
reference point for constituting mutual obligations. These derived instead from relationship of 
hierarchy and deference, which were constantly being remade in the workplace.  Assam 
Labour Report, 1902-1903, p.12; Letter from P.G. Meltius, Commissioner of the Assam Valley 
Districts to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam dated 6th May, 1904, Rev A, 
77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. M. Anderson, ‘India, 1858-1930: The Illusion of free labour’ in 
Craven and Hay (ed.) Master, Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire (Chapel 
Hill, 2004) p.451. 
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practice (keeping the hoes, using umbrellas) or broadly a particular custom—
were resisting its change. 
 Recognising the analytical purchase of the notion of dustoor, the discussion 
will refrain from employing it in this restricted sense. Dustoor, as this chapter 
will argue,  does not imply a yearning  for a reified culture or an unchanging 
custom, but alludes to a developing expression of an “acceptable” conduct  of a 
tea garden—an “unwritten contract” between workers and managers.409 This 
expression (of what was acceptable) did become a site of bargaining between 
workers and managers.410 This contest, at times, assumed an episodic 
“collective” nature. Coolies participated in the process of ascertaining the 
boundaries of what was acceptable, by acting in a context of its perceived 
outrage. The instances of the “serious disturbances” (read collective forms of 
protest) on tea gardens as explained by another officer from the Assam 
colonial establishment: 
 Was often due to the idea (well founded or otherwise) that wages are too low, the 
introduction of some new dustoor or some indiscretion on the part of the manager. 
Some act of the manager may in itself be sufficient cause for the disturbance, but it is 
generally not sufficient in itself to account for the serious disturbance that sometimes 
occur, in which the majority of a labour force take part.411 
                                                 
409 This draws from the notion of ‘moral economy’ as conceptualised by Thompson and Scott. 
Thompson’s reading of the food riots of eighteenth century England situates certain 
“legitimising notions” emanating out of a desire to defend ‘traditional rights or customs.’ The 
notion of moral economy in Scott’s analysis develops how the norm of reciprocity and the 
rights to subsistence informs the peasant action in South East Asia under colonial rule. These 
ideas are further reinforced by Bhattacharya’s discussion of labouring poor, where he argues a 
common a commonality in ‘cultural terms’ where ‘reference point is not wage slavery under 
capital, but poverty and the life of labour in everyday experience.  E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral 
Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and Present, no.50 (Feb, 
1971) pp.76-136; J. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, 1974).  
410 Such bargaining has been argued in the context of Calcutta jute mill workers in the colonial 
period.  For instance, Chakrabarty argues that the notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ informed 
the worker’s protest and action, ‘where the worker reacted when he  saw himself being 
deprived of something that he thinks is justly his’. Again Basu reads the jute workers’ politics 
as being strongly influenced by notions of customary rights based on mutuality of shared 
interests at workplaces. D. Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class History (Princeton, 1989) 
p.178; S. Basu, ‘The Paradox of Peasant-Worker: Re-Conceptualizing workers’ Politics in 
Bengal’, Modern Asian Studies 42, no.1 (2007) pp.47-74. 
411 These incidents which were unreported earlier were later collapsed under overarching 
categories of “unlawful assemblies’ and “rioting”. Just in the period from 1885-1890, there 
were 416 cases of unlawful assemblies and 529 incidents of rioting on the tea gardens of 
Assam. H.L. Thomas, Sub divisional officer, South Sylhet to the Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet 
dated 23rd January 1904. Rev A, 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA; Assam Labour Report for the years, 
1884 pp.6-7; 1885 p.5; 1887 pp.8-9; 1888 p.34; 1889 pp.19-20; 1890 p.20; S. Bose, Indian 
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The anxieties and necessity to act collectively, as emanating from the material 
and social life on the tea garden, will be detailed and discussed in the 
subsequent sections. This ranges from a breakdown of cultural norms, violence 
on the part of managers, payment of short wages, and stoppage of fixed price 
rice. At times, it was considered as illegitimate to “wrong” a woman as to 
arbitrarily increase the tasks.  Here, “collective” is not used as a short hand for 
an “undifferentiated coolie community” residing in the garden, nor implied to 
be the “pre-existing” identities of ethnicity/caste/religion within them. The 
discussion will be attentive to ascertain how the recurring contingencies to act 
“collectively” related to the “solidarities” constituted, reconstituted and 
transformed in the practices of work and life on the plantations.412  
Before engaging with these lines of enquiry, two preliminary caveats are in 
order. First, this exercise does not intend to imply that the conditions of 
operation of life and work of tea coolies in the plantations were favourably 
“negotiated” and coercion/violence was always resisted. The interest in such an 
exercise is not to qualify the notion of “oppressive tea garden” by the practices 
of “resisting coolies”. This is more to foreground the forms of protest—
assuming a collective nature, as embedded in the practices of plantation life 
and work of the period. Secondly, this is not to construct a hierarchy between 
the confrontational collective and non-confrontational individualised modes of 
protest, valorising in effect the “flashes of outbursts” in neglect to the 
“everyday forms of protest”.413 
                                                                                                                                
Labour Historiography and its Historiography in the Pre-Independence Period, Social Scientist 
13, no. 4 (April 1985) p.9. 
412 The “solidarities” formed during the process of migration, work and life and 
“contingencies” to collectively act emerging to address overlapping concerns, rather being 
exclusive, in effect reinforce each other.  This moves away from a unilinear process of “class 
formation” towards greater politicization as observed in some other contexts. See, S. 
Bhowmick, Class Formation in the Plantation System (Delhi, 1981). 
413 M. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll: The World that Slaves Made. (New York, 1972) 285-324; 
D.E. Haynes and G. Prakash, Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in 
South Asia (1991) pp.1-22. Also see M. Adas, ‘From Foot-dragging to Flight: The Evasive 
History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and South-east Asia. and A.L. Stoler, Plantation 
Politics and Protest on Sumatra Coast in J.C.Scott and B.J.T. Kerkvliet (ed.) Everyday Forms 
of Peasant Resistance in South East Asia(New Haven,1984) pp.64-86; pp.124-143. 
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5.2 Dustoor and Assam Tea Gardens in the late nineteenth 
century  
 Workers on the late nineteenth century plantations, apart from their daily tasks 
on the fields and factories, also carried out agricultural activities on the rice-
lands, which the managers selectively rented out to them. It was promoted by 
the management, as a part of the cost of reproduction of the workforce was 
shifted to the agricultural sector, making a below subsistence wage and a 
flexible working force possible.414 This was also a planter’s strategy of 
“settlement” beyond the contract, which was assuming some consequence 
during this period, especially in the district of Sylhet in Surma Valley.415 
However, during the tea manufacturing season, when the demands for working 
hands were at its peak, the worker’s participation in her/his own agrarian 
activities was deemed as an interference.416 A tea manager (Sylhet, 1902), 
operating along those lines, arrived at the residential quarters of the workers 
(coolie lines) to collect the hoes, which they were using for their own 
agricultural activities. Workers used to the dustoor (of keeping their hoes)—
that contributed to their material subsistence (agriculture)—could not come to 
                                                 
414 R. Dasgupta, ‘From Peasant to Tribesmen to Plantation workers’ in S. Karotemprel, B.D. 
Roy (ed.) Tea Garden Labourers of North East India (Shillong, 1990) pp.19-23. 
415 In the late 1880s, the ceiling for plantations leasing out land to workers without special 
permission was up to ten percent of the total grant of land or a maximum of two hundred acres. 
The 1906 enquiry particularly favoured the positive results in Surma valley of planters settling 
their workers on the garden rice lands and they did not show resentment (as Assam valley 
planters) for allowing the time-expired workers some land outside the garden grant. This was 
the outcome of different strategies of settlement in the two valleys. Citing the case of the 
district of Sylhet, the report mentioned that the rice lands given to workers formed an integral 
part of their income and workers tended to move to gardens giving rice land. One garden of the 
district parcelled out five hundred acres of land for a working population of about three 
thousand.  Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee (Calcutta, 1906); R. Dasgupta, 
Labour and Working Class in Eastern India: Studies in Colonial History (Calcutta, 1994) 
p.158; K. Dasgupta, ‘Wasteland Colonization Policy and Peasantization of ex-Plantation 
Labour in the Brahmaputra Valley’ in S. Karotemprel, B.D. Roy (ed.) Tea Garden Labourers 
of North East India (Shillong, 1990) pp.35-50. 
416 There were managers interviewed by the 1906 enquiry who favoured a strategy of land 
settlement but also felt that the cultivation work on these land often takes workers off work 
during the manufacturing season. Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the 
Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p .155. 
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terms with the legitimacy of its “change”, and made an organised attack on the 
offending manager.417 
 Such modifications were symptomatic of an intensified work process, most 
visibly manifested in the case of introduction of hats (Jhampis) in Rowmari 
(Lakhimpur, 1903). Investigation of the incident revealed that the garden, of 
late, was practising harsher work discipline and production speedups.418 
Among the numerous amendments initiated, it was also realised that the 
coolies using hats made them more “productive”, by allowing the use of both 
the hands for plucking work. This flexibility was not feasible in the prevailing 
mode of holding an umbrella during work. The “unpopular” move manifested 
in assaults on the manager, the assistant manager, and the head clerk. The 
protesting party (about two hundred) marched on to Dibrugarh (district 
headquarters) and assembled in front of the Magistrate’s office (Kutcherry) 
ventilating their concerns to the colonial authorities. Military force had to be 
called in to disperse the crowd. This was a moment of unusual success for the 
workers. The colonial report on the incident concluded that ‘they (coolies) will 
use umbrellas and the managers have generally had to give in’. 419 
  The Rowmari affair was not an isolated case and some other incidents in this 
period alluded to these concerns. For instance, determined action directed at 
the management transpired on Joyhing tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1896) when the 
manager tried to extend the “working week” by forcing work on Sundays.  
Again, when the manager of Adabari garden (Sylhet, 1897) compelled the 
workers to the fields on a particular Sunday, there was a general feeling of 
discontent. Shortly after, the women workers working in the tea-house 
(factory) attacked the European assistant with their umbrellas and threw him 
                                                 
417 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904. ASA. 
418 R. Behal and  P. Mohapatra: ‘Tea and Money versus Human Life’: The Rise and Fall of the 
Indenture System in the Assam Tea Plantations 1840-1908 in Plantations, Proletarians and 
Peasants in Colonial Asia, special edition, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, nos.3&4 (1992) 
pp.165-166. 
419 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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over into a ditch. Several male workers, who were present in the scene, stood 
looking on, encouraging the women.420  
 Such a process can also be illustrated by a photograph from the early twentieth 
century depicting the daily operation of field work on a tea garden. The 
practices of employing water carriers (Pani-wallah), especially during the peak 
season—as shown in the photograph—was not simply instituted to “benefit” 
the workers, but were usually sporadic measure to minimise breaks and persist 
the incessant process of work.421 This becomes evident in a “hypothetical” 
dialogue noted in the planter language handbook, where the worker on telling a 
manager that s/he was thirsty, is promptly told by him that ‘Paniwallah is 
bringing water’.422 
 
                                                 
420 John Kelly in a study on Fiji plantations cites a similar report by an overseer of Fiji 
plantation of work-gangs of women coolies disciplining their European overseers by capturing 
them, beating them, immobilising them and urinating on them. Such an act argues Kelly, had a 
sexual dimension to it, for the ‘dignity of the overseer, his masculine, sexual, controlling 
persona could not survive it.’ Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 
1904, ASA; J. D. Kelly 'Coolie' as a Labour Commodity: Race, Sex, and European Dignity in 
Colonial Fiji in Plantations, Proletarians and Peasants in Colonial Asia, special edition, 
Journal of Peasant Studies 19, nos.3&4 (1992) pp. 259-263. 
421 Photograph titled Carrying water for tea coolies is roughly from the later decades of the 
nineteenth century and  forms part of a private collection of W. Pratt who is the great grand-
daughter of an ex Cachar planter named Samuel Davidson (1846-1921). Davidson was the 
manager of Burkhola tea garden in the late 1860s till the late 1870s, and has also been credited 
for several innovations in tea manufacture and machinery. W. Pratt, Life with Tea and India: 
Diaries of Family life in the Cachar area, Spring Lecture meeting, Families in British India 
Society, 22nd May 2010. See http://www.koi-hai.com; http://www.new.fibis.org/?s=tea 
422 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927). 
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  Figure 5.1: Garden Paniwallah (Water Carrier) 
 
The intensification of the working day became the theme of many 
confrontations. For instance, the workers (numbering 150-200) of Khorikotia 
garden (Sibsagar, 1899), went up to the manager and complained that they are 
deprived of a longer “break” during the work day. This led to an animated 
exchange with the manager, who caught a worker by his hair and threw him 
down. Soon, the assembled workers turned on the manager and he received 
several blows from their lathies (sticks). Some sixty workers of Sephanjuri 
(Sylhet, 1902) made a combined protest on the refusal of the manager to give 
them leave. A quantity of plucked leaf was thrown away and a large body of 
coolies left the garden. The report of an altercation from a South Sylhet tea 
garden (Sylhet, 1903) mentioned, ‘(that the) disturbance was due to a general 
reduction in wages and a consistent refusal to grant leave during the busy 
season’.423 
                                                 
423 HL Thomas, Subdivisional officer, South Sylhet to the Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet dated 
23rd January 1904. Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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A modification in the rhythms of work and enforcement of stricter discipline 
were manifesting in the change of dustoor—from keeping hoes to giving up 
hoes, from umbrellas to hats, and from Sunday being holiday to becoming a 
working day. Revisions of dustoor, in these cases, encoded moves to 
restructure the organisation and conduct of work. This generated a collective 
sense of outrage and a growing necessity to act.  
 The manufacturing season, when the workers were expected to turn up earlier, 
was often marked by the absence of a rest day (especially Sunday), as 
obligated by the contract.424 Moreover, workers were habitually allocated 
overtime work, which according to some contemporary was not entirely 
voluntary.425 These tendencies were facilitated by the contract(s) and many 
specific plantation practices, which empowered the managers to induce 
workers to toil harder and longer, affecting the health and well-being of the 
workers.426 An Assam valley manager felt that the arrest rights were 
                                                 
424 The protective clauses of Assam contract which ensured a paid weekly holiday became 
largely irrelevant because of the establishing remuneration methods based daily earnings 
according to ‘tasks’ completed.  Such revisions and especially forcing labour on Sundays 
found some resonance in the ideas of “unpopularity” of work on Assam plantations. An early 
and typical planter concern for Sundays being deemed a holiday was voiced in 1872 where a 
manager from Upper Assam suggested that, ‘…Sundays where mostly no work is done, is 
alone an item of most serious moment to us all (planters).’ He went to statistically suggest that 
this ‘arbitrarily increases all expenditure by some fourteen percent’ This “saving” as he further 
mentioned’ would enable all of us who cannot now import (workers)’. Reports on the Tea and 
Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874) p.105 
425 C. Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies in Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.47. 
426 The relationship between overwork and sickness came to ‘scientifically’ defined and 
medically identified in the late nineteenth century Assam plantations. An instance of the 
effects of “overwork” was exemplified in the case of Dhinkari tea garden (Assam Valley) by a 
sanitary investigation to “explain” the high rates of mortality—which in the period from 1884 
to 1887 consistently maintained annual rates of higher than 8%. The investigation revealed that 
this one hundred and eighty acres large estate, producing an average yield of 550 pounds of tea 
per acre, had a working population of one hundred sixty. This was deemed as an “unhealthy” 
condition of work according to the current scientific/medical opinion. It was argued that 
gardens producing more than 300 pounds of tea per acre required a minimum of one adult 
coolie per acre of working force. The medical report concluded that the, ‘coolies were often 
put to overtime and extra work, to prevent a waste of growing leaf. Insufficient labour was one 
of the main causes of sicknesses. Assam Labour Report, 1887, p.32; R. Behal and  P. 
Mohapatra, ‘Tea and Money versus Human Life’: The Rise and Fall of the Indenture System in 
the Assam Tea Plantations 1840-1908 in Plantations, Proletarians and Peasants in Colonial 
Asia, special edition, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, nos.3&4 (1992) p.160. 
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particularly necessary and essential because it ‘prevented the coolie from 
sitting idle’.427  
Alluding to the general pervasiveness of such work intensification strategies 
and practices, a colonial official from Assam valley noted, ‘that in order to 
secure economy, a stricter discipline has been enforced on many gardens and 
owing to the shortage of labour, coolies are turned out to work willy nilly. 
Work on the tea gardens has become more irksome’.  Yet, at the same time, he 
also perceived certain “limits” to these drives. He went on to suggest ‘that the 
coolies being better acquainted with their rights are more disinclined to endure 
the strict discipline under which they are kept’.428 
5.3 The Shifting Authority of Manager 
The execution of tea garden discipline was often attributed to the methods and 
functioning of the manager—the Sahib.429 This, as already discussed, was 
conditioned by the legislative and extra-legislative constructions of his 
“exceptional” authority, and its consequent bearing on the social and work 
relations of the plantations. Writing in the late nineteenth century, an Assam 
manager asserted with this confidence ‘that he (planter)  is vested  with a good 
deal of power and authority—partly by law, but mostly by coolie tradition and 
                                                 
427 Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874) p. 153. 
428 Apart from the changes in productivity (See Chapter 5) there was a general decline in the 
working population of Assam valley by four percent between 1900 and 1903. In the same 
period the area under tea cultivation however increased by ten percent. D.H. Lees, Deputy 
Commissioner, Darrang to the Commissioner of Assam Valley in a letter dated 21st April 1904. 
Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
429 The manager of a tea garden (Sahib) in the late nineteenth century ranged from a sole 
European (and sometimes Indian) in charge of a smaller tea garden, to larger establishments 
(1000 acres and above) employing  a head European in charge (Burra Sahib) above one or 
more assistants (Chota Sahib). The assistants often had distinct roles. One of them was 
delegated to oversee field work and the other, generally a mechanical engineer, looked after 
the work in the factory and was responsible for the quality and quantity of tea manufactured. 
The manager earned anything between Rs. 450 and Rs. 600 and some larger companies (like 
Assam and Jorehaut Company) even allowed them a share in the profits. The assistants’ salary 
could range from anything between Rs. 50 and Rs.250 with a pony allowance, a house, and 
one or two servants. ‘Life in an Indian Tea District’, Chambers's Journal of Popular 
Literature, Science and Arts, no. 772 (Oct 12, 1878) p.653; D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea 
planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.8; H.A. Antrobus, A History of the Jorehaut Tea 
Company Ltd (London,1948) p.273; S. Ward, A Glimpse of Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.115; J. 
Weatherstone, The Pioneers, 1825-1900: The Early British Tea and Coffee Planters and their 
way of Life (London, 1986) pp.78-80; T. Kinney, Old Times in Assam (Calcutta, 1896) p.26. 
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his own self-assertion’, where in all events, ‘he is generally quite able to cope 
with any tendency to kick over the traces’.430 Another manager, fairly 
competent in stamping his writ, was being recollected with a sense of 
admiration by his assistant (Sylhet, 1890s): 
Charlie (the Manager) was a first-class planter who ruled with a rod of iron. He was 
not loved by his labour, but feared, and the discipline at Chandpore (tea garden) was 
unique even for Sylhet (the district). No detail was too small for his attention. Each 
operation, plucking, pruning, or planting, was carried out with the maximum of 
efficiency.431 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Assam Tea Managers and Assistants. 432 
A persistent invocation of fear and punishment did not take away from the fact 
that the deep linkages between violent planter practices and the execution of 
work/control objectives was being reconstituted in a period of relative 
                                                 
430 D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.206. 
431 W. M. Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935). 
432 Group of European tea managers and assistants (Photo 1903 or before). NAA INV 
04423501, Photo lot 161, Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and 
Australia, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
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settlement and continuity. Now the idioms of “approval” were also assuming 
some relevance.433 This is not to deny the continued bearing of coercion and 
physical violence on the managerial authority, but rather to emphasise the 
elements of “reciprocity” in the manifestation of that authority.434 In such a 
framework, it is futile to personify the Assam planters as either “coolie-
drivers” or “benevolent paternalists”.435 
  Also, the aspirations of managers to wield the “rod of iron”, could not be 
homogeneously and consistently realised, being contingent on spatial and 
contextual variables. The rhythms and routines of plantation did become an 
arena of acceptance, negotiation and even overt resistance.436 A general 
“tempering” of planter power was noted by a colonial district commissioner: 
In former years, the planter was supreme on his garden, he maintained discipline by 
his own methods, and untrammelled by law…nowadays the coolie has a fair 
knowledge of the labour laws, gained by his experience, and is usually well capable of 
looking after his interest.437 
 
 A shift (in planter power) has to also be situated in the changing stance of 
colonial authorities with respect to the unilateral arrogations of magisterial 
privileges by managers, which was largely endorsed in practice. A colonial 
district officer, writing in 1904, observed that ‘any affray between a planter 
                                                 
433 A shift from an unrestrained ‘violent’ strategy of work discipline is noted in a planter 
textbook of the period. The author advising the managers suggests that ‘it should be made an 
absolute and unbending rule at all times that no assistant is allowed to lift his hand’. It went on 
to recommend that ‘there are other ways of punishing offenders, and it is manager’s business 
to allot such punishment.’ C. Bald, Indian tea: Its culture and manufacture (Calcutta, 1922) 
p.318. 
434 For instance, the desire of the managers to regulate and dispense the drink of the coolie was 
not just driven by the urge to limit its interference to the work process. It was also founded on 
such reciprocal ties—which the circulation of such an object entailed. See Chapter 4. Also see 
S. Baildon, Tea Industry in India (London, 1882) pp.159-160. 
435 R. Behal, ‘Coolie Drivers or Benevolent Paternalists? British Tea Planters in Assam and the 
Indenture system’, Modern Asian Studies 44, no.1 (2010). 
436 This is very much in agreement with what has been argued in the context of Kanpur Jute 
mill workers ‘where the work culture and discipline were not created by state regulations and 
managerial strategies alone; these are constituted through sedimented  practices, through acts 
of resistance, through conformity with rules.’  C. Joshi, Lost Worlds (London, 2005) p.143. 
437 H.W.G. Cole, Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur to the Commissioner of Assam valley 
Districts. Letter dated 9th March 1904. Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-
117, Aug 1904. ASA. Emphasis mine. 
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and coolie (now) is viewed through a magnifying glass, whereas formerly 
many occurrences of this kind altogether escaped notice’.438 A closer attention 
to the planter “excesses” was also a manifestation of the many scandals of  
Assam tea gardens— like cases of  kidnapping, oppression and  torture—being 
debated in  press, public forums, books, and becoming a  theme  of  numerous 
official and non-official writings.439 In such a charged climate, the colonial 
state’s “rethinking” of the Assam contract system and especially the privilege 
of private arrest, at least tolerated an impression of incorporating the “spaces of 
exception” within the “jurisdiction of law”.440  Apart from a much publicised 
criticism made by the Chief Commissioner of the province, there were 
                                                 
438 Ann Stoler presents a striking shift in the perceptions of “protest” of the Dutch 
administrative and plantation elite of colonial Sumatra.  The labour violence was largely 
personalized and downplayed in the 1870s. By the 1920s, it came to be construed as a 
politically motivated prelude to communist revolution. DC Sylhet to Secretary to Chief 
Commissioner of Assam, Sylhet 16th March 1904. Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, 
nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA; A. Stoler, ‘Perceptions of Protest: Defining the dangerous in 
colonial Sumatra’, American Ethnologist 12, no.4 (Nov. 1985) pp.642-658. 
439 As far back as the late 1880s, the Indian Associations’ memorial detailing the abuses in free 
recruitment and the harsh life of coolies on plantations received a fairly widespread media 
attention. For instance, just in the year 1888, the following newspapers sympathetically 
covered the issue: Hindoo Patriot, Calcutta, May 21st; The East, Dacca, May 26th; Anand 
Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, May 24th; The Tribune, Lahore, May 23rd; Mahratta, Poona, May 27th; 
Hindu, Madras, May 30th; Peoples` Friend, Madras, May 30th; National Guardian, Calcutta, 
June 1st. The Anti-slavery reporter had reported the incidents of violence and flogging in 
Assam tea gardens in the late 1860s. It stepped up its attention on the Assam coolie system—
especially since the 1890s. See, ‘Coolie Labour in the Tea Gardens of India’, The Anti-Slavery 
Reporter and Aborigines' Friend 13, no.6 (November 1893.) pp.346-348; ‘Contract Labour in 
Assam’, The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines' Friend 21, no.2 (March 1901) pp.64-66; 
‘The Labour System in Assam’, The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines' Friend 24, no.4 
(Aug 1904) pp.134-135. Again the Assam coolie question found place in the “national” 
economic histories being written in the period and was seen as another instance of the 
exploitation of British rule. See, G.S. Aiyar, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India 
(Madras, 1903) pp.180-181; R.C. Dutt, India in the Victorian Age; An Economic History of the 
People (London, 1904) p.352. Also see D. Ganguli, Slavery in the British Dominion (Calcutta, 
1972); A. Sen, Notes on the Bengal Renaissance (1946, Bombay) pp.50-51; T. Mishra, ‘The 
Image of West in Asamiya Literature’ in C. Vijayasree (ed.) Writing the West, 1750-
1947:Representations from Indian Languages (Delhi,2004) pp.18-19. 
440 For instance, since the year 1904 there was a more comprehensive and extensive tabulation 
of incidents of “rioting”, “unlawful” assembly etc. in the annual labour reports of Assam. This 
was the outcome of a greater concern of the colonial state with respect to these incidents which 
were deemed earlier to be the private affair of planters and tea gardens. The 1902-1903 labour 
report in light of reported riots suggested that it ‘throws upon state some responsibility for 
preventing any injustice as would give the coolies a substantial grievance.’ R. Behal, ‘Forms of 
Labour protest in Assam Valley Tea Plantations, 1900-1930’, Economic and Political Weekly 
20, no.4 (Jan 26th 1985) p.PE-20; P. Griffiths, The History of Indian Tea Industry (London, 
1967) p.378; E. Kolsky, ‘Crime and Punishment on the Tea plantations of Assam’, in M. D. 
Dubber and L. Framer (ed.) Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford, 2007) 
p.287. 
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concerns raised by other authorities.441  For instance, the Commissioner of 
Assam valley districts opined that ‘the original justification for the grant of the 
power (of private arrest) to the planters was because of the fact that courts 
were difficult to access’. This premise, he argued ‘owing to the improved 
communications, has to great extent been removed’.442 Again, another Chief 
Commissioner noted that the numerous cases of “disturbances” on tea gardens 
cannot be ‘effectively ascertained in court’. He strongly recommended that the 
‘proceedings of a trying magistrate should, wherever possible, include a local 
investigation to be held upon the garden’.443 The Chief Commissioner duly 
issued a circular calling for ‘on the spot’ enquiry by the Inspector of labourer 
or any other European official of the district.444 Such state intervention was 
systematically despised by planters from the inception of the contract system. 
This was again questioned in a planter textbook where the author advised his 
readers (planters) that ‘no appeal should be made to the law except in extreme 
need. Police officers are best kept off the estate if possible’.445 Yet, the 
premises of such “exceptions” were no longer as persuasive. The rationale for 
their protection was no longer so compelling. This meant that there were other 
attempts to generate “knowledge” about the conditions of life and work on 
                                                 
441 Henry Cotton was the Chief Commissioner of Assam from 1896 till 1902. In the 1900 
labour report for Cottons’ views showed a strong departure from the positions held by him and 
other Chief Commissioners on the coolie labour question. Cotton cited specific instances of 
low wages and state of indebtedness of workers on tea gardens. He further showed the 
inefficacy of inspections and the depressing effect of hard work on birth rate. In cases of 
conflict between the managers and workers, he noted that the magistrates had often proven 
themselves for giving biased verdicts. The Indian Tea association lodged a strong protest to the 
Government of India arguing that Cotton’s case was not ‘warranted by facts’. Yet, the 
allegations voiced by individuals in significant official position only reinforced the idea of 
“unpopular” Assam tea gardens–where every instance of manager-worker conflict was seen 
with increased scepticism as a commentary on the system as a whole.  
442 F.J. Mohanan, Commissioner, Assam Valley Districts, Proceedings of Assam Labour 
Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.199.  
443 Letter from Secretary to Chief Com of Assam to Registrar, High Court Calcutta dated 6th 
Oct 1902. Investigation into cases of disturbances on tea gardens, Assam Secretariat 
Proceedings, Home A, no. 31, June 1903, ASA. 
444 Investigation into cases of disturbances on tea gardens, Assam Secretariat Proceedings, 
Home A, nos. 30-34, June 1903, ASA.  
445 C. Bald, Indian tea: Its culture and manufacture (Calcutta, 1908) p.319. 
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plantations beyond the sanitary gaze—which was the predominant grid of the 
nineteenth colonial state’s intervention.446 
 The shifting dynamics of absolute authority of managers was also echoed in 
the gestures of managers to “familiarise” themselves with the culturally and 
linguistically diverse working population. Following in the spirit of Robert 
Bruce, who felt the necessity to copiously note and graphically demonstrate the 
Chinese methods of tea manufacture in the 1840s, the managers and tea 
companies were finding some value in compiling and consulting language 
handbooks.447 A striking evidence of an endeavour to comprehend the coolie 
bat (coolie talk) was a handwritten language guide composed by a new 
assistant in the early twentieth century. 
                                                 
446 Till the late 1890s, the  routine inspection reports of tea gardens made by the Civil Surgeon 
of district primarily supplied information under the heads like the nature of  house 
accommodation, water-supply, medical attendance, hospital accommodation, general  sanitary 
arrangements, and food supply. The inspectors were merely advised to notice the ‘general’ 
treatment and condition of labourers. Physical and Political geography of the province of 
Assam (Shillong, 1896) p.131; Compilation of the Circulars and General Orders of the Chief 
Commissioner of Assam (Shillong, 1885) pp.79-93. 
447 The joint stock company Finlay Muir in its “standing instructions” to their representative 
visiting the tea gardens  mentioned that they should assess and make notes of any  new 
assistant (manager)  engaged by the company for their knowledge of the vernacular. This 
formed a crucial basis for the increase in salary the fourth year, and the bonus for such 
knowledge. At the same time, it mentioned that the number of labour absconding was to be 
‘carefully noted against a manager’. Standing instructions for the Tea Estates Department of 
Messrs Finlay Muir & Co. Calcutta (Glasgow, 1900). 
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Figure 5.3: Coolie Bat or the Coolie Talk448 
These manuals did not merely serve the purpose of a cultural/language 
grounding for the intending managers and assistants, but also came in handy 
for achieving the diverse objectives of work and discipline on the plantations. 
For instance, a young European assistant learning the “tricks of the trade” was 
passed on with “native” phrases by the manager, which he diligently scribbled 
down in a notebook. He recounted how he would direct workers during field 
work by shouting phrases like: Ek angle se lumba; aurney (Just the size of one 
                                                 
448 This sixty page handwritten "Coolie Bat" dictionary was compiled by William Tulloch 
Charleson—an assistant who joined the Deundi tea estate in Sylhet in the 1910s. For more 
details of Deundi tea garden during this period see W M Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea 
Planter (London, 1935); http://www.koi-hai.com/archives.html. Also see, Tea District labour 
Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927); F. Hahn, Kurukh Grammar 
(Calcutta, 1911) pp.152-156; S. Endle, Outline Grammar of the Kachari (Bara) Language 
(Shillong, 1884) pp.60, 64-66. 
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finger; not more) and Sub beyfahida dhal nikaldo (Remove the useless 
sticks).449 This is also characteristic of Charlesons’ handwritten phrase book, 
where tasks like to prune (Khatum katna) and pluck (toolna) find a prominent 
mention.450 
At times, a change of manager familiar with such nuances precipitated a 
“crisis” because it brought in its wake new symmetries of work and 
discipline.451 This was reiterated by a colonial official, who felt that a new 
charge lacked ‘(an) intimate knowledge of their coolies and their wants which 
is necessary for the successful working of a garden in the Assam system under 
which an employer directly deals with the coolies’.452 This seems to have been 
the case in an episode of collective action directed at the management of 
Tehapara garden (Sylhet, 1916). Investigations revealed that the workers were 
gravely disgruntled with certain rules and the practices of discipline initiated 
by the new manager. After an incident of assault by the manager, the entire 
coolie-labour population of the garden consisting of hundreds of men, women 
and children collected near the dispensary and confined the manager, his 
assistant, head babu, native doctor and a sardar in a stable. Bricks and bamboo 
sticks were pelted on the detained party.453 Another “unpopular” new manager 
showing excessive zeal in direction of “reform” caned one of the workers; 
                                                 
449W. M. Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935). 
450 See Figure 5.3 
451 For instance, Antrobus mentions in his book Jorehaut tea Company that it favoured a policy 
of ‘continuity of management, not only because of its maintenance of a consistent policy of 
cultivation, upkeep and manufacture, but by reason of the contented labour force’. H.A, 
Antrobus, A History of the Jorehaut Tea Company Ltd (London, 1948) p.269. 
452 This view was most emphatically made in 1906 Assam Labour enquiry commission report, 
which they emphasised a ‘direct’ organisation of work and management in Assam in 
comparison to the other tea growing regions (Duars and Ceylon)—which worked through 
different intermediaries. In this particular instance, the commissioner of Cachar underlined this 
point through an example of contrasts of two tea gardens in the district—Dolu and Barkhola—
showing differential rates of desertion (7 and 46 respectively) after a new manager had 
assumed office. While the manager of Dolu (Milne) had spent a greater part of his working life 
in Cachar and appreciated the “specificities” of Cachar, the manager of Barkhola had ‘acquired 
his experience in Darjeeling and Terai’ and adopted a new system of management. The change 
in management was seen as more “excessive” because the manager tried to implement the 
Assam contract and also ‘raised the hoeing task, and made other changes...such as compelling 
all to appear at muster’. Assam Labour Report, 1890, p.188. 
453 Letter from BC Allen Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to Secretary to 
Government of India. Home Department, Police Branch, No 103, Part B, March 1916. NAI. 
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whereupon the workers beat him severely.454 The concerted actions of workers 
targeting the management in Jellupur (Cachar), Bhagaicherra (Sylhet) and 
Barjan (Sibsagar), in the year 1896, was occasioned by a new manager 
assuming office on these gardens.455 
5.4. The Rice Question 
  The significance of rice in the everyday life of the working population was 
critical, as it was the main cereal consumed by a vast majority of the 
workers.456 A regular provision of rice was an overriding concern for the 
Kacharis residing on the isolated Assam Company plantations in the 1840s and 
1850s. The ability of the Company gardens to hold Kachari labour depended 
on its capacity to sustain its rice supplies.457 The provision of rice for the 
workers was “institutionalised” through these early struggles and a notion of 
entitlement which materialised with a discourse of coolie protection in the 
contract. A certain quantity of rice, at a predetermined price, was made 
available to the coolies, which constituted an integral part of the “non-wage 
benefit”. There was no standardised practice and quantity of dispensing rice 
“benefits”, and it varied from district to district, and even from one garden to 
the other.458 
                                                 
454 Assam Labour Report, 1884, p.4. 
455 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
456 Rice was the staple cereal for migrants coming from ‘tribal’ regions of Chotanagpur, 
Central Provinces and Orissa. The growing relevance of the  recruiting region like North West 
Provinces and Bihar (especially in Sylhet district) generated a view in planter-official circles 
,that wheat (flour) rather than rice constituted their main diet of the new migrants. A theory 
offered for the high rates of mortality—often associated with  upcountry coolies—was said to 
have been a consequence of  this change of diet (from wheat to rice). There were several 
official steps to change the nature of food allowances during transit and even the “fixed price 
rice” on the tea gardens. See Chapter 2 for details. 
457 For concerns around rice leading to work stoppages and strikes in the Assam company 
plantations, see chapter 1. 
458 The rice supplied to the workers was generically called ‘coolie rice’ in the Calcutta market, 
which many contemporary observers noted for generally being of an inferior and poor quality. 
One scientific investigator mentioned some of the names (with different qualities) of coolie 
rice supplied in different gardens:  Kazla no.1, Kazla no. 2, Jhabra and Kalachitu. H. Mann, 
‘Note on the Diet of Tea Garden Coolies in Upper Assam and its Nutritive Value’, Journal of 
Asiatic Society of Bengal 3, no.2 (Feb. 1907) p.104; C. Dowding, Tea-Garden Coolies in 
Assam (Calcutta, 1894) p.29.  
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 The reconstitution of the “protection” of coolie, made through amendments to 
the Assam contract in the late nineteenth century, also made such provisions 
exceedingly irregular.459 Planters often rationalised these “cuts” by claiming 
that the changing dietary profile of the workers did not necessitate a fixation 
with rice. A colonial officer noted that the ‘quantity of rice imported by the tea 
gardens in Assam (around 1900) was much less than twenty or thirty years 
ago’.460 The logic of reductions and apprehensions regarding the necessity of 
dispensing rice found “voice” in a planter language manual: 
Do you eat all the rice you buy from the garden store? 
Do you resell it at a higher price? 
Do you make liquor from it?461 
However, another planter bitterly grumbled that the ‘clause (of contract) 
concerning the sale of rice has always proved the most difficult to deal with’. 
He particularly observed that the ‘coolies did not trouble the garden when 
prices rule low, but when prices are high the garden is at once requisitioned 
and no matter whether there is stock or not, rice has to be forthcoming at the 
stipulated price’.462 The question of rice-supplies figured prominently in the 
official interrogation of the new recruits proceeding to Assam, to gauge their 
awareness of the circumstances of their employment. The “stereotyped” 
queries posed by the registering officer were allegedly responded by answers 
“tutored” by the recruiters and contractors:  
Recruiting officer: At what price will rice be supplied to you?   
Coolie: At three rupees a maund. 
 Recruiting officer: If the price of rice be more than three rupees who will pay the 
difference? 
                                                 
459 Assam Labour Report, 1888, p.70. 
460 Such a sentiment is reflected in a statement made by the manager of Assam Company, 
where he described the ‘fixed price rice’ as a ‘loss’ which drained the company of one 
thousand rupees every year. Enquiry into the causes of friction between the planters and 
coolies, August 1904, no.98. ASA; The Report of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906 in 
S.D. Punekar and R. Varickayil, Labour Movement in India, Vol. I (1989, Delhi) p.164. Also 
see, D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.48; S. R. 
Ward, Glimpse of Assam (Calcutta, 1884) pp.125-126. 
461 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927) p.60. 
462 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) pp.159-160. 
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Coolie: The sirkar (employer).463 
 Contrary to many such apprehensions, the price of rice and the deductions 
made on account of rice advanced, suggested a commissioner of a tea district, 
was one of most recurring issues of dispute between managers and coolies.464 
For instance, when the manager of Bardeobam tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1900) 
terminated the dustoor of allowing rice advances, the coolies of the garden 
made a collective demonstration and declined to work.465 Again, in Kharbon 
garden (Lakhimpur, 1904), the usual allotment of rice given to female-coolies 
under contract was downscaled. The manager (Macnidoe) after giving out the 
reduced amount on the day of distribution was assaulted by the coolies of the 
garden with bricks and bamboos.466 Similarly, the workers of Towkok garden 
(Sibsagar, 1894) came in a body and demanded rice from the garden store on a 
day which was not the customary rice distribution day. On being denied the 
“exception”, the agitated coolies made a charge towards the store and 
confronted the men guarding it.467 
 In these separate episodes, the alteration of dustoor of rice (discontinuation of 
advances and reduction of amount) could have adversely impacted the general 
material condition and the food-security of the plantation’s population.468 The 
rice procurable at the weekly market (haats) was usually priced higher and also 
affected by the geographical setting of the garden.469 The gardens located in 
the “interiors” obtained food grains at a much higher rate and the supplies were 
                                                 
463 Assam Labour Report, 1888, p.12; The Bengalee 27, no.39 (Sep.25, 1886) p.461 cited in D. 
Ganguli, Slavery in British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972) p.3. 
464 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
465 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Such dependence of plantation population on importation and discharge is not specific to 
Assam. For instance in colonial Sumatra, the estate industry were almost wholly dependent on 
imported rice. A. Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt (Ann 
Arbor, 1995) p.41. 
469 These variations of such markets was noted by the colonial observers who particularly 
observed that in some districts the weekly markets were the immediate vicinity of tea gardens, 
and were of great convenience to the garden labourers. W.W. Hunter, A Statistical account of 
Assam, Vol. 1 (London, 1879) p.143. 
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extremely irregular due to indifferent communication networks.470 These 
insecurities induced by the uneven nature of rice supplies were articulated in a 
general refusal of work and organised action targeting the offending manager.  
 The relevance of rice in the changing material circumstances of the resident 
population was also articulated in the demand for a change in the timings of 
it’s discharge. Coolies did not merely resent to the stoppage or reduction on the 
rice concessions (dustoor), but expected the garden management to respond to 
the situations of want and scarcity. Such discrepancies were particularly felt by 
the newer coolies. Some new coolies of Bordubi garden (Lakhimpur, 1902) 
refused to work alleging that they were not alloted enough rice. When the 
manager tried to force them to get back to work, he was attacked. Eventually 
he had to use his revolver to scare them off.471 A colonial report noted that the 
so called “non-Act” coolies (not contracted under Assam contract), who were 
“legally” not entitled to the fixed price rice (like Assam contracted workers), 
would “expect” the managers to make some rice available at a reduced price 
when the market rates went up. The “rights” of control (like private arrest), 
which managers frequently claimed over the Act XIII contracted workers, 
generated complimentary obligations of protection (like fixed price rice).472 
Further, the centrality of rice in the daily subsistence of the resident workers 
made such claims “legitimate”.  
5.5 The Occasions of Tea Garden 
The emergence and institutionalisation of occasions like rice distribution day 
has to be situated in the milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
                                                 
470 The Sanitary Commissioner of Assam made a survey of the “food situation” on the tea 
gardens in the late 1870s. He found the centrality of rice in the diet of workers was also 
because of the expensiveness of other food items procured in the open market. Assam Sanitary 
Report 1878 and 1879, pp.7-10, pp.15-18. 
471 The practice of dieting the new arrivals as regulated by ordinances in the colonies was never 
regulated by legal enactments on Assam tea gardens. The practice of giving rice to new coolies 
was suggested in Ceylon plantations, where the language handbook mentions: The Kangani 
addressing the planter says: ‘Sir, the two new coolies have arrived, please issue them rice and 
cash.’ Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA; W.G.B. 
Wells, Cooly Tamil, as understood by Labourers on Tea and Rubber estates (Colombo, 1915) 
p.68; Assam Labour Report, 1889, p.80. 
472 The Report of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906 in S.D. Punekar and R. Varickayil, 
Labour Movement in India, Vol. I (1989, Delhi) p.146. 
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century life on plantations. On this day, the workers would collect in front of 
the rice godown to receive their supplies. The manager positioned himself at 
the gate of the godown and distributed the rice according to the individual 
allotments and the nature of their contracts. 
An analogous occasion taking shape on late nineteenth century plantations was 
the pay-day. This was the occasion when workers would get remunerated for 
their work. They assembled at an assigned place at a pre-given time which is 
depicted in the next photograph. 
 
Figure 5.4: Pay Day.473 
In this scene, the manager conducts the payment. The assessment of Kamjari 
(outdoor work) and Haziri book (attendance register) was placed on the 
table.474 The gathered coolies waited for their turn to receive wages. A 
manager recounted the occasion of payment in some detail: 
                                                 
473 Assamese Tea receiving payment from a man at a table n.d. NAA INV 04423002, Photo lot 
161, Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and Australia, National 
Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution.  
474 The managing agents and the visiting agents to see that managers pay their own coolies, 
and, in their absence, their European assistants. Standing instructions for the Tea Estates 
Department of Messrs Finlay Muir & Co. Calcutta (Glasgow, 1900).   
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On pay-day…men, women, and children—in fact, all the coolies present themselves, 
attired in the best, outside the bungalow or wherever the ceremony of paying is to be 
performed. They are called up by name and in rotation to receive their wages; a few 
have part of their money cut for idleness and insubordination, but with these 
exceptions all receive their pay in full and depart happily.475 
The days of rice distribution, payment and muster emerging from the culture of 
work and remuneration, assumed the nature of rituals on the plantations—to be 
participated at a recurring moment (daily, weekly, fortnightly or monthly) 
depending on the prevailing dustoor of the garden.476 These occasions held the 
potential of “collecting” the entire coolie-labour population of the garden at 
one place and at a given time.  
 
Figure 5.5: Mustering the coolies477 
The presence of the manager/management made these occasions particularly 
conducive for the organisation and collective expression of concerns, 
                                                 
475 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.176  
476 This also seems to have some lineages from slave plantations where the weekly distribution 
of provisions were treated as paternalistic rituals. ‘..By dramatizing a sense of mutual 
obligations between masters and slaves, the ritual was designed to help promote a sense of 
community on the plantation. The ceremonial giving in itself served to emphasize the master’s 
reputed benevolence and promote the slaves’ gratitude.’ C.W. Joyner Shared Traditions: 
Southern History and Folk Culture (Urbana, 1999) pp.94-95. 
477 Mustering Assamese Tea Coolies at Factory. NAA INV 04422901, Photo lot 161, Emma A. 
Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and Australia, National Anthropological 
Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
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emanating from overlapping anxieties.478 This was manifest in case of 
Kharbon garden (Lakhimpur, 1904), where the rice distribution day became 
the occasion for such a contest when the manager arbitrarily reduced the rice 
quota of the women workers.479 
  Again, on one pay-day in Barhalla tea garden (Sibsagar, 1892), the manager 
declined to pay a coolie (Harilas) and had him forcibly removed from the 
scene, when he raised objections for being denied his dues. The aggrieved 
individual called out the other assembled coolies to seize the manager. The 
coolies joined together and attacked the manager and his assistants with broken 
bricks and clay.480 
 On a particular pay day in Hukanpukri garden (Lakhimpur, 1900), a coolie 
protested that his overtime work (ticca) was under assessed. The assistant 
manager making the payments hit the dissenting man with his fist. The three 
hundred assembled workers then made a charge towards him. The assistant had 
to flee from the scene and take asylum in his bungalow, which was encircled 
by the coolies. They later broke inside the building, but the assistant along with 
the other European staff managed to flee. The party of coolies then proceeded 
to assault the native establishment of the garden, as they fancied that they had 
assisted the sahibs to get away.481 
These cases of “individuals” being disciplined for conveying her/his grievance 
on the estimation and payment of wages (non-payment, underassessment) took 
the nature of a collective response directed at the management. The events of 
pay-day had occasioned the larger solidarities to address the concerns. Such 
concerted action did not always materialize from grievances in the pressing 
                                                 
478 Pay days often became sites of conflict in other plantation contexts. For the sugar 
plantations of Trinidad, see K. Haraksingh, ‘The Worker & the Wage in a Plantation 
Economy’ in M. Turner (ed.) From Chattel Slaves to Wage Slaves: The Dynamics of Labour 
Bargaining in the Americas (Kingston,1995) pp.224-240 
479 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
480 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA.; E. Kolsky, 
Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 2010) 
pp.176-177. 
481 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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context of the occasion, but could become avenues for the articulation of older 
persisting concerns. 
 For instance, on the Khawang garden (Lakhimpur, 1914), the manager, during 
the daily inspection of field work, had reprimanded a female coolie (Durapati) 
for the quality of leaves being plucked. Later in the day when the women 
workers were being paid for their daily tasks, the manager kept Durapati 
waiting. She suspected that the manager would refuse to pay because of the 
“objections” during the day, and therefore urged the other assembled women to 
wait until her dues were paid. On finding such apprehensions coming true the 
women attacked the manager, who had to take refuge inside the office along 
with his head clerk. The coolies then laid a siege on the office and kept the 
manager confined for three hours. Windows were broken, abuses were hurled 
and broken bricks and like were thrown.482 
 The “new” occasions of payment (rice or wages) has to be situated in a 
context where there was a simultaneous process of production and 
reproduction of apparently “older” cultural/religious occasions in the changed 
milieu of the plantation.  
David Crole, an ex-Assam planter, mentioning the most prominent of the 
“coolie festivities” on his garden (Fagua) remarked: 
 …coolies are given three of four days holiday…they enjoy themselves to the top of 
their bent, which end they attain by setting on foot a horrible debauch…abetted 
thereto by an old garden custom (still unfortunately kept up by many planters), 
according to which each coolie is supplied with a bottle of rum to commemorate the 
festive occasion…coolie often receives a certain amount of baksheesh from the 
planter.483 
 In the context of Ceylon plantations, James Duncan argues that the production 
of docile bodies (coolies) in the colonial plantations would ideally have 
necessitated the production of de-cultured workers. But the strategies to 
produce rationalized bodies were continually undermined as elements of 
worker’s networks and ways of life remained intact. This becomes relevant in 
the Assam plantations where occasions like drinking and festivities suggested 
                                                 
482 King Emperor versus Durapati and nine others. Home Department, Police Branch, 
September 1914, No 139. NAI. 
483 D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.199. 
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that the decultured and docile bodies, as ideally required by the plantations, 
was not completely realised.  However, Duncan’s emphasis on ‘remaining 
intact’ does not fully appreciate the shifts such practices and “traditions” 
undergo in a dynamic context.484 
 Cultural/religious occasions being reproduced and produced in the plantation 
context also became sites where the legitimacy of discipline were tested and 
break from routines were negotiated.485 The managers on such occasions 
would usually allow leave to the coolies, gave them some additional cash and 
even made provisions of alcohol. The planter’s language handbook 
underscoring the significance of these occasions duly included a separate 
section on Poojah and Gods. The potential themes of conservation between the 
managers and coolies with respect to such occasions are very suggestive: 
Coolie: In five day’s time is our Big Pooja, Sahib. May we have two day’s leave? 
Coolie: We want half day’s leave for Kali Pooja. 
Manager: To enable you to make purchases you will get daily cash payment for the 
work you do during three days preceding the Pooja.486 
The exchanges between manager and coolies indicating to a general 
“acceptable” conduct, did not always hold true in practice. Three incidents, to 
that effect, can be cited. In the first case from Holonguri garden (Sibsagar, 
1900), a demand of a holiday on Kali puja made by the Santhali workers was 
turned down.  When the manager went down the lines on a horseback to induce 
                                                 
484 A fascinating instance of this is Hosay festival in colonial Trinidad, where Hindus and 
Sunnis apparently celebrated a Shia festival. Such a dynamic can also be located in the case of 
indentured labourers in Fiji, where the principal religious festival shifted from Holi to Diwali. 
James Duncan, Climate, Race and Bio power in nineteenth century Ceylon (Aldershot, 2007) 
p.69; P. Mohapatra, ‘”Following Custom”? Representations of Community among Indian 
Immigrant Labour in the West Indies, 1880-1920’ in R. Behal & M. van der Linden (ed.) 
Coolies, Capital and Colonialism: Studies in India Labour History (2006, Delhi) p.181-188; J. 
D. Kelly, ‘From Holi to Diwali in Fiji: An Essay on Ritual and History’ Man 23, no.1 
(Mar.1988) pp.40-55.  
485  Religious occasions have been read in different contexts as a site for defining work time 
and festive time. Festivals are sometimes seen as a time and space in which the everyday is 
temporarily replaced by interactions of a different sort. In the context of contemporary Jute 
mill workers, Fernandes argues that Durga Puja festival served both to legitimize and subvert 
the authority of union and managers. C. Joshi, Lost Worlds (London, 2005) p.242; G. De Neve, 
The Everyday Politics of Labour: Working lives in Indias’ Informal Economy (Delhi, 2005) 
p.239; L. Fernandes, Producing Workers: The Politics of Gender, Class and Culture in the 
Calcutta Jute Mills (Philidelphia, 1997) p.93. 
486 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927) p.83-84. 
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them to work, a group of workers surrounded him with sticks in hands.487 In 
the other incident from Barjuli garden (Darrang, 1891), the workers resented 
on being forced to get back to work on the very next day of an important 
religious festival— Karam puja.488 The assistant manager on his daily rounds 
of the lines to turn the coolies out for work tried to pressurize some of them 
and assaulted a resisting sardar. The incensed coolies made a collective 
offensive on the assistant manager, chasing him out of the lines until his 
bungalow. Again, the manager and the assistant of Kellyden garden 
(Nowgong, 1898) forced the coolies to turn out for work, after three days’ 
holiday given for Fagua/Holi. They encountered a general opposition. On the 
attempt of the assistant to hold a woman by the hand and induce her to go back 
to work, the coolies attacked him and the manager with sticks.489 
 These instances form part of a larger body of incidents of enforcement of 
harsh discipline and resistance to such moves.  The coolies being turned out for 
work was attempted to be “routinised” in the daily life on the plantations. The 
contracts bestowed the authority to deem absences as illegal, and permit a 
degree of force and coercion to make the reluctant coolies comply—as and 
when required. This encouraged the systematic attempts of the unhealthy, 
unpopular and undermanned gardens to put a greater proportion of coolies 
under contract(s), not merely to curb “desertion”, but also enforce this daily 
work routine (Kamjari). But a sense of a general illegitimacy on being forced/ 
disciplined for their absence/leave from work was heightened by the 
significance of the moment, where shared cultural and communal practices 
                                                 
487 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
488Festivals like Karampuja seem to have had strains of communitarian solidarity being 
reconstituted in the plantation context. During our fieldwork in the Duars plantation region 
(May-June 2000) we found that this was a festival practised by a majority of the labour 
population of the tea gardens. In this yearly ritual the branch of the tree karam is buried. This is 
further circulated throughout the labour line stopping at each quarter in which vermillion (this 
act of application of sindur is symbolic of the transfer of the evil spirits in the vicinty into the 
branch) was applied to the branch. Subsequently it is taken to a nearby river or stream where it 
was immersed. S. Chaudhury and N. Varma, ‘Between Gods/Goddesses/ Demons and 
‘Science’: Perceptions of Health and Medicine among Plantation Labourers in Jalpaiguri 
District, Bengal’, Social Scientist 30, nos 5-6 (May-June 2002) p.32.  
489 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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were invoked. Again, the customs of leave and other benefits (dustoor) during 
such events, which varied according to the gardens/occasions, was negotiated. 
5.6 Coolie Lines 
Residential patterns of coolie-labour assume a particular relevance in the 
production of solidarities on the tea garden. However, these patterns were not 
uniformly consistent. A colonial medical investigator observed that ‘no 
condition that varies more widely than this (residence patterns) does in 
different gardens’.490  The organization of coolie dwellings in barracks and 
lines and its policing (chaukidaring) was embedded in the strategies of 
immobilisation and spatial surveillance. They also became a focal point of the 
sanitary policing of the unhealthy plantations.491 The evidence of “coolie lines” 
appears from the early years of plantations in search for “settled” workers. A 
greater “systematisation” of the lines was desired in the late nineteenth 
century:  
(Coolie) lines should be numbered, and there should be a line-chokidar for each 
double row of houses (or lines); also, each sirdar’s gang of men should, as many as 
possible, be housed in one line; of course, the women must go with their husbands..By 
this arrangement of having a chokidar and a sirdar responsible for the way each line is 
kept, and also for conduct of the coolies in that line will be kept in better order…less 
trouble will be experienced by those chokidars and sardars in turning the coolies out 
to work in the morning.492 
                                                 
490 G.M. Giles, A Report of an Investigation into the Causes of the Diseases known in Assam as 
Kala Azar and Beri Beri (Shillong, 1890) p.145. 
491 The high rates of mortality observed on tea plantations was often attributed to the sites of 
the lines. For instance, the high death rates (above 20 percent) observed in Borkhala tea garden 
(Darrang, 1879) and Shakomotho (Darrang, 1881), was said to be satisfactorily resolved by a 
change in location of respective coolie lines. A general template for the coolie lines was 
offered by a colonial medical officer (G.M. Giles) in the late 1890s, keeping in mind these 
‘sanitary principles.’ Assam Labour Report, 1879 p.19; Assam Labour Report, 1881 p.21-22. 
G. M. Giles, Tea garden sanitation, being a few remarks on the construction and sanitary 
arrangement of coolie lines, with special reference to the prevention of the disease known as 
anaemia of coolies, beri-beri, and anchylostomiasis (Shillong, 1891). 
492 A degree of systematisation of coolie lines is also observed in the coffee plantations of 
Ceylon from the 1860s, in comparison to the1840s and 1850s.  Crole further noted that large 
plantations in Assam (with more than one thousand souls) had approximately half dozen coolie 
lines. These houses were thatched bamboo huts, each partitioned to hold four or sometimes 
more families. F.T.R  Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the 
management of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) p.68; J. Duncan, Climate, Race and Bio 
power in nineteenth century Ceylon (Aldershot, 2007) pp.84-85; D. Crole, Tea: A text book of 
tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) pp.196-197.  
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  Apart from being firmly located with the framework of the plantation policy 
of settling and controlling workers, the coolie lines functioned as  critical sites 
for socialization, “festivities” and the new occasions like “weekend drinking”.  
Managers mostly required the ‘outsiders’ visiting the lines to be reported by 
the chowkidars. Though, they often expressed an inability to completely stop 
some visitors who were, generally, family and friends.493 The next photograph 
depicts an everyday scene of the coolie lines.  
 
Figure 5.6: Coolie Lines.494 
 There was a distinctive attempt to organize the lines along ethnic/racial axes. 
A contemporary observed that the different tribes were housed on ‘separate 
rows of huts, as these people never mingle’.495 A planter described the 
everyday scene on the lines where ‘the tom tom sounds; men chaunt, and 
women dance’.496 In a similar tone, another planter narrated that ‘rarely a night 
                                                 
493 S. Baildon, Tea Industry in India (London, 1882) pp.172-173. 
494 Living Quarters of Assamese Tea Coolies. NAA INV 04423702, Photo lot 161, Emma A. 
Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and Australia, National Anthropological 
Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
495 Such a strategy of organising lines on basis of caste and village origins was also practised 
on Ceylon coffee plantations. S. R. Ward, Glimpse of Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.115; J. 
Duncan, Climate, Race and Bio power in nineteenth century Ceylon (Aldershot, 2007) pp.84-
85. 
496 S. Baildon, Tea Industry in India (London, 1882) p.165. 
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passes in the lines but there is some form of festivity going on and in the 
season of the native holidays and on Sunday the din is terrific, five or six tum-
tums all going at once’.497 Here, a clear identification of the different tribes and 
caste cannot be decisively established. Also, the recruited batches (arkatti and 
sardari) being housed together were not always clusters of “family and kins”, 
but were groups being forged during the process of recruitment, settlement and 
work. The reproduction of older identities through an “ethnicised” recruitment 
and residential strategy competed with the production of new identities in the 
processes of mobilisation, work and life on the plantations.498 A strict 
cordoning of the different coolie lines and bastis could not always be 
sustained, and there was a measure of traffic between them. Time-expired 
workers frequently moved between the garden and the basti, retaining familial 
and social ties with workers on the garden. Markets and Haats—emerging 
within the confines or in the vicinity of plantations—also became the sites for 
such interactions.499 
5.7 Work Place, Authority Structure and Issues of Tasks and 
Wages 
The processes of socialisation had a bearing on the articulation of anxieties at 
the workplace, where other associations were being produced in the operation 
of work. Here, it is crucial to reiterate the practices of work and wage 
assessment in place on Assam plantations of the period. The workers, in order 
to earn her/his daily wage (hazira), had to complete a daily task (nirikh). The 
                                                 
497 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.175. 
498 The Sonthali deputation after visiting Assam noted that ‘the manner and customs of our 
Sonthals have been altogether spoilt’. This was due to the fact their kinsmen were found to 
have married their daughters with other castes. Revenue & Agriculture, Emigration B, nos 1-4, 
NAI. 
499 The presence of markets was much differentiated across the geographical space in the two 
valleys. A commissioner in charge of a tea district in Assam valley observed in the late 1880s 
that weekly haats were mostly situated in central places, and served a group of gardens, and 
usually held on Sundays. The 1906 Report  specifically citing the case of Surma Valley 
plantations (Sylhet in particular)  noted that ‘…besides the public markets nearly every tea 
garden has its weekly or bi-weekly hat, to which crowds of villagers and tea garden coolies 
may be streaming either to make purchases …or goods for sale’. Special Report on the 
Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 1886-1889 (Calcutta, 
1890); The Report of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906 in S.D. Punekar and R. 
Varickayil, Labour Movement in India, Vol. I (1989, Delhi) p.144. 
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payment for work over and above this amounted to what was the overtime 
(ticca).500 The task was not determined by a fixed amount of hours put in daily, 
but by the work characterized as constituting a reasonable day’s labour. Such 
“flexibility” was allowed by the contracts, which stopped enforcing a defined 
work schedule for tea gardens. 501 
 The nature, availability and intensity of tasks were contingent on the tea plant 
cycle and the state and demands of the industry. During the manufacturing 
season, when the work-process was intensified and the tasks increased, the 
coolies were hard-pressed for time. In contrast, during winters a sharp drop in 
employment meant a general decline in earning.502 These seasonal variations 
were mentioned in several provincial labour reports. It was noted that the 
remuneration during the manufacturing season could be as much as ‘two or 
three times the contract rates’, but most other times the coolies ‘never earns 
their contract wage’.503  
  A local District Commissioner, in order to get a general sense of such 
variations, issued a circular addressed to the managers to submit their schedule 
of tasks. The “knowledge” of the prevailing rates was not very enlightening as 
‘in one part of a garden hoeing was heavier than another part. In some 
weathers it was easier than in other weathers, and so on. Plucking was heavier 
in a weak than in a full flush’.504 Another district commissioner in a similar 
zeal to get this logic ended up suggesting that ‘it is a perfect waste of time to 
make managers put up a schedule of task. On a large garden the tasks vary 
according to season and the quality of coolie’.505 
                                                 
500 D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.64 
501 See Chapter 2 for details.  
502  The managers often “encouraged” the laid off workforce to go back “home” to ‘recruit’ 
during this period as sardars. Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.204. 
503 Again a commissioner of a tea district (Darrang) observed that the minimum wages for men 
(Rs5) women (Rs.4) and child (Rs.3) were seldom earned except busy the ‘tea season’. He 
further expressed his reservations regarding these earnings being sufficient.  Assam Labour 
Report, 1879; Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874) p.94. 
504 Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet, Assam Labour Report 1882, p.36.  
505 Deputy Commissioner, Darrang, Assam Labour Report 1883, p.6. 
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A comparison of the rates of field tasks from four tea gardens of a single 
district in Assam valley reveals a variation in rates and also considerable 
differentiation in the nature of tasks. 
 
Work Garden 1 
Dijoo (78 acres 
under tea) 
Garden 2 
Lilabari (280 
acres under 
tea) 
Garden 3 
Hulmari (342 
acres under tea) 
Garden 4 
Silanibari (350 
acres under 
tea) 
Hoeing 
(deep) 
15 nals 20  nals (men) 
15 nals 
(women) 
8, 10, 12  nals 
According to 
class of work 
--- 
Hoeing 
(light) 
25-30 nals 
According to state 
of ground 
30-40 (men) 
20-30 (women) 
25-40 nals 
According to 
conditions 
25-40 nals 
According to 
conditions 
Hoeing 
(double) 
12 15 (men) 
10 (women) 
--- 16-20 nals 
Plucking 4-8 seers 
According to 
season 
6-10 seers 
According to 
flush and 
quality 
6-8 seers 
According to 
season and flush 
3-8 seers 
According to 
season and flush 
Forking     
Pruning 
(top) 
  300 plants  
Pruning 
(stick) 
  50 plants 40-80 plants 
According to 
style and age of 
plants 
 
Table 5.1: Field Tasks on Tea gardens in late nineteenth century. 506  
The modes of assessing work was either by a measuring device (called nal) or 
counting the rows of tea bushes (gallis). As planting was not uniform 
everywhere, the two measurements did not always coincide. Also, these tasks 
                                                 
506 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890). 
196  
varied according to the nature of the soil, time of the operation, and intensity of 
work—deep or light.507  
 Plucking tasks measured by weight of the leaves collected was also influenced 
by the local, seasonal and the method of operation.508 The shifting nature of the 
Assam/Indian tea, competing with the Chinese tea as a “superior” drink in the 
global tea market, was not just achieved by the application of modern 
technology and greater mechanisation of production process, but, also, 
facilitated by the methods of plucking practised in the late nineteenth century 
plantations. This was plucking the top part of the tea flush—buds with two 
leaves (fine plucking)—which was supposed to yield a superior quality tea 
during manufacturing.509  
                                                 
507 Hoeing essentially done by men was carried out five to seven times a year. A deep hoe was 
usually done once a year. Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) 
p.65; The Report of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906 in S.D. Punekar and R 
Varickayil, Labour Movement in India, Vol. I (1989, Delhi) p.151. 
508 The nature plucking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had significantly 
improvised from the early tea plantations of East India Company working under the 
supervision of Bruce and the advice of the “skilled” Chinese. In the 1860, Lees observed that 
the tea bushes flushed from twenty to thirty times a year and if the leaves were plucked 
immediately as it tended to harden on the bushes and became unfit for production. A more 
‘scientific’ and ‘systematic’ approach to plucking was attempted from 1870s which identified 
three general variables—the season, the method of plucking and the species of tea bush. But on 
the same garden, there were other variables to contend with. The flush could have been full or 
weak, plucking might have to be carried on from behind the flush or by getting in front of it.  
Distance was also a factor, as planted areas  of some gardens were close to the coolie lines and 
tea houses, while in some others it could be as far as a mile. Around the turn of the century 
plucking usually began in March and April and is continued till the beginning of December. 
There were six to seven full flushes in a year, but each bush was plucked approximately every 
ten days. W.N. Lees, Tea Cultivation, cotton and other agricultural experiments in India: a 
review (Calcutta, 1863) p.369; T.G. Stoker, Notes on the Management of Tea Plant (Calcutta, 
1874) pp 6-12; J.C. Kydd, The Tea Industry (London, 1921) pp.17-10; P Griffiths, The History 
of Indian Tea Industry (London,1967) pp.484-485; H.A, Antrobus, A History of the Jorehaut 
Tea Company Ltd (London,1948) pp.99-101;  Assam District Gazetteers, Sibsagar (Allahabad, 
1906) p.149; Assam District Gazetteers, Sylhet (Allahabad, 1906) p.141. 
509A tea planter from Darjeeling mentioned a similar change where the practice of plucking 
three or sometimes more leaves shifted to two leaves and a bud method and sometimes just one 
leaf and the bud. Antrobus citing an Annual meeting of Assam Company (1902) described 
‘fine plucking’ as plucking of two leaves and a bud taken at seven days old, and the coarser 
plucking was ten to twelve days old leaf, taking the third leaf when available. A.J. Wallis-
Tayler, Tea Machinery and Tea Factories (London, 1900) p.33; J.  Buckingham, A Few Facts 
about Indian Tea (London, 1910) p.24; Antrobus, A History of Assam Company (Edinburgh, 
1957) p.190. 
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Figure 5.7: Old and New Methods of Plucking510 
This shift had a bearing on the plucking abilities of workers as observed by a 
tea manager in the 1890s: 
Under the old regime, when coarse plucking was universally practised, an industrious 
woman has been known to bring in over a maund (80 pounds) of leaf in a day; but she 
can rarely manage to pluck a third of that amount with strict “two and a bud.511 
 Such a change is suggested in the language handbook where the planter 
coaxing the workers to ‘pluck with both hands’ (to intensify the work process) 
made it very apparent that they had to concentrate on ‘plucking two leaves and 
one bud’.512 This distinction (coarse or fine) was often rigorously enforced. 
This was narrated by an assistant who said that the manager ‘would 
occasionally search the baskets (of the pluckers) and added to the threats of 
what would happen to a woman and her forbears if she plucked an extra 
leaf’.513 Such practices of ‘plucking surveillance’ have become a recurrent 
theme in Jhumur songs. In one of the songs, the worker is sternly instructed to 
                                                 
510 J.  Buckingham, A Few Facts about Indian Tea (London, 1910) p.14. 
511 D. Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.58. 
512 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927) p.45. 
513 W M Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935). 
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pluck Ekti koli duiti paat (one bud and two leaves) in order to earn her bhaat 
(rice/food).514  
  The rigorous demands for precision and accuracy stood in stark contrast to 
the claims of “easiness” of plucking and “naturalness” of nimble finger of 
women. The time required to master these skills was observed by a planter 
when he suggested that, ‘the difference between an old hand and a beginner 
was transparent in the quality and quantity of leaf brought to scale’.515 The 
value of an “old hand” in plucking was apparent from the experiences of 
“experimental” plantations as described by Bruce.516 A sustained yearning for 
settled workers was, therefore, apparent from the inauguration of tea 
cultivation and production in Assam.  As this was becoming more feasible in 
this period, one could argue that it not only addressed the chronic “shortages” 
of labour, but also allowed the acquisition of specialised skills—to attain the 
different tasks with greater efficiency. 
   Again, the variation and lack of regularity in the amount of work constituting 
a “reasonable” rate led to different customs (dustoor) in a particular garden 
constituting the schedule (for the different tasks) at any one time.517 Such rates 
were often excessive and tough to accomplish, as narrated by some 
returnees.518 On certain occassions, some planters on finding that the 
cultivation was falling into arrears would even reduce the task to induce the 
coolies to earn a double hazira.519 The “flexibility” to define tasks could not 
                                                 
514 Kali Dasgupta, Folk Songs of Bengal and Assam (Calcutta, 2003) in 
http://kalidasgupta.com/kalicd2.html; P. Chatterjee, A Time for Tea: Women, Labor, and 
post/colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation (Durham, 2002) pp.193-196. 
515 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.137. 
516 See Chapter 1 
517 A Deputy Commissioner of a tea district (Sylhet) noted the futility of comparison of tasks 
of different gardens. He argued that such a comparison ‘is more of an arbitrary presumption 
than a genuine searching of truth’. Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The 
Province of Assam during the years 1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890). 
518 See Chapter 3. 
519 The District Commisioner of Kamrup observed that the planters would sometimes reduce 
the task from say thirty nals to twenty nals to encourage the coolies to earn double hazira by 
hoeing 40 nals. Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam 
during the years 1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) pp.217-226. 
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always inscribe the will of the manager/work supervisor.  At times, these 
unilateral moves were resisted by the solidarities forged in the context of life 
and work and the urgent contingencies emanating from these shared anxieties. 
 For instance, on the increase in the pruning task (25 nals to 30 nals) in 
Kharjan tea estate (Lakhimpur, 1901), all the coolies refused to recognize the 
change and kept working according to the older rates (25 nals). The manager 
summoned the coolies to his bungalow and enquired a man, Gulali, whether he 
had accomplished his task. Gulali replied in an affirmative according to the 
dustoor. This was immediately contradicted by the field overseer (muharrir). 
The manager then slapped Gulali, on which the assembled coolies attacked 
him with sticks. The manager took refuge inside his bungalow, where he was 
held up with his assistants for nearly two hours.520 After a “unilateral” 
augmentation of the hoeing task in Bangaon garden (Darrang, 1903), the 
coolies reluctantly carried on under the new rates for few days but eventually 
struck work. When the native assistants tried to get them back to work, the 
workers refused to submit. Later they assembled outside the manager’s office 
with hoes in hand, addressing their complaints to the manager.521 The workers 
of Puthiacherra (Sylhet, 1902) struck work when the hoeing task of the garden 
was augmented.  Later, they assaulted a sardar for compelling them to get back 
to work.522 A general refusal to work due to the tasks being “excessive” 
occurred on the Sessa tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1901). Around sixty coolies left 
the garden and appeared before the district commissioner to complain about 
their tasks.523 
 The increase in tasks was often used as a “strategy” to discipline the workers 
for delays, absences and work deemed as “bad” or “short”. At times, not just 
the degree of tasks, but its nature was altered to discipline the “erring” coolies. 
For instance, when the women workers of Sapataki garden (Sibsagar, 1892) 
arrived late for plucking one afternoon, their sardars were ordered (by the 
                                                 
520 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
521 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
522 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
523 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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manager) to put them to hoeing—a more physically punishing work. The 
manager was attacked and left unconscious.524 Again, when fines were 
inflicted by the manager of Mozemga garden (Sibsagar, 1879) on some women 
as a punishment for “short-work”, he was severely assaulted by them.525 A 
textbook on tea management advised the managers in such circumstances ‘to 
not fine the whole lot as they have a common cause of resentment’, but rather 
to ‘select the worst of them and fine them a lot’.526 
 The assessment of an individual’s task was ‘theoretically’ open to the 
‘interpretations’ of the supervising authorities regulating and registering the 
work.527 Contesting this view that ‘the subordinate staff has as a general too 
much power in this respect (in the measurement of work) ’. A colonial report 
emphatically asserted that ‘there was no ground for supposing that 
measurements generally are not supervised by the managers’. Gardens, as it 
went on to depict, ‘are marked in blocks, and the manager knows exactly and 
the coolies too have a fair idea of how many are required for a particular 
task’.528  
                                                 
524 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
525 Annual Report of Police Administration of Assam, 1879, p.23 
526 C Bald, Indian tea: Its culture and manufacture (Calcutta, 1922) p.319 
527 In case of Chinese coolies in Cuba the law demanded that they completed five “tasks” a 
week. In most instances, the “task” was determined by the overseer, who could arbitrarily 
declare any work as unsatisfactory and withhold wages. This became one of the most frequent 
complaints of labourers. Again in the plantations of Fiji, the guideline supposedly defining 
tasks was work which an average, able-bodied male worker could complete in six hours steady 
work. The definition and allotment of tasks in the field was however left to discretion of the 
overseer who was ‘to all intents and purposes the sole judge of the fair limits of the task work.’ 
A.J. Meagher, Coolie trade: The traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America (Philadelphia, 
2008) p.255; K. Saunders, Indentured labour in the British Empire, 1834-1920, p.133; Shaista 
Shameen, ‘Migration, Labour and Plantation Labour in Fiji’ in S. Jain and R.Reddock, Women 
Plantation Workers: International Experiences (Oxford, 1998) p.55; D. Ganguli, Slavery in 
British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972) p.4. 
528 Special Report on the Working of Act I of 1882 in The Province of Assam during the years 
1886-1889 (Calcutta, 1890) p.164. 
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Figure 5.8: Morning Paper of Manager 529 
 
This was very much in line with a growing sentiment towards “scientific 
management” of plantations, where every aspect of plantation life and work 
process was attempted to be carefully defined to obtain maximum efficiency 
through documentation, control and intensification. The limits of such 
strategies becomes evident in everyday practices. 
 The next couple of photographs depict the operation of daily field work 
carried (early 20th century). 
 
                                                 
529 E Money, The cultivation and manufacture of tea (London, 1883) p.153. 
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Figure 5.9: Plucking Tea Leaves.530 
                                                                     
                                                 
530 Assamese Women in Costume, Picking Tea Leaves. NAA INV 04423401, Photo lot 161, 
Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and Australia, National 
Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
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Figure 5.10: Hoeing the Field531 
 The images of plucking work being conducted by women and hoeing task 
done by the men reveals the dominating presence of supervisors (sardar and 
muharrir) organising, controlling and verifying the work. In the first image, 
the sardar (at the back with a turban) was directing a group of female pluckers 
working on a few designated rows (gallis) of the tea bushes.  In the second 
image, the overseers (with kurta or shirt) were supervising and recording the 
male coolies hoeing along certain rows of the bushes.   
 Supervision at the workplace operated through varying layers of control with 
diverse and overlapping functions in the conduct of work. The work 
supervisor, or Sardars, were placed over batches (Chillan) of men or women 
and apparently received general directions from the manager regarding the 
                                                 
531 J. Buckingham, A Few Facts about Indian Tea (London, 1910). 
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work to be achieved on a daily basis.532 They were accountable for their batch 
turning out for work at the designated hour, and also the attainment of a 
quantity of work by them.533 The ‘sardar’s mode of management’, as a planter 
portrayed, ‘was to parade up and down between the rows of the bushes, armed 
with a small stick and the dignity that his position of authority gave him’ and 
where he constantly ‘incited them (coolies) to make haste and get along faster 
(Che lao! Che lao!) ’.534  
 The authority of sardar, contrary to many allusions in the planter narratives, 
was not necessarily derived, but was also constituted and reconstituted by their 
location in the work hierarchy and social life on the tea gardens.535 Some 
sardars were the recruiters (recruiting sardar), who managed to persuade and 
bring a fairly large number of people with them. While others were older 
“respected” men of the garden and even the nearby bastis. A manager (H 
Grant, Ainakhal Tea Garden) from Cachar referred to three “prominent” 
sardars on his garden to the 1906 Labour Commission. This gives a sense of 
the broad variation of this category.  One of them, named Manniram Das, was 
a native of Sylhet and owned property close to the garden. He controlled over 
two hundred coolies of the garden for which he received one anna per rupee 
worth of work executed (twenty five percent of the wages). The other sardar, 
Ismail, was born on the garden, while the third, Ramsha Kurmi (a native from 
                                                 
532 The necessity of overseers was immediately realised by the colonial government with the 
arrival of Chinese workers in Cuba, and the emerging “labour difficulties”. They 
recommended the planters to appoint overseers to ‘guide, watch over, and assist the labourers 
in their work.’ A.J. Meagher, The Coolie Trade: The traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin 
America, 1847-1874 (Philadelphia, 2008) p.208. 
533 W M Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935).   
534 The intensity of the work that the Sardar demanded (Come on! Come on) had interesting 
parallels with the Jhumur song Sardar Bole Kaam Kaam (Sardar says Work! Work). G. 
Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (Calcutta, 1884) pp.135-136. For such practices in 
contemporary tea plantations in North Bengal P. Chatterjee, A Time for Tea: Women, Labor, 
and post/colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation (Durham, 2002) p.201. 
535 In the case of Surinam plantations, the equivalent of Sardar called Mandur was seen as an 
crucial link in the chain of command as they could speak in the native language. But the 
‘threat’ of demotion, as Hoefte argues, kept them on the side of the employers. Shobita Jains’ 
study of the contemporary Assam plantation shows a degree of mutuality existing between the 
sardars and their gangs. R.  Hoefte, In Place of Slavery: A Social History of British Indian and 
Javanese Laborers in Suriname (Gainesville, 1998) p.23; S. Jain, ‘Gender Relations and the 
Plantation System in Assam’, in S. Jain and R. Reddock, Women Plantation Workers: 
International Experiences (Oxford, 1998) p.55. 
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Azamgarh), had worked on the plantation for more than thirty years. They 
commanded over fifty coolies individually and received the wages of the 
workers. These sardars shared social and work ties with their gang, which 
were articulating in extremely complex ways.536  
When a sardar was severely abused by the manager of Talap tea garden 
(Lakhimpur, 1898) for taking a ‘break’ during work and chatting with other 
sardars, the coolies attacked the manager and his three assistants. Two years 
later, on the same garden, a riot occurred under fairly comparable 
circumstances. The Assistant manager (Jameson) while “disciplining” the 
coolies for the way work was being conducted ‘took hold of the sardar and ran 
him up to the place where the plucking was to begin’. He was attacked with 
sticks.537 The incident which transpired in Barjuli garden (1891, Darrang), 
where the manager forced the coolies to turn out for work on a day after a 
festival, started when a sardar, representing the worker’s case, was assaulted 
by the manager.538 
These incidents, signifying the ties of deference and mutuality of interests 
between the sardars and coolies, has also to be appreciated in the background 
of several other incidents where the sardar becomes the target, as an exemplar 
of perverse and coercive authority.  
 Apart from their role in supervising field work, the sardars also assisted in the 
measurement of the individual’s task which was documented by the mohurir—
the native supervisors—and entered in books.539  Later, they were supposed to 
appear before the manager to give an account of the day’s work, complain 
                                                 
536 Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts 
(Calcutta, 1906) pp.148-149. 
537 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
538 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
539 Crole makes a case for a “chain of hierarchy” in place during field work. The sardars were 
said to be supervised by mohurir and who in turn was under a head or burra muharrir—who 
was answerable to the manager for the whole conduct of the work. D. Crole, Tea: A text book 
of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.8. 
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against any defaulters, and receive the instructions for the subsequent day’s 
work.540 
 
Figure 5.11: Native Supervisors.541 
The relentless goading of managers, overseers and sardars to drive the workers 
hard on the fields, as the following phrases from a language handbook 
suggested, was not always effective. 542 
Why have you not finished your work? Others can finish, why cannot you? 
The quicker you pluck the more the pice you will make 
Make the hoe deeper 
You must finish it. Else you would be short paid. 
The extremely strenuous deep hoeing, mentioned a manager, was the occasion 
for the ‘coolies to shirk and get better of his employer’. He found this 
impossible to check because by ‘dexterous manipulation the coolie cuts the top 
                                                 
540 F.T.R Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the management 
of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) p.81.  
541 Assamese Tea Overseers and Writers in Costume Outside Wood-Slat Building. NAA INV 
04423600, Photo lot 161, Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and 
Australia, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
 
542 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927) pp.44-48. 
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earth in such a way to present the appearance of a good deep cut’.543 Such 
shirking was interpreted by another manager as a ‘trick is to make the manager 
think that he has given a wrong order and give them easier work in 
consequence’.544 
 The quality and the quantity of individual’s work was recorded in the 
‘books’—(Figure 5.12) which was becoming a stable feature in the task 
assessment practices of the late nineteenth century tea gardens.545The sense of 
empowerment of the mohurir, as suggested in the figure (5.12), was not just 
his clothes, umbrella, stick but also the pen and book. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Figure 5.12: Garden Book: Daily Kamjari Book546 
There were instances of discrepancies and corrupt practices in assessment (by 
sardars) and recording (by mohurir), leading to serious anxieties among the 
field workers.547 Even the work in the tea-house/factory was marked by the 
                                                 
543 G. Barker, A Tea Planter’s Life in Assam (1884, Calcutta) pp.81-82. 
544 F.T.R Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the management 
of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) p.13. 
545 F.T.R Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the management 
of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) p.44, p.46. 
546 F.T.R  Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the 
management of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) 
547 Chakrabarty argues that such ‘falsification of documents’ was integral to the operation of 
power and authority that the sardar wielded over the coolie. A contemporary observer alluding 
to the fact that ‘coolies are often cheated out of a portion of their wages’ suggested that to 
prevent this fraud the ‘planters often oblige the muharrir to pay in their presence, or what is 
better, pay them personally.’ D. Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class History (Princeton, 
1989) p.108; S Ward, A Glimpse of Assam (Calcutta, 1884) p.125.  
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presence of work supervisors (as in the next two photographs) evaluating and 
recording the work. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 and 5.14: Working in Tea Factory.548 
 
                                                 
548 Assamese women sorting tea n.d and Assamese men packing and weighing tea n.d. NAA 
INV 04423202 and NAA INV 04424002, Photo lot 161, Emma A. Koch photograph collection 
of India, South Asia, and Australia, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian 
Institution. 
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There was a feeling that the books kept in the local vernacular (Assamese and 
sometimes Bengali) meant that the ‘imported labourers (as well as the 
managers) were pretty much in the hands of mohurir who writes these 
accounts’.549 Absences marked in books were not always intentional and often 
used as a means of fining work deemed as short or bad. Some other practices 
of not keeping a ‘record’, but merely giving the workers a token with a value 
‘commensurate’ with the portion of the task achieved.550 The dimension of the 
tokens from Mertinga tea garden (Sylhet, 1896) varied according to the 
fraction of the task concluded.551  This was also seen as an effective tactic to 
discourage ‘absenteeism’, as the tokens were collected at the ghunti (muster) 
the day after. A manager (Sylhet, 1902) permitted an ‘established’ garden 
chowkidar (who also owned a shop in the garden) to cash these tokens. He 
took a percent commission for his “services” and coolies often ended up 
surrendering the tokens earned during the course of the month, just in 
exchange for food. A riot was reported from this garden with the coolies 
complaining that their wages were low. 
                                                 
549 Major Graham (Deputy Commissioner, Darrang) Reports on the Tea and Tobacco 
Industries in India (London, 1874) p.81. 
550This practice was reported by the Commissioner of a tea district in the late 1870s. The 
official efforts to conduct an enquiry in to causes of mortality on a garden in Cachar were 
hampered because of the absence of any books showing the earnings of each worker 
separately. The system on this garden (followed by other gardens of the area) was to pay in 
"tokens", which were cashed on a weekly or monthly basis.  These token did not always have a 
cash value, but sometimes merely mentioned the quality of tasks achieved—half haziri, quarter 
haziri. Das in his study of plantation labour noted that daily payment made by brass tokens 
which were not only cashed by the gardens management but sometimes commissioned to a 
shop. The 1906 Commission found this as a general practice in the district of Sylhet.  Assam 
Labour Report, 1880, p.5; Proceedings of Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting 
and Labour Districts (Calcutta, 1906) p.137, pp.139-140. R.K. Das, Plantation Labour in 
India (Calcutta, 1931) p.143. 
551 These brass tokens are from a private collection. The first image illustrates distinct tokens 
used by the gardens belonging to different tea companies—mostly in Sylhet. For details see 
http://www.koi-hai.com 
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Figure 5.15: Garden Token. 552 
 The pervasiveness of grievances against such ‘excesses’ is borne out by a 
‘practical treatise’ on the ‘management of Assam tea gardens’ where the author 
observed that the ‘coolies are continually complaining that their sirdar is 
cheating them’. He strongly recommended his readers (young tea planters) that 
‘though a manager should never take a coolie’s part against his sirdar...but he 
would not be acting fairly to let such a complaint pass unexamined into’. He 
went on to propose a ‘way out of the difficulty’: 
 Bring the coolie and his sirdar face to face. Say to the coolie. “Now, then, you say 
this sirdar has cheated you out of some land? Answer, “Yes.” “All right, then! I shall 
measure your land myself; and if you are wrong, you forfeit your day’s hazira, for 
complaining unjustly of your superior. If you are right, then I shall punish your 
sirdar...Most likely one of them will give in.553 
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of such a strategy, there were instances 
when the workers could not be so easily placated. Workers of Rema garden 
(Sylhet, 1898) refused to join work because their previous day’s tasks were 
arbitrarily deemed as ‘short’, without the overseers actually measuring it on the 
excuse of persistent rains.554 On being paid short wages, the workers of 
Khobang tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1892) assaulted the overseers who were 
perceived as the “reason” for the faulty assessment of their tasks.555 There was 
                                                 
552 H L Thomas, Sub Divisional Officer, South Sylhet to Deputy Commissioner Sylhet, 23rd 
January 1904. Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904. ASA. 
553 F.T.R Deas, The Young Tea-Planters’ Companion: A Practical Treatise on the management 
of a tea-garden in Assam (London, 1886) p.41. 
554 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
555 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
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a strike in Amrailcherra tea garden (Sylhet, 1902) and workers declined to get 
back to work because they had issues with the overseers for habitually making 
under assessments. On being physically coerced by the manager to comply, 
they assaulted him.556 
  There were complaints made by workers of Balipara tea garden (Sylhet, 
1890) for being paid less than what they felt they had actually earned during 
the month.  When the manager tried to arbitrate, he was assaulted.557The 
intervention of a manager of Kalacherra (Cachar, 1892) to “protect” the garden 
babu from being assaulted by workers for an existing objection was resented. 
A large group followed the manager on his way back to the bungalow. He was 
later stopped and assaulted.558 Again, when the management of Mirtinga tea 
garden (Sylhet, 1903) stopped the pay of some individuals on account of bad 
work, they collected in front of the garden office and vented their concerns.559 
The “disquiet” that took place on the pay day on Hukanpukri garden 
(Lakhimpur, 1900), which led to a group of three hundred workers combining 
against the manager, started with an individual complaining about the faulty 
assessment of their overtime work.560  
 Such anxieties were not limited to the field.  In a case reported from the tea-
house of Joboka garden (Sibsagar, 1902), the “factory workers” assembled as 
they were seriously aggrieved about their overtime assessment. When the 
manager attempted to ‘disarm’ them, he was challenged and severely beaten 
along with his assistant.561 
 The practices of assessment on the fields for plucking, accomplished by the 
women workers, had to undergo another stage of assessment: the verification 
and weighing of the leaves plucked. 
                                                 
556 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
557 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
558 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
559 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
560 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
561 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
212  
 
Fig. 5.16: Weighing leaves in presence of Manager 
The photograph (Fig 5.17) from Jorehaut tea company garden was of a 
‘weighing booth’ for plucked leaves brought by the female coolies.562 The 
European manager was assessing the quality of the leaves (fine or coarse), 
while one of the native assistant weighed it and the other kept a record of the 
weight in the books. The weighing scene was detailed by a tea manager from 
another garden: 
There were three weighing booths (for plucked leaves)…The head babu wrote up the 
hazris (attendance), and we (European manager/assistants) searched each basket 
before it was put on the scale. When a fault in leaf was found…the woman with her 
basket was turned out of the line into a large pen alongside…by the time the weighing 
was finished there would be forty or fifty women waiting…clearing out the offending 
shoots from their baskets.563 
                                                 
562 W.A.B. Nicholetts, served in the Jorehaut Tea Company from 1898-1937 and this 
photograph is taken from one of the tea gardens around 1905-1910.  H.A. Antrobus, The 
Jorehaut Tea Company Ltd. (London, 1948). 
563 W. M. Fraser, The Recollections of a Tea Planter (London, 1935). 
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These practices of ‘disciplining’ for the quality of leaves plucked and other 
suspicions of cheating during weighing also figures prominently in the 
language handbook.564 
What is the brick doing in your basket?  You are trying to get extra weight. 
Your leaf is hot and red. 
Your leaf is very coarse. 
You must pick out the coarse leaves before I can weigh it.  
The claims of authority and complete control of the European managers and 
assistants was exaggerated, as the sardars and mohurir were also relevant in 
conducting the operation (Figure 5.17). 
 
Figure 5.17: Weighing Leaves in the absence of manager565 
 
                                                 
564 Tea Districts Labour Association Language Handbook, Santhali (Calcutta, 1929) pp.40-41. 
For a similar practice in Ceylon see Cooly Tamil, as understood by Labourers on Tea and 
Rubber estates (Colombo, 1915) pp.50-52.  
565 Assamese Women in Costume, Bringing Baskets of Tea Leaves to Be Weighed n.d. NAA 
INV 04423402, Photo lot 161, Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and 
Australia, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution. 
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 Durapati (Khawang garden, Lakhimpur, 1914) was subject to a similar 
probing and disciplining and later denied payment on account of the “poor” 
quality of leaves she had plucked. The assembled workers assaulted and 
confined the manager in his office. 
  The discrepancy in the timing and non-payment of wages was also a potent 
tactic to “bind” the coolies, compel them into debt and, at times, discipline the 
“offenders”. Such practices of labour control were employed on the Assam 
Company plantations in the late 1840s. This stimulated serious disturbances 
and contributed to the ‘militant’ image of the Kacharis—who consistently and 
collectively thwarted these moves.566 These practices apparently persevered in 
the changed milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
plantations. Even after the establishment of ‘occasions’ like the pay-day and 
‘protective’ claims of the contracts for  legislating a ‘minimum wage’—which 
was rarely enforced. 
 On the non-payment of wages on the customary pay-day, the workers of 
Scottpur garden (Cachar, 1896) declined to work. Again, when the wages were 
not paid to the workers of the Rema tea estate (Sylhet, 1898), they refused to 
join work. On the use of physical intimidation by the manager to comply, the 
coolies made a collective assault on him. They were later ordered to the muster 
ground where they again attacked the manager, and struck him several blows 
with sticks and stones.  
 A clear purpose in the modification of pay day was manifest in a case reported 
from Powai tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1917), which was briefly noted earlier. On 
a particular Monday, the assistant manager (Grant) of this garden arrived at his 
office to pay the workers their weekly earnings. The assembled group seemed 
to be in agitated mood and Grant sensing danger made a rush for his bungalow, 
but was struck several times on the way. The workers later ransacked the office 
premises. The following morning, despite the presence of police in the garden, 
about five hundred workers came out in a “festive” mood with sticks, knives 
and drums and marched round the lines in procession. Later they wrecked the 
local trader’s (kaya) shop. The investigations into the incident revealed that 
                                                 
566 See Chapter 1. 
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there was general discontentment on account of the garden authorities 
changing the pay day from Saturdays to Mondays. The workers did not have 
ready cash for the weekly Sunday market which forced them to take loans from 
the local kaya (trader), whose prices they considered extortionate. There were 
simultaneous attacks on the symbols representing the garden authorities and 
the local trader. It was out of the apprehension that there was a collusion 
between the two parties and the change in the dustoor of payment was made to 
benefit the traders.567 
5.8 Notions of Honour 
A strike was reported in Alinagar garden (Sylhet, 1900). When the assistant 
manager went to make enquiries, he was assaulted. A curious remark was 
made in the official report on the incident. It read as follows: ‘the case appears 
to have originated in some violence on the part of the assistant manager of the 
estate, who as the accused said took their izzat from them’. What was this izzat 
that the workers of Alinagar claimed was being taken from them? Izzat, or 
honour, has been variously argued to have been reposed in women—who were 
being potentially threatened in these circumstances.568 
  The role and presence of women, as has been argued earlier, was central to 
the work process of plantations, since its very inception.  An early interest in 
migrant workers was also premised on the perceived necessity of women (and 
even children) for plucking work, which was not being “satisfactorily” 
rendered by the local Assamese society. The early contract Acts (1863) 
specified a percentage of females (15%) in each batch being transported to 
Assam. The entrenchment  and spread of a specialising work process from late 
1870s, with a more precise definition of different “jobs” on a plantation (often 
organised along  lines of gender and age),  was also a strong reason for the 
                                                 
567Again when the prices demanded by the traders were found to be unjustifiably high, there 
were cases of hat looting in Bindukhuri and Balipara gardens (Darrang, 1901). Letter from JC 
Webster, Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Assam to Secretary to Government of India 
dated 23rd April 1917. Home Department, Police Branch, June 1917, 115, NAI. R. Behal, 
‘Forms of Labour protest in Assam Valley Tea Plantations, 1900-1930’, Economic and 
Political Weekly 20, no.4 (Jan 26th 1985) p.PE 21. 
568 For a discourse of izzat in the contemporary plantations. See P. Chatterjee, A Time for Tea: 
Women, Labor, and post/colonial Politics on an Indian Plantation (Durham, 2002) p.160. 
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continued reliance on contactors, who could redress any gender imbalance on 
tea gardens. The competence of contractors in “delivering to order” could 
potentially fulfil such gendered requirements. There was also a strong 
predilection to perceive women as “settling” the workforce. The contractors 
frequently forged such conjugal unions in depots (depot marriage) and, 
thereby, offering to tea gardens happy couples, who were more likely stay.  
The patriarchal authority of managers also claimed to “influence” matrimonial 
alliances on the plantations, reaffirming their clout and hold on the workers.569 
A planter handbook clearly makes that allusion: 
Manager: Could you not marry your son/daughter to a girl/boy on this garden? 
Manager: Longa’s daughter/son will not make a good wife/husband to your 
son/daughter. She is a lazy girl/boy 
Manager: I agree to let your son/daughter marry the person you have selected.570 
 The power to frame matrimonial unions merely to ‘suit the interests of the 
industry’ and enforce the ‘will of the planters’ could not render it as 
completely notional. A planter suggested that ‘the relations between husband 
and wife, I think, will bear comparison with those existing amongst our 
peasantry. The relations between parents and children are even closer and 
fonder’. The colonial state appeared to uphold the sanctity of marriage. The 
1893 amendment to the Assam contract made the provision that the contracts 
of husband and wife should be synchronised. But the patriarchal intents of the 
colonial law was made explicit in the 1901 Act which deemed that “single 
woman” could not travel to Assam without the consent of a lawful guardian 
(husband/father).   
 The differentiation of wages and deskilling of woman’s work in the plantation 
reaffirmed the roles of men as the “breadwinner”—where women of 
family/community needed care and protection. But in conjunction to the 
production of family and its associated norms of honour and protection, there 
were the stereotypes of the promiscuous coolie-woman and the rampant 
                                                 
569 R.P. Behal, ‘Power Structure, Discipline, and Labour in Assam Tea Plantations under 
Colonial Rule’ in R. Behal & M van der Linden (ed.) Coolies, Capital and Colonialism: 
Studies in India Labour History (2006, Delhi) p.162. 
570 Tea District labour Association Language Hand-Book, Savara (Calcutta, 1927). 
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practices of managers keeping female coolies as mistresses and concubines.571 
In addition, instances of sexual abuse on the ‘isolated’ enclaves were not 
infrequent.  The manager of Kacharigaon (Darrang, 1902), assaulted two 
coolies, which according to the official report, ‘had improper intimacy with a 
girl, who was kept by the manager as his mistress’. A coolie girl from Maduri 
garden (Sibsagar, 1892) was confined and assaulted by the manager when she 
snubbed his overtures. This lurking threat of the abuse of the woman was 
articulated in the anxieties over izzat.  
 When a native assistant manager ‘insulted’ the women of a garden, the coolies 
caught hold of him, tied him on his pony, and took him through a distance of  
eleven miles to the bungalow of the superintendent to make complaints.572 
Again, when the manager of Nadua tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1899) attempted to 
“outrage” a coolie girl, he was assaulted by the workers. There was a “riot” of 
Rangajan tea garden (Sibsagar, 1899) which was due to the ‘ill feeling against 
the assistant manager in regard to a woman on the garden’.573 
 The Assistant of Hatikuri tea estate (Cachar, 1913) continued, despite 
objections, inspecting the leaves plucked by the women coolies collected in 
clothes worn round their waists. He was severely assaulted by the coolies. Six 
of them were charged and arrested for rioting and assault. The legitimacy of 
the act of assault and the general approval to it was more clearly revealed when 
an attack was made on the police and the arrested men were released. On 
further enquiries of the incident it was found that the coolies were gravely 
dissatisfied with this mode of examination of leaves and had made several 
complaints to the head babu of the garden.574 
                                                 
571 In a book on European in India a section on the planter mentions that ‘you occasionally 
come across a bachelor Planter whose views on a certain form of mortality are somewhat lax. 
This is he who fits himself with a partner of his loneliness, generally a daughter of the soil.’  A 
Guha, Planter Raj to Swaraj (New Delhi, 1977) p.45; H. Hervey, The European in India 
(London, 1913) p.53 
572 Assam Labour Report 1884, p.4. 
573 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA 
574 Letter from WJ Reid to Secretary to Government of India.  Home Department, Police 
Branch, No 67, Part B, July 1914. NAI.  
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 In a case reported from Koliapani garden (Sibsagar, 1905), one can more 
clearly notice the dynamics of how a “small” act of disciplining of a coolie girl 
could provoke communal anxieties of honour being threatened and snowball 
into a general grievance. The manager of the garden in question (Mangin), on 
his daily inspection of the pruning tasks, took a coolie girl (Durgi) by her ear to 
a place where he felt that she should have been working. Around five men 
working in the vicinity immediately came rushing up to him, and one among 
them (Gambhir) in a very agitated mood questioned the manager— “Ki katri 
maike marile?” (Why did you beat up the girl?). Soon, around thirty other field 
workers approached the scene and assaulted the manager with their clods and 
sticks. The fleeing manager was chased and held hostage in his bungalow by a 
group which had grown to around one hundred and fifty. Later in the day, the 
Koliapani workers—men and women numbering around two hundred—
marched for Jorhat (the subdivisional headquarters), and lodged a complaint to 
the Deputy Commissioner that the sahib had threatened their izzat.575  
5.9 Violence as Protest, Protest as Violence 
 A degree of violence, as we have noticed in our cases, is a recurring facet of 
protest action of plantation workers. Apart from physical attack, appliances 
used in plantation work like hoes, kodalis, sticks and daos became weapons at 
these moments of conflict. It needs to be restated that physical disciplining was 
a vital element in the perpetuation of planter authority as they had “arrogated” 
to themselves the right to private discipline. A shift from practices of 
systematic and excessive use of violence, rampant in the “unsettled” 
plantations of 1860s, did not imply that violent disciplining was purged. It was 
more in the lines of what Merry suggests in the context of colonial Hawaii 
‘that the (planters’) image of paternal power enabled violence to be thought as 
discipline, justifying the use of flogging and whips on the plantations’. But as 
she goes to point that there were ‘forms of violence that were thought to be 
                                                 
575 Case 22 G.R. of 1905, PC Mangin versus Tulsi Kairi, Kamal Kairi, Ramcharan Ganju, 
Arjun Goala, Bhandari Ganju, Jagua Bhumiz, Lachman Muchi, Sibchoran.; Sections 147, 148 
IPC, Home Department, Police Branch, nos. 105-107, Part B, July 1905. NAI 
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excessive just as paternal authority in the home required violence to establish 
and maintain discipline, but not excessive violence’.576  
  Such a tendency comes to the fore in the cases of assault on individuals, 
which at times were deemed disproportionate and met with organised 
opposition. A coolie in the Apin tea garden (Cachar, 1895) was ordered by the 
manager to bring back certain individuals who had absconded. While returning 
back to the garden, two of the apprehended coolies escaped. He was severely 
disciplined by the manager, who beat him up with a stick. Later in the day 
when the manager was making the rounds of the garden, the coolies expressed 
their dissent. One worker caught hold of the bridle of his pony and others 
threatened him with kodalis (hoes). On the public caning of a worker from 
Bokel tea garden (Lakhimpur, 1893), the coolies attacked the manager on 
whose orders such an act was carried out. An aggravated assault with hoes was 
committed by a number of coolies of Laskarpur (Sylhet, 1897) on the manager 
who had given three strokes with a stick to one of the coolies in chastisement 
for assaulting a sardar.  
 Often it was not merely the nature of violence, but the individual targeted 
which led to it being perceived as “illegitimate”. This becomes evident in the 
disciplining of Durgi (a young girl who the manager “mildly” took by the ear), 
which led to assaults and mass withdrawal of workers from the garden. 
  With regard to the numerous “incidents” of violence of tea gardens, consider 
three cases which can be detailed at some greater length: 
 In the first incident, Aghna, a chaukidar at the bungalow of Dr. Patherson 
(Moran tea garden, Lakhimpur, 1902) was brutally whipped by him. This 
assault caused some disenchantment and ill-feeling in the garden. The colonial 
investigation report of the incident read: 
Dr Patherson of Moran tea estate found fault with a coolie named Aghna and slapped 
him; this enraged him and his relations. Aghna and three other coolies brought a 
                                                 
576 S.E. Merry, Colonizing Hawaii: The cultural power of law (Princeton, 2000) p.140. J. 
Breman, Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the colonial order in Southeast Asia 
(Delhi, 1989) 
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number of coolies and formed an unlawful assembly, with the common object of 
insulting and intimidating Dr. Patherson and Mr. Harroks (the manager).577 
 The “personal” annoyance of Aghna and his relations, which the report 
suggests, grossly underestimated the antipathy the incident provoked. The 
“unlawful assembly” consisted of around sixty workers of the garden who 
pursued the carriage of the manager and doctor, as they were driving home 
through the coolie lines, using defiant language.  
 In the next instance, a series of assaults were made on Matadin, a coolie of 
Monai garden (1914) by the manager, assistant manager and their orderlies. 
The battered and bruised Matadin had to be taken to the “coolie hospital” in 
fairly critical circumstances. Later, a group of about two hundred workers took 
the ailing Matadin from the hospital and decided to leave the garden. The 
manager tried to halt this “exodus” and make the group return by pursuing 
them on a horseback. One of workers—Ramadin, (possibly a relative of 
Matadin)—grabbed the manager’s horse by the bridle and forced him to 
dismount. The manager then drew out his revolver and fired. On this the 
workers assaulted the manager with sticks till he fell unconscious. The group 
then broke into two parties, one of which administered a severe thrashing to a 
Sikh havildar (police constable), and the other party went searching for a 
particular jamadar (native staff).578  
 The third incident occurred on 27th July 1901. This subsequently went to 
court. This allowed two versions of the same episode to appear, which, as we 
will see, is very instructive. The first account was apparently based on the 
witnesses of some workers of the garden. It was told that the whole incident 
started when a worker named Hiroa had requested a babu (Rajoni Cant Ghose) 
leave, as he was feeling unwell. The babu refused to accept this request.  
Shortly afterwards, while Hiroa was working on the field, he again happened 
to meet the babu and repeated his appeal. He was again denied, but in an 
extremely offensive tone. On this, the brother of Hiroa pushed the babu, 
                                                 
577 Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA 
578 Letter from BC Allen, Offg Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Assam to Secretary 
to Government of India, Home Department dated 20th June, 1914. Home Department, Police 
Branch, nos. 120-22, August 1914. NAI. 
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wherein two sardars quickly rushed to stop him. Later in the day a group of 
around twelve men struck work, and proceeded to the residential lines 
announcing that they intend to leave for Zillah (district headquarters) to lodge 
a complaint. One of the members was then despatched to bring the families to 
join them in their mission. When the news reached the manager (Lyall), he 
repeatedly sent a garden staff to communicate an order to the striking party to 
immediately report to him. The party consistently refused to comply. 
Describing the same episode, the garden doctor claimed that ‘they (the striking 
workers) accompanied their refusal with threat’. However, the court in its 
judgement observed that ‘there is not the slightest evidence to support this, and 
the man who himself went to bring them, does not say so’. Lyall later 
proceeded to the scene (with the babu) to personally stop these workers from 
leaving. On the refusal of the workers to comply, he ordered a group of coolies 
(described as old coolies) to thrash the striking party. 
  The manager, in a written statement to the court, had a different story to tell. 
He claimed that on hearing the news of some workers leaving, he decided to go 
to their residential quarters to pacify them and was “unexpectedly assaulted” 
with sticks and knocked down by two men—Nauhu and Sriram. The garden 
doctor added further detail to this assault. He went to the extent of quoting 
Lyall, who he claimed to have pleaded the workers approaching to attack him: 
‘What has happened? Leave your lathies and come to me to see what I shall 
do’.579 
 These relatively detailed and slightly contesting accounts indicate how the 
workers anxieties regarding work, discipline and violence, manifesting in 
myriad ways (including through violence), could very easily have been 
reduced into “one violent act” in the colonial reporting. The vicious assaults on 
Matadin did not necessarily lead to counter violence, but workers at first chose 
to leave the garden with the intent to, perhaps, take Matadin to a better 
equipped hospital at the district headquarters, or register a complaint with the 
colonial authorities stationed there. The ensuing action of the manager to 
                                                 
579 Emperor vs Lyall And Ors. on 2/12/190. (1902) ILR 29 Cal 128, 
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/842423/. 
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prevent this group from leaving, by force and fire, led to a string of assaults on 
him and the garden authorities. Similarly, Hiroa and his fellow workers 
initially decided to go to the Zillah after Hiroa’s repeated requests for leave 
went unheeded. The manager’s attempts to “personally” stop them, by possibly 
supervising a “collective” attack, led to scuffles and severe fights on the 
garden.  These instances remind us about the nature and limits of our “sources” 
(from the colonial archives), which foregrounds violence as the necessary 
reason and condition of coolies’ “reaction”. Such a narrative strategy is 
particularly employed to empty agency from the worker’s actions, where very 
different motivations and modes of protest are conveniently collapsed into the 
overarching category of violence and quickly read as “instinctive” and almost 
“compulsive”.  Again, this is not to deny the significance of violence in coolie 
labour protest, but to suggest a degree of scepticism regarding its 
overrepresentation.  
 A feature which comes out at these moments of violent conflicts is that the 
point of attack is not restricted to the manager himself but also other symbolic 
manifestations of his authority. Here it is useful to see the representation of 
managerial authority through a contemporary photograph.  
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Figure 5.18: Tea Manager Bungalow, European Assistants and Native Staff.580 
 
The bungalow, the figure of him riding the horse, the other individuals 
identified with this authority structure (European assistants, native staff and 
even the colonial policemen) became potential targets during such conflicts.  
5.10 A Collective Will to Leave 
A very distinctive practice that emerges from our survey is the phenomena of 
workers withdrawing “collectively” from gardens and presenting themselves 
before the colonial authorities stationed at the district headquarters. This 
propensity was confirmed by a colonial commissioner in the early twentieth 
century when he opined that ‘tea coolies have a pretty clear idea that they are 
somehow under the special protection of the sarkar’, and he went to suggest 
                                                 
580 Tea Managers' Thatch Roof Bungalow in Assam n.d. NAA INV 04423502, Photo lot 161, 
Emma A. Koch photograph collection of India, South Asia, and Australia, National 
Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution 
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that ‘our court records will show that they are ready enough to complain’.581 
This “erroneous idea”, as characterised by another official of the time, ‘has 
been formed by the coolies that in cases against the managers, they have the 
sympathy of the authorities’.582 
  These practices can simply be read as “outcomes” of the opportunities made 
possible by the “protective” contracts. Before the concepts of protector, 
protection and the “rights to complain” were codified in the 1865 Act, cases 
can be cited of coolies collectively going up to the district authorities to 
ventilate their concerns. In the year 1864, a violent punishment meted out by a 
plantation manager (Schoneman) resulted in the death of a worker named 
Summon. The subsequent disciplining of some dissenting fellow workers 
precipitated in a collective act targeting the manager, where he and other 
members of the management were disarmed and bound up. The coolies then 
marched on to the district headquarters to lodge a complaint. During the same 
period (early 1860s), a group of  hundred workers from a Cachar tea garden 
marched up  to the district headquarters to complain about the work (Kodalir 
kaam i.e digging work) assigned to them.583 
  In fact, the “rights of coolies to complain” (encoded in the 1865 Act, and 
subsequently affected by the 1882 Act) clearly mentioned a “proper 
procedure” to be followed: the objections made had to be routed through the 
manager to the District Commissioner/Protector for further action.584 This 
rendered other modes of complaining largely illegal. Apart from the explicit 
rights of managers to arrest, paradoxically, the coolie’s “rights to complain” 
criminalised worker’s practices of leaving the gardens for the headquarters to 
address their urgent, yet, grave concerns. Such “illegality”, as defined by law 
and contract, failed to erode the “legitimacy” of the right to complain when the 
manager and management were perceived to have seriously violated the “codes 
                                                 
581 Enquiry into causes of friction between planters and their coolies on tea-gardens, Assam 
Secretariat Proceedings, Home A, nos.98-112, January 1904, ASA. 
582 Enquiry into causes of friction between planters and their coolies on tea-gardens, Assam 
Secretariat Proceedings, Home A, nos.98-112, January 1904, ASA. 
583 See Chapter 2 for details 
584 See Chapter 2 for details 
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of conduct”. In such cases of breakdown, relief was sought from another 
authority.  
  For instance, in an incident called ‘Mesaijan affair’ (Lakhimpur, 1888), 
drawing some publicity, a group of coolies left the garden and marched up to 
the district headquarters. The colonial commissioner gives the following 
account of the case: 
A large body of coolies left the garden and came to the station, complaining of 
ill-treatment. They stated that both men and women had been flogged; in the 
case of women that they had been tied to a post in the porch of the manager’s 
house, their clothes lifted up to their waists, and that they had been beaten on 
the bare buttocks with a stirrup leather by the orders of the Assistant manager, 
Anding. The Deputy Superintendent of Police went out and enquired, and 
found that two women, Panoo and Khumti, had been assaulted in the way 
described. I myself went out, and, on further enquiring ascertained that a 
woman named Sukni had also been beaten some three or four times. The 
women Panoo and Khumti had been flogged for desertion and Sukni for short 
work.585 
 The flogging of Khumti, Panoo and Sukni was reminiscent of the Cherajolie 
incident of the 1860s, where the violence was routinely and systematically 
employed. A later report on the ‘Messiajan affair’ revealed that the death rate 
on this particular garden was around twenty five percent. 586 An acute shortage 
of workers made the managers employ violent practices to force work. This 
incident brutally reminds us that apart from “closer supervision” of workers, 
violence as a strategy to discipline and force work was not abandoned.587 The 
act of disciplining could not have been but considered extremely unreasonable. 
It was not only made into a spectacle (tied in front of the manager’s house 
                                                 
585 India: Coolies in Assam Tea gardens. House of Commons Debates. 03 March 1890 vol 341 
cc1632-6. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1890/mar/03/india-coolies-in-assam-
tea-gardens; Assam Secretariat Proceedings, Revenue A, nos. 77-117, Aug 1904, ASA. 
586 Assam Labour Report, 1889 p.46. 
587 In an incident reported from Sibsagar in 1886 around 110 left the garden to complain to the 
Assistant Commissioner. They mentioned the existence of a dungeon, where absconders and 
recalcitrant coolies were confined and tied with ropes. The Bengalee 27, no.49 (December 
1886), p.587 in D. Ganguli, Slavery in British Dominion (Calcutta, 1972) p.44. 
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where the other coolies could see it) and was brutal (flogged with leather 
stirrups on their buttocks) but also persistent (one individual beaten three or 
four times) and repeated (the treatment was meted out to three different 
women). That it was inflicted on the women coolies of the garden, could also 
have provoked the anxieties of honour (izzat) and the threats to it. 
 The case cited of coolies leaving the Monai garden (1914), after an assault 
was made on one of the coolies (Matadin), can also be seen in this light. The 
unreasonableness of the act was not only because of the disciplining that 
Matadin was subject to. But the fact that he was punished for the same charge 
on three different occasions: by the manager, the assistant manager and by the 
garden staff, which made it highly excessive and illegitimate.588 
 The “moments” of complete breakdown of faith in the manager and 
management was not restricted to cases of excessive and persistent violence, 
but other overriding and grave concerns also informed these “marches”. For 
instance, some workers of Khabang garden (Lakhimpur, 1891) presented 
themselves before the district commissioner complaining about the 
misrepresentation made to them. Their issue was that they were made to 
understand that their “contract” ran for a period of four months. The coolies 
were “persuaded” by the commissioner to return to their garden. Such a return 
was again suggested” by the same commissioner when another batch of 
workers came to complain about overwork and insufficient food. A planter 
recounting the same incident observed that their return failed to ‘instil a new 
nature into them’.589 
  The instances already mentioned in which coolies marched upto to the district 
authorities reveal a range of concerns. The sixty coolies of Sessa garden 
(Lakhimpur, 1901) alleged their tasks were excessive. The two hundred coolies 
of Rowmari (Lakhimpur, 1904) were aggrieved regarding the introduction of a 
new practice (of using Jhampis instead of umbrellas). The entire labour 
                                                 
588 Home Department, Police Branch, nos. 120-22, August 1914.  NAI. 
589 D Crole, Tea: A text book of tea planting and manufacture (London, 1897) p.196. 
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population of Koliapani garden (Sibsagar, 1905) presented themselves before 
the commissioner accusing the sahib of threatening their izzat..590 
 At least three other cases can be cited of coolies leaving plantations in the first 
two decades of twentieth century. In 1910, the coolies of Denan tea garden 
(Cachar) marched out of the garden in a body to complain that they had been 
short paid.591 In 1911, Namrup tea garden (Lakhimpur) coolies left to complain 
that the manager had refused a bonus of ten rupees per head, which they 
argued was the dustoor.592 In the year 1917, coolies from Karimganj 
Subdivision (Pathini tea garden, Sylhet) struck work demanding a higher wage, 
which was refused by the manager. This followed a withdrawal of around six 
hundred workers making their way to the district headquarters.593  
5.11 Conclusions 
 The nature of Assam plantations in the late nineteenth century, showing a 
degree of continuity and stability, allowed  a notion of customary (Dustoor)—a 
new form of “contract”—to emerge  between the managers and the coolies. 
Dustoor, here, was not taken as an unchanging custom, but rather, an 
“acceptable conduct” of the garden, which was unwritten but legitimate. The 
legitimate conduct, rather being static, was alive to the changes, and therefore, 
open to further negotiation and bargaining. This qualifies a strong tendency in 
literature to characterize the nature of labour regime to be exclusively defined 
by the rules (of the contract) and unilateral excesses of the planter and closed 
to any bargaining (with the coolies). Such a framework has most 
fundamentally characterised the nature of “collective” protest of coolies—
where life and emerging forms of protest within plantations remains largely 
curbed, individualised, or turned violent. 
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 The shifting nature of managerial authority alluded to the fact that an 
exclusively violent strategy of control was no longer sustainable, and it had to 
be informed by elements of “reciprocity” and “approval”.  The contingencies 
when dustoors were perceived to be gravely violated and “collectivities” 
forged to address such violations were not removed from the “solidarities” 
produced and reproduced during the process of migration, life and work on 
plantations. Such an understanding allowed us to place these fragmentary 
“episodes” in the plantation practices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  The anxieties informing collective action ranged from rice, tasks and 
earnings to issues of discipline, social life and izzat. These expressions  were 
conditioning and was conditioned  by the nature of workplace organisation, 
remuneration practices, patterns of residence and garden “occasions” like pay 
day, weekend drinking and rice distribution day. The production of these 
“new” occasions was also marked by the “reproduction” of “older” occasions 
like Karam Puja, Kali Puja and Holi acquiring new roles, without losing their 
earlier significance. The forms of  protest  ranging from violence to   collective  
withdrawal  was argued to have had a  longer presence on plantations and 
beyond, but were assuming new meanings, purposes and resonance in a rapidly 
changing context.  
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6. The End of Contract?: Chargola Exodus and Assam 
Tea Coolies  
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the year 1921 (May), coolies from Karimganj subdivision (Sylhet, Chargola 
valley) struck work demanding a higher wage, which was refused by the 
managers. This followed a sequence of withdrawal of coolie in batches. They 
now seemed resolved to go back to their home districts, shouting victory cries 
to Mahatma Gandhi and claiming to work under his orders.  By the middle of 
the first week itself, already a thousand coolies had left and many others were 
reportedly on strike.  
 The local planters were extremely concerned about this state of affairs. 
Warrants were issued on certain coolies under Act XIII contract, and a few of 
them arrested. However, these coolies were bailed out and garlanded by 
nationalist activists in Karimganj, and on the advice of the local officials the 
further issue of warrants was stopped.594 An emergency meeting of the 
Chargola valley managers and colonial officials was convened at a local club 
on 6th May.595 They expressed grave concern over the coolie unrest in the 
valley citing the hike in hazira (daily wages) as their primary demand; 
apprehended more strikes in the forthcoming days, and also repeated the usual 
fears of these incidents turning violent. There was a general “consensus” to 
offer new rates, which amounted to an increase of thirty to fifty percent.596 
This had reverberations in the higher echelons of the powerful and highly 
organised tea lobbies of the twentieth century. Representatives of the Tea 
Association from Calcutta and Surma Valley met the Governor and Chief 
Secretary of Assam on the 17th of May and discussed the issue of wage hikes. 
                                                 
594 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.57. 
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The Calcutta representative maintained that if the increased wages were 
persisted with, then the gardens would be compelled to close down.597 By the 
middle of June, the valley was beginning to have a “deserted look” with two 
gardens reported to have “lost” almost the entire labour force, and most of the 
gardens suffering “losses” of around thirty to sixty percent.598  
Meanwhile, the “passive” stance of local colonial establishment in repatriation 
of the coolies was coming under relentless attack from the nationalist press of 
Calcutta, which was closely observing the dramatic turn of events.599 The 
situation became all the more critical after the so called ‘Gurkha Outrage’.600 
C.F. Andrews, a close associate of Gandhi, who on his way to Assam stopped 
in Bengal. He was particularly derisive of the Bengal government’s position of 
not involving itself in the repatriation of the coolies and thereby taking a “pro-
capitalist” stance—expressed in his writings in newspapers and the public 
speeches that he made.601 The official enquiry committee into the incident 
under Montgomery Wheeler led to heated debates in the Bengal legislative 
assembly in July 1921. Meanwhile, the situation was becoming more critical in 
                                                 
597 Forthnightly Report 2nd half of May for the Province of Assam and Conference of Chargola 
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Proceedings of North East India History Association (Barapani, 1983). 
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Assam with the “strike wave” spreading to the Assam valley plantations. A 
Labour Enquiry Committee was set up in late 1921 with politicians, colonial 
officials and tea representatives on board, to understand this new and 
extraordinary moment of crisis in Assam.602 
 The exodus of Chargola holds a particular significance in the contemporary 
nationalist writings and later regional histories. Most of these writings picture 
this as “moment” when the plantation enclaves—demarcated and guarded in 
the forests of Assam—were finally breached by “outside” ideas and influences. 
The oppressive labour regime which was built on a close nexus of contracts 
and contractors was finally broken. The Assam tea coolie was set free. The 
enormity of the “episode” can be summed up in the words of a contemporary 
nationalist newspaper: 
The strike of the coolies of the tea gardens of Assam is really a revolt against the age-
old tyranny and exploitations to which they have been the most hapless victims. From 
the time the coolie falls into the hands of the artful recruiter, the arkatti...till he finds 
his resting-place in his grave away from his native home, his life is one long drawn-
out misery. And not only men but women and children have the same old story...the 
helpless coolie passed into the gardens it was felt that he was lost to civilization and 
humanity. He had fallen into conditions from which it seemed to earthly power could 
rescue him…But his redemption has at last come…he is determined to break the 
shackles for ever or die in the attempt.603 
This theme titled the ‘Nationalist upsurge in Assam’ sponsored by the 
Government of Assam, the episode stands as a testimony of the messianic 
powers of Gandhi who comes to Assam to “deliver” the coolies from their 
bondage: 
To the simple, poor people, Gandhiji was an avatar and they fondly believed that he 
had come to Assam to deliver them from their age-old bondage. Gandhiji’s visit to 
Assam gave the tea workers an opportunity to take part in the Congress programmes. 
In May 1921, the historic labour exodus from Chargola and Longai valleys of Cachar 
district began when thousands of labourers of thirteen tea gardens left their gardens, 
shouting Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai.604 
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 The author, in her zeal to establish the direct role of Gandhi in the episode, 
plays around with the chronology of the events. Gandhi’s visit to Assam in 
September 1921 is appropriated in the cause-effect sequence where his calls to 
involve the coolies in the Congress programme, leads to the historic exodus, a 
full four months back in May of that year!  
This chapter does not intend to merely qualify this argument of transition—
from contract (unfreedom) to freedom, from passive to political, from 
individual to collective.  It rather seeks to study the “episode” as an entry point 
to the changing nature of plantation and the strategies of work and life in the 
early twentieth century. 
6.2 Situating the Episode 
 At the outset, it is useful to make a set of preliminary observations about this 
particular incident. Unlike other moments of collective withdrawals, the 
Chargola episode was not restricted to a specific garden and the numbers 
therefore involved were significantly bigger.605 Also the coolies were not 
simply making a bid to the nearby headquarters, but they seemed determined to 
go back to the districts from which they originally came. The Assam coolies 
had often made this “collective” journey from home to the tea garden with the 
“aid” of arkattis and sardars and the “protective supervision” of the colonial 
state. It was probably the first time they were “collectively” making the 
journey from tea garden to their “homes” without the aid of the recruiters and 
without the supervision of the colonial state.   
Coolies for Sylhet and specially Chargola valley were historically recruited 
from Ghazipur, Azamgarh, and Benaras districts of North West Provinces by 
sardars and “settled” primarily on Act XIII contract.606 In the year 1888, for 
example, out of 45,000 coolies from North West Provinces in Assam tea 
plantations, around 35,000 were in Surma Valley. By 1891 more than 57,000 
                                                 
605 The entire Chargola valley alongwith the adjoining Longai valley was affected. In total 
8,000 out of the total working population of 15,000 left the gardens. Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922). 
606 In Sylhet more than half the total number of Assam contract labourers imported during the 
year came from North West Provinces and Behar while in the previous year there was a similar 
preponderance of Bengalis. Assam Labour Report, 1877. 
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coolies came from North West Provinces and more than half were in the 
district of Sylhet.607 The North-Westers, or the “up-country coolie”, as we had 
briefly observed, had earned a notorious reputation among Assam planters for 
being very weak in constitution and showing greater propensity to die and 
desert. Ironically, these very terms of criticism for the ‘upcountry’ coolies were 
reversed in the Surma valley, especially the Chargola valley. They, in turn, 
stood as a confirmation for their suitability as coolies. 
  In case of Chargola valley…contrary to the general opinion elsewhere, NWP coolies 
are considered the best available, both in regards to work and ability to stand the 
Sylhet climate…coolies of this nationality formed a striking contrast to those found in 
other parts of the province (Assam).608 
 Again, the “specific” nature of sardari recruitment in Chargola valley was 
underlined by colonial report in the late 1880s. It made a distinction between 
the two Assam sardars: ‘a sardar maybe a coolie sent to his country by his 
employer, or he might be a coolie who obtains leave to go home, and at the 
time of return brings back neighbours, friends and relatives with him’. In the 
case of Chargola valley, it went on to argue that the ‘second kind of sardar’ 
existed and the result brought about was what it called was ‘family 
                                                 
607 North Western Provinces was renamed as United Provinces in 1901. Assam District 
Gazetteers. Special Report on the Working Act I of 1882 in the Province of Assam During 
Years 1886-89 (Calcutta, 1890) p.214; Sylhet District by B.C. Allen (Calcutta, 1905) p.137. 
608 There has been a fair evidence of a recruiting region as a source as a source of labour 
supply for the overseas plantation declining simultaneously with an increase in labour 
immigration to some inland destination. Chotanagpur region which supplied forty to fifty 
percent of colonial emigrants during the 1840s and 1850s, became an important source of 
labour supply to Assam in the following decades. A similar trend was observable in the labour 
supplying districts of Azamgarh, Ballia, Ghazipur and Jaunpur of North West Provinces, 
where there was a decline in supply of indentured labourers to the overseas plantation in the 
last decades of nineteenth century. Mauritius, a major destination of labour from the ‘Eastern 
Catchment Area’ was already meeting its demands from the settled labour force.  A part of this 
supply got diverted towards the jute mills of Calcutta, the agricultural farms of East Bengal 
and the tea gardens of Assam. One can clearly locate a switch from a predominantly Bengali 
labour force to one coming from NWP and Behar in the jute mills of Calcutta from the 1890s.  
Surma valley plantations especially the plantations of Sylhet, which was coming up most 
rapidly during this period, drew upon this source of supply. In the period 1881-1890, almost 
71,950 coolies were recruited for the Sylhet tea gardens, which doubled on the next decade 
with 141,650. Special Report On the Working Act I of 1882 in the Province of Assam During 
Years 1886-89 p. 17 (emphasis mine.); P. Chaudhury, ‘Labour Migration from United 
Provinces, 1881-1911’, Studies in History, 1992 (8,1) pp.13-14; G. Pandey, Construction of 
Communalism in Colonial North India (New Delhi, 1990) p.77; R. Dasgupta, ‘Factory Labour 
in Eastern India: Sources of Supply’ in Labour and Working Class in Eastern India: Studies in 
Colonial History (Calcutta, 1994) p. 18; Assam District Gazetteers, Sylhet District, Supplement 
to Vol II (Shillong, 1905) p. 70. 
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colonization’.609 Such informal modes of mobilisation by the sardars were 
deeply affected by the practices of the “free system”. The distinction of the 
sardars and arkattis were getting increasingly blurred and sardars came to be 
controlled by “Local agents” within the frameworks of Tea District Labour 
Supply Association (TDLSA). Such practices were formalised in the twentieth 
century where the whole system of recruitment came to be channelled through 
a Labour Board (on the lines of TDLSA). 
The changes in the second decade of the twentieth century had a crucial 
bearing on these developing processes. The war had sparked a boom in Assam 
tea industry because of a substantial expansion in sales and market of the 
commodity. Consequently, there was an increased demand for workers, with 
over a hundred thousand coolies arriving on tea gardens in the 1915-16 season. 
The next two seasons experienced a sudden dip, with only nineteen thousand 
coming in 1917-18 season. The local demands for labour within the recruiting 
districts contributed to these shrinking numbers. The end of the war meant that 
the abnormal labour demand within the recruiting regions had partially 
subsided, which was not the case in Assam plantations. This was not only to 
compensate the insufficient supplies of workers in the previous years, but also 
to meet the fresh and growing requirements generated by large extensions of 
existing tea gardens and opening of new gardens justified by artificial war time 
prosperity.610 The existing workforce was also depleted by an influenza 
epidemic raging in the tea gardens. There was persistent tendency of workers 
in South Sylhet moving towards the adjoining Tiperrah region offering new 
and better opportunities. 
 In 1918-19 and 1919-20 seasons more than three hundred thousand coolies 
travelled to the gardens of Assam. In the case of Chargola valley the “new”” 
coolies now recruited through the agency of Tea District Labour Supply 
Association (TDLSA) came from a different geographical background. By the 
second decades of twentieth century districts like Basti and Gorakhpur were 
                                                 
609 Special Report on the Working Act I of 1882 in the Province of Assam during Years 1886-
89 (Calcutta, 1890) p. 23.  
610 The all-India area under tea had risen from 624,000 acres in 1914, to nearly 692,000 acres 
in 1919. P. Griffiths, History of the Indian Tea Industry (London, 1967) p.177. 
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replacing the older districts of Azamgarh and Ghazipur as the major 
“suppliers” of recruits for the inland destinations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 : Labour Migration to Assam 1910-1921.611 
The newer recruits were seriously impacted by high mortality during transit 
and on the plantations. These newer coolies formed the “bulk” of workers 
leaving the plantations during the exodus. There were reports of over four to 
five thousand of the coolies returning to the two districts of Gorakhpur and 
Basti.612 The new recruit’ theory still does not explain as to why only the new 
recruits of Chargola valley leave the gardens? Also, how does this explain the 
                                                 
611 Assam Labour Reports for the years 1911 to 1922. 
612 Report of the Revenue administration of UP for the year ending 30th September 1921. 
Reproduced in Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p. 15. 
YEAR NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS 
1909-10 39,332 
1910-11 43,657 
1911-12 58,646 
1912-13 59,873 
1913-14 58,646 
1914-15 63,638 
1915-16 1,10,376 
1916-17 48,130 
1917-18 19,407 
1918-19  2,22,171 
1919-20 1,02,089 
1920-21 25,472 
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nature of the mass withdrawal, which was not restricted to a particular garden 
and, at times, not just to the newer coolies? For instance, over eleven hundred 
coolies leaving the valley during the “exodus” had worked for more than 
decade and more than two hundred fifty coolies were there for almost fifteen 
years.613   
6.3 Markets and New Networks of Information 
Chargola valley extended about thirteen miles north and south where a  
government road ran all the way down dividing the gardens on west and east 
side to it.614 The gardens being in close proximity meant that it opened up 
possibilities of interaction, association and circulation of information.615 This 
also brings into relief the specific social terrain of the Sylhet district. Being a 
densely populated region, the garden and the surrounding village had 
significant overlaps. Ganj, a very common suffix used in Sylhet district, 
indicated it to be a market place.616 
   Bazaars and haats as we have noticed emerged as sites where new ties and 
relationships were forged. Very crucial to this was the presence of a large body 
of time-expired coolies who were settled outside the garden grants (basti). 
Time-expired workers also moved between the garden and the basti, retaining 
familial and social ties with workers on the garden.   
The newer coolies coming from the home districts established larger networks 
of information. For instance, coolies coming from the districts of Gorakhpur 
and Basti were witness to “Gandhi talk”, where Gandhi had assumed cultic 
status and rumours about him were very much in the circulation.  
6.4 Anxieties of Colonial State and Nationalists 
                                                 
613 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.11. 
614 A. H Walker, Rivers, Roads and Tea Gardens of Cachar and Sylhet (Calcutta, 1895) p. 21. 
615 Assam District Gazetteers, Sylhet District, Supplement to Vol II (Shillong, 1905) pp.19-22 
and Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.11. 
616 Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee (Calcutta, 1906) pp. 66-69. 
237  
In such a context, one of the earliest measures taken by the colonial 
administration of Assam during the exodus was prohibition of meetings and 
speeches within seven kilometres of the gardens (section 144). It was hoped 
that this measure would be able to counter the rumours, which it believed to 
have been a result of the intensive propaganda campaign of the nationalist 
volunteers filling the mind of the coolies with wild ideas. However, these 
actions did not yield desired results because of what it called as the covert 
nature of propaganda campaign targeting the coolie population in markets and 
other places frequented by them.617 The Labour Enquiry Committee also 
makes the point: 
It is probable that secret propaganda had been carried on for some time in the gardens 
in the Chargola valley. Otherwise it is difficult to account for the extent and 
suddenness of the exodus. There is also no doubt that after the prohibition of meetings 
an insidious campaign was being conducted surreptitiously on some gardens. 618 
 This clearly indicates that it was not the regular meetings and speeches of the 
non co-operators but bazaar talk and gossip which were creating all the nasty 
chat. A proposal by the government of Assam, to apply the Seditious Meeting 
Act (Act X of 1911) to the districts of Sylhet and Cachar and declare 
Karimganj subdivision as a proclaimed area clearly stems from such concerns 
of not being able to check this feeling and articulation of dissension.619  
   Such unease was aptly reflected in the measures deemed necessary by the 
colonial state to tackle the situation. Attempts were made to strengthen the 
armed police, intelligence system was beefed up and counter propaganda work 
was undertaken.620 A desire to make an impression on the minds of coolies 
about the continued existence of the British Raj–the official version of the 
situation, was sought to be forcefully pushed. A colonial officer (Llyod) was 
                                                 
617 Telegram dated 18th May from Chief Secretary Government of Assam to Secretary to 
Government of India, Home Department, Political Branch, June 1921, nos. 143-146. NAI 
618 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.19. 
619 Strike of tea garden coolies in Assam, Proposal of the Government of Assam to apply the 
Seditious meeting Act X Of 1911 to that province. Home Department, Political Branch, , 
nos.143-146, June 1921. NAI. 
620 Political situation in Assam-Increase of the strength of troops in the province for internal 
security purposes. Home Department, Political Branch, no. 534, 1922. NAI 
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specially deputed to organise counter-propaganda work in Surma Valley. He 
held a series of meetings in Sylhet district for this purpose. Special assistance 
was sought from the United Provinces Government to this end, and they 
accordingly sent two men to conduct counter-propaganda work amongst tea 
garden coolies from United Provinces. Assam rifles were augmented in 
affected areas so that the continued authority of the British Raj could be 
impressed upon the coolies.621  
  The desire to control information was not limited to the colonial state; the 
nationalists, as well, realised their shortcomings. A very familiar and often 
quoted explanation given by the coolies of Chargola valley for their decision to 
leave was that it was Gandhi ka Hookum. However, making this as a case for 
connection with the Non co-operation movement needs to be qualified. 
Gandhi’s first reaction to the exodus is very interesting in this regard: 
I should be sorry if anybody used my name to lead the men to desert their employers, 
it was clear enough that it is purely a labour trouble..(I was)  informed that the trouble 
is purely economic622    
In another issue of Young India, in a reply to a planter accusing him and his 
men of inducing the coolies to strike, Gandhi goes on to write: 
I can assure him (the planter) that I never advised a single coolie in Assam to strike. I 
do not profess to know the problem of labour there. . He should moreover know that 
there is no non-co-operation going on with capital or capitalists. Non Co-operation is 
going on with the existing Government as a system. But there is bound to be non-
cooperation wherever there is evil, oppression and injustice, whether anybody wishes 
it or not. The people, having found the remedy, will resort to it. If they do stupidly or 
unjustifiably, they alone will be the real losers.623 
 Again, during his visit to Surma Valley in September 1921, Gandhi 
particularly expressed his disapproval of the coolie strikes and hartals and 
censured them for indifference to what he regarded as the more important 
matters of boycott and the use of spinning wheel.624  
                                                 
621 Forthnightly report for the Second half of July for the Province of Assam. NAI 
622 Young India, 8th June in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. XX. Emphasis mine. 
623 Young India, 29th June in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. XX, pp.299-300. 
Emphasis mine. 
624 Khan Bahadur Saiyid Abdul Majid, a minister who visited Sylhet during the period said, 
‘..(that) the people were quite unanimous in thinking that Gandhi unseen was a far greater 
personage than Gandhi seen..and the common people’s observation was that he was only a 
kaya’. Forthnightly report for 1st half of September 1921. NAI 
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  The investment of the Gandhian message in this context, often at variance to 
the dictates of Gandhi and the official Congress version, suggest a lack of 
control over the information networks within the plantation area covering a 
number of gardens. An argument of these networks of information inhabiting 
an “autonomous” sphere is not made where the contacts with other coolies, 
villagers and the non co-operators had a significant bearing.  
This period was witness to a general climate of defiance, anticipating a 
possible end to the British Raj and the imminence of Gandhi’s Raj. Many 
demonstrations, public meetings and hartals in the nearby Subdivisional 
headquarters of Karimganj and the Sylhet town were held. The realisation of 
land revenue in the adjoining villages was also extremely low. All of this 
would have been very strong influence in the circulation of such ideas.  The 
workers bound by a work-schedule could not have personally attended the 
public meetings and speeches in large numbers, but nonetheless the 
interactions with villagers, time-expired workers and even the non-co-
operators at these haats could not deprive them of the “buzz in the town”.  
6.5 The Legitimacy of the Manager 
The post war period was also marked by a new and intensive economy drive in 
the tea industry. The garden managers were given little discretion in effecting 
wage hikes or giving out other inducements to workers experiencing want and 
scarcity. Concerns were raised about the prestige of managers being 
undermined by the “hard and fast” decisions regarding wage rates by their 
agencies in Calcutta. There were cases of coolies wiring directly to these 
agencies for relief, which was said to be ‘most subversive of discipline and the 
very necessary patriarchal control of the manager’. The perpetuation of the 
authority structure within the plantation, as we have argued, could no longer be 
premised exclusively on coercive mechanisms of control. It had to be by based 
on a degree of “approval” and “acceptable conduct”. In such a situation, 
consider the scene on the morning of the 3rd of May in the Anipur tea estate 
described by the manager, from where it all began: 
..On the morning of May 3rd a number of coolies demanded an increase of wages, i.e., 
8 annas and 6 annas for men and women. Previous to this an increase of wages had 
not been asked for. I (the manager) told them it was impossible for me to give them 
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the wages demanded… some one amongst them shouted Gandhi Maharaj ki jai. They 
left the muster ground in a body and in half an hour were leaving the garden. 
  It is important to recap the decisions taken in the meeting of the managers and 
local officials held at Dullabcherra Club on the 6th May, just four days into the 
first batches of coolies leaving the tea estates of the valley. The extremely 
tense and nervous body of the planters reluctantly agreed to hike wages. They 
further felt that such a decision should be communicated to the coolies at the 
earliest to halt the spread of the unrest. The resolutions of the meeting read: 
While recognising the danger of yielding to pressure and the encouragement that such 
yielding [Wage hike] may give to agitation elsewhere the officials did not consider 
this a sufficient reason for refusing concessions just due and absolutely necessary to 
keep the labour on the gardens..we therefore advise to concede the rates they had 
unanimously agreed on, and to do this at once and not wait for further trouble.625 
 Yet, this could not prevent a delay in its general implementation. At times, 
concessions were withdrawn on many gardens, after being announced, as they 
were not being ratified by the Calcutta agents. For instance, on the 8th of May, 
Dunlop (manager of Goombhira division) agreed to hike the wages in the order 
of 6 annas (for men) and 4 annas (for women.).  This proposal was not 
approved by agents of the company. Such a move could only have eroded the 
credibility, legitimacy and sense of authority of Dunlop. It was not entirely 
surprising that the coolies of Goombhira division started leaving the garden by 
the 10th of May. Even the personal assurances given by the manager of 
Dullabcherra that concession offered would not being reversed, could not stop 
the coolies of his garden leaving. On being interrogated the coolies said that 
the concessions after all would not be confirmed.626  
 Some managers complained that their submission to the demand of wage 
hikes under the pressure of strikes had actually proved counterproductive. The 
workers believed that it was on Gandhi’s orders that the wages have been 
increased: 
…All the remaining coolies [of the garden] had worked regularly throughout the week 
at the old rate of wages. Sunday 8th, was our pay day, and pay was proceeding as usual 
when word came that three neighbouring gardens had raised the wages to 6 and 4 
                                                 
625 Conference of Chargola Valley Tea Planters and Government Officials, 6th May 1921. 
Report, ALECR 1921-22. 
626 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.84. 
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annas. From this moment the coolies were absolutely mad and for three days the 
garden was in an uproar. It was stated that Gandhi has raised wages.627 
 The decision to hike wages did not necessarily reinvigorate a sense of 
satisfaction among workers as expected by the managers and the colonial 
administration. The extra Assistant commissioner of Karimganj Subdivision, 
for example, ventilated the complaints of several managers that even with 
increased wages the coolies were doing just as they liked and were not working 
satisfactorily. Wage hikes did not necessarily have a deterrent effect and 
coolies on some other gardens went on strike for one or two days even after the 
wages had been increased.628 Some managers, who considered themselves 
extremely fortunate of not having to deal with strikes on their gardens, 
experienced a ‘nasty feeling’ among their coolies during the period.629 
…There was a feeling of unrest before the exodus. When I met some coolies they 
were bitterly complaining against the Manager…they said that the manager would not 
listen to their grievances…when I went to the garden after the exodus and obtained 
evidence of his extreme unpopularity, I dismissed him. If I had kept him on, I am 
afraid I would have lost all my coolies.630 
The manager of Tea Estate related about a male returnee who said that he 
would not have stayed back at the time of exodus for even a rupee a day!631 
The refusal of the first batches of coolies who had left the gardens to accept the 
rice and other provisions at Karimganj town is particularly suggestive. They 
believed that the supplies has been provided by their manager, who no longer 
could claim their loyalty. A most perplexed Subdivisional officer of Karimganj 
relates the incident to the Enquiry Committee: 
I obtained a stock of rice and salt and arranged to supply the coolies. About 200 
coolies came up to me on the 7th or 8th May as far as I remember and the first question 
                                                 
627 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.58. 
628 Rai Bahadur Panchu Gopal Mukherjee, Extra Asst Com, SDO, Karimganj and H.A. Wray, 
Manager, Singlacherra. Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 
1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) pp. 61-63, p.56. 
629 A. Brown, Rajnagar TE. Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee 
Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.47. 
630 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.28. 
631 H.A Wray, Manager, Singlacherra Tea Estate. Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour 
Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.55. 
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they put me was whether this rice was being supplied by Government or by the tea 
gardens; they said that they would not touch it if it was supplied by the gardens…I 
told them that if they did not want to take rice and salt that was offered them, they 
might go. Nobody took anything and they all went.632 
 This bankruptcy of legitimacy did arise from a momentary failure of the 
managers to effect wage hikes. This has to be more concretely situated with 
other complimentary concerns. It was observed during the time of the Chargola 
exodus that there was a tendency of workers declining to go to hospitals.633  
Dr. Dunlop of the Chargola Valley read this ‘resistance’ as a part of the 
‘Gandhi propaganda’ to renounce hospitals and Western medicine.634  It was 
not simply a case of tradition versus modernity in the coolie’s resistance to go 
to the hospitals. The general ineffectiveness as relating to the high rates of 
mortality, especially during this period, evoked a sense of cynicism. 
 
 
 
Year Total  Deaths 
1917-1918 21,961 
1918-1919 62,176 
1919-1920 44,866 
1920-1921 28,927 
       
      Table 6.2 : Mortality on Assam tea gardens 1917-1921635 
                                                 
632 It is significant to note here the cultural value of salt as an index of loyalty. For accepting 
food/salt provided by someone would mean an acknowledgement of allegiance to him and the 
failure to do so would be deemed as namak-harami –the term in Hindustani for disloyalty. Rai 
Bahadur Panchu Gopal Mukherjee, Extra Asst Com, SDO, Karimganj. Evidence recorded by 
the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p. 64. 
633 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.97. 
634 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.97. 
635 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.94 (Emphasis mine) 
and Assam Labour Report for the year 1917-18, 1918-19 and 1919-1920. 
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 The virulent influenza epidemic raging in the tea gardens claimed 40,000 lives 
in the period from 1919 to 1921.636 More than 150,000 people lost their lives 
in the tea estates of Assam in the 1917 to 1921 period. The Labour Enquiry 
Committee particularly observed these conditions as the reasons for 
‘discontentment with garden life’: 
The fact that the best medical attention on the gardens could often do little to save life 
in such circumstances conduced to a feeling of despair, and even to a belief among the 
more ignorant that the garden was haunted by some evil spirit. It is not, therefore a 
surprise that some of these unfortunate immigrants lost faith in European medicines 
and methods of treatment and that when ill-health began to prey on body and mind 
and the earning capacity was diminished, they became discontented with the 
conditions of tea-garden life.637   
 
 The failure of the authorities to check falling earnings and protecting lives 
aggravated a growing feeling that something was drastically wrong. The 
changing conditions of work, which further affected the material/social 
circumstances (dustoor), fed into this disillusionment.  
6.6 Changing Practices of Work, Life and Control on Sylhet 
Plantations 
  The differentiated nature of plantation landscape in Assam was not just 
limited to the nature of contracts, practices of contracting and sources of labour 
supply. In certain significant ways the work practices also took particular and 
distinctive trajectories.  
 For instance, in Surma Valley plantations (especially Sylhet) “fine plucking”, 
which was becoming a “norm” in the Assam valley plantations, was rarely 
practised. “Coarse plucking” giving greater yield compensated for the lower 
price it realised in the market.638 During war, when quality became a secondary 
consideration, the result was still coarser plucking in Sylhet. However, the end 
of war led to a huge accumulation of tea stocks.639 The garden agents realised 
                                                 
636 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.94.  
637 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.95. Emphasis mine  
638 For the differential abilities in the modes of plucking. See Chapter 5 
639 The war had a tremendous stimulus to the industry. In the period 1914-1919, the increase in 
production of Indian tea was nearly 64 million pounds. In the 1919 season there was a shortage 
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that the remedy for this overproduction lay in switching to fine plucking. This 
had a twofold impact: firstly, it made a serious dent to the voluntary 
opportunities for overtime work. Between January and May 1921, there was 
little overtime work. Overtime hoeing virtually stopped till the winters when 
the semi abandoned tea was being reclaimed.640 Secondly, the precision 
demanded in fine plucking meant a fall in the quantity plucked by individual 
workers necessitating a revision in the daily task for plucking. However, such 
changes were not usually recognized and many managers driven by 
“economy” steadfastly stuck to their old rates. 
 It is therefore not surprising that coolies on gardens demanded the reduction of 
nirikh (task) or nal (measurement).641Coolies of a particular tea estate went on 
a strike demanding similar wages as the neighbouring gardens. But when the 
revised wages, with an increase in tasks was offered they refused, continuing 
with their strike.642 
 This was aggravated by the “novel” practices adopted by plantations in the 
assessment of tasks. The usual “deductions” made for the weight of the basket, 
for wet leaf and for the quality of the leaf plucked were more stringently 
enforced. The managers started deducting the “wastage” in manufacture of tea 
called the ‘factory charges’. One manager went to the extent of penalising the 
workers two pounds (of the weight plucked) in peak seasons to “compensate” 
for the limited plucking during the “off season”.643 No hard and fast rule was 
                                                                                                                                
in the shipping space. Again in 1920, congestion at the Port of London, made it necessary to 
regulate shipments from India. Thus the 1919 crop was not completely shipped till June 1920. 
Tea had to be kept on the gardens during the worst part of the monsoon and they arrived at 
market flat and dull showing the effects of storage. Then the unfavourable conditions in 
London rendered necessary a limitation of the quantity of tea offered at the weekly auctions in 
Mincing Lane, as the dealers were unable to finance or pay for larger quantities P. Griffiths, 
The History of the Indian Tea Industry (London, 1967) p.177 
640 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.59. 
641 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.65 
642 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.42. 
643 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.42. 
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observed in regard to these deductions and in some gardens deductions were as 
high as fifty percent. 644  
Payment through the so called ‘ticket-system’ was a widespread practice in the 
Sylhet plantations as can be seen in the next image. 
 
Figure 6.1: Tokens on Sylhet Tea Gardens.645 
The gardens generally cashed these tokens on a weekly basis. By this time the 
coolies might have already been indebted to the shopkeepers. The Labour 
committee came across cases where the local shopkeepers, accepting the 
tokens did not honour its full face value, taking huge discounts on them. The 
Superintendent of Police of Sylhet, observed that a coolie taking a ticket to the 
shopkeeper would get less than fifty percent of it’s’ worth.646 
The cutting down on the expenditure and changed working practices within the 
garden meant that certain “norms” were not honoured—coolies in many 
gardens were not given the usual agreement bonuses, overtime  was reduced, 
and they were forced to take leave. A tea manager noticed the “cumulative” 
effect of these practices: 
                                                 
644 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.32.  
645 See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion on the token system. http://www.koi-hai.com 
646 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.31. 
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The unrest, if any, amongst coolies was I think mainly due to cutting down of 
expenditure. In our own case it meant that coolies were not given the usual agreement 
bonuses and a smaller amount of ticca, and were also encouraged, and in some cases, 
forced to take more leave than they wanted and could not, of course, and understand 
the reason. This fact combined with Gandhi talk that was openly being instilled into 
them by Bengalis in the bustee and bazaar, had the effect of unsettling them and 
making them think there was something wrong.647   
 
During the post war period, land offered to the coolies was increasingly 
becoming scarce due to the sustained influx of newer workers. This was 
compounded by the large scale tea extensions to address to the “abnormal” 
demands in the markets. They intruded into the land held by workers for 
cultivation, or grazing lands for their cattle. The South Sylhet gardens, which 
were in close proximity to the independent state of Tipperah, experienced a 
significant shift of workers towards the new gardens being opened there. They 
were offered higher wages and rent free land for cultivation for a term of two 
to three years.648 Babu Rajniranjan Deb, a tea manager, noted that in the period 
(1916-1921) about fifty percent of the workers had ‘peacefully absconded to 
Tipperah, without causing any commotion’.  He adds further that ‘coolies are 
attracted to Tipperah because they say that they would get 8 annas for each 
hazira and also plenty of paddy fields’.649   
  The “choices” being exercised by these workers in accessing better 
opportunities was apparently compromised by the contracts they were held 
under. A “freedom” from Assam contract in Sylhet (where it abolished in 
1908) was limited by a peculiar articulation of Act XIII. The rights of control 
(like private arrest) were still invoked by planters. Such planter aspirations 
were in fact articulated during the discussions regarding the Assam contract in 
the early twentieth century.  A demand for a short contract in lieu of the Act 
                                                 
647 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.64 (Emphasis mine.) 
648 The manager of Balisera and Lungla tea estate related to the Enquiry Commission of 
spending more than Rs. 1,80,000 and 60,000 respectively in recruiting during the 1915-1920 
period without any increase in the working population, most of them making their way to 
Tipperah especially in the years 1919 and 1920. Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 
1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) pp. 87-88; Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) pp.35, 37-38, 41.  
649 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p .29. 
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XIII contract was made by the local tea association. This was argued to offer 
the managers of the gardens giving out bonus some degree of “protection”. 
Chief Commissioner of Assam, while ruling out the possibility of amending 
Act XIII contract (which applied to whole of India), encouraged them to arrive 
at some “common-sense practice” for the interpretations of its provisions.650 
Such “common sense” practices meant that not only   four hundred forty odd 
warrants were issued between July 1920 and June 1921 in two subdivisions of 
Sylhet for “breaches” against workers but there were cases of managers 
sending chowkidars to neighbouring gardens to bring back workers.651 
Instances of coolies returning from prison to complete their contract on the 
garden were not entirely a rare. 
6.7 Gandhi Baba ka Hookum: A New Will to Leave  
 These conditions of a bankruptcy of legitimacy and a general sense of changed 
conditions in life exacerbated the repressed oppressions and aspirations within 
the plantations, which was increasingly articulated during the period.  
Grievances and, at times, purposeful action was directed against the authority 
structure within the plantation.  
 The manager of the Doloi tea company said that the coolies on his garden 
went on strike for five days demanding the dismissal of a particular babu.652  
During the April strikes in the Burtoll and Lydiacherra gardens, the coolies 
complained of babus cheating them in payments and drove out some of them. 
On being interrogated the coolies said that they wanted to get rid of the babus 
first and then deal with the manager.653The batches of coolies of Anipur Tea 
                                                 
650 Indian Tea Association Report 1905. 
651 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.86. 
652 R Pringle, Manager, Doloi Tea Company Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.48. 
653 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.72. 
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Estate when interrogated by the Subdivisional officer at Karimganj complained 
about the Jamadar of the garden.654  
The authority exercised by the babus over and above that of their sardars, who 
were supposed to be their in-charge, was also resented. They were detested for 
their corrupt practices in book keeping.655  
Coolies on certain gardens went on strike objecting to the posting of a 
particular manager recalled from leave.656 JW Hallan, the manager of 
Phulcherra Division, talked about the “unreasonable” demand made by his 
coolies that no Europeans should speak to the women and no Babus should 
speak directly to them and that everything should be done through their 
sardars.657    
The sexual exploitation of the ‘coolie women’ by the managers also drew deep 
antipathy. The Khoreal shooting case where a manager shot a coolie who was 
resisting his daughter being forcibly taken by him was widely publicised. The 
fact that the Manager got away with a small fine could not have but drawn 
deep resentment.658  
The general depressed standard of life and loss of “faith” in the managers to 
address those concerns was inscribed in the message and person of Gandhi. 
There were reports of coolies receiving letters from United Provinces 
containing the news that Gandhi was arranging their conveyance back home. 
Some of the departing coolies claimed that Gandhi has sent a steamer to 
Karimganj to take them back where they would be given land for free. There 
were rumours of food without work, and that land under tea was being given 
up for rice cultivation. Some claimed that garden and hats belonged to Gandhi 
                                                 
654 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.63. 
655 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 1922) p.31. 
656 Forthnightly report for the 2nd half of May. NAI 
657 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) pp.38-39. 
658 The local press most extensively covered Khoreal Shooting case and even news articles in 
Calcutta were published in evidence to the oppression of coolies by the planters and complicity 
of the state in it. 
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and that the manager had no right over them, and that they could cut out the tea 
and plant paddy and sugarcane instead.659 In certain gardens, the news of wage 
hikes in other garden, made some coolies claim that Gandhi has increased 
wages and they demanded similar hikes.660  
Gandhi Ka Hookum symbolised the yearnings, anxieties and the general spirit 
of defiance of the coolies expressed and legitimised through cultural/religious 
idioms, which were much in popular circulation. During the time of the exodus 
there were reports of a boy in one of the gardens of Anipur proclaiming that 
the spirit of Gandhi had come upon him and asked all the people to gather 
around and listen to what he had to say (in effect what Gandhi has to say or 
Gandhi ka Hookum). He was placed on a Hindu shrine in the lines and 
worshipped by coolies for two days. Another man made similar claims in the 
Singlacherra gardens.661 There were reports of coolies taking oath over a bowl 
of holy water (Shapath Lena) not to disobey Gandhi Ka Hookum of leaving the 
gardens in a body or else being turned into mud or stone!662 
   Victory cries of Gandhi Maharaj ki Jai (Hail King Gandhi) manifested that 
defiance into collective action. Many coolies interrogated by their managers 
during the exodus said that they were leaving because their bhailog (brothers) 
                                                 
659 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.62 
660 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.57. 
661 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.57 & 64. 
662 Shahid Amin in his fascinating study of ‘Gandhi as Mahatma’ argues that Gandhi’s pratap 
and appreciation of his message derived from popular Hindu beliefs and practices and the 
material culture of the peasantry. What the peasants thought about Mahatma were the 
projections on the existing patterns of popular beliefs about the ‘worship of worthies’ in rural 
north India. The stories of Mahatma from the Swadesh journal that he analyses falls in four 
distinct groups- testing the power of the Mahatma, opposing the Mahatma, opposing the 
Gandhian creed and boons granted and/or miracles performed. We do not access to such vast 
and continuous accounts in the region of our study but the last three categories broadly applies. 
S. Amin, ‘Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-22’, Subaltern Studies 
III pp. 1-61. Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 
(Shillong, 1922); P. C. Bamford, Histories of Non cooperation and Khilafat (Delhi, 1925) 
p.61. 
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had decided to go.663 Formal discharge certificates were needed to be obtained 
for leaving the gardens for coolies serving under Act XIII contract.664 The 
Subdivisional officer of Karimganj pointed out to several batches of the coolies 
of the “illegality” of their action, but later admitted to this practice of coolies 
coming to the headquarters and applying for discharge. The tea workers on the 
Assam plantations had for long established these traditions of “complaining” 
and more so they now claimed it to be Gandhi Baba ka hookum. 665 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
663 C. Townsend, Superintendent of the Longai Tea Company and H.A. Wray, Manager, 
Singlacherra T.E. Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-
22 (Shillong, 1922) pp.51-52, p.56. 
664 Out of 8,799 coolies leaving 3,715 were under agreement, 2,286 were not under agreement 
and 2,798 were dependents. Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p.10.  
665 Evidence recorded by the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Report, 1921-22 (Shillong, 
1922) p. 63. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
To conclude this study at a moment of “collective withdrawal” of contract 
coolies in the twentieth century was not to posit a counter tendency to the 
“collective arrival” of contract coolies in the nineteenth century.  The attempt 
here was not deny the exploitatative nature of colonial capitalism and coercive 
intents of the contract labour regimes, but to shift the focus on the contract 
workers of plantations and see how they were negotiating, intervening and 
even reconstituting such processes. 
Such a shift in focus was located in an understanding of plantations as modes 
of organising work and labour which was differentiated in time and space. The 
inauguration of “experimental” plantations in Assam in the 1830s by Robert 
Bruce came out of a realisation that the idea of “making tea” could not  remain 
fixed on acquiring the “skills” of manufacture from the Chinese, but required 
“systematic cultivation” of tea. The emerging rhythms of plantation work 
process, i.e. the division between periods of intense work and slack period, 
coincided with the rhythms of agriculture of the surrounding areas. This did 
not encourage the local population to shift as “settled” workers, given the low 
levels of remunerations being offered by the planters. The private plantation of 
Assam Company in the 1840s faced similar concerns of “settling” workers. A 
local migrant group (Kacharis) was induced by the company to work on the 
plantations. By the 1850s, a degree of systematisation and routinisation of 
these plantation work process had been established but it was still marked by 
irregular conditions of life and work. The Kacharis exhibited a degree of 
concert and purpose around issues of wages, timing of payment and supply of 
rice that lead to several work stoppages, strikes and mass withdrawal from the 
plantations. The planters attempted to resolve these “labour difficulties” by 
sourcing a new group of long distance migrant labour, and through a new 
system of penal contract (Act XIII). The crux of this contract— introduced in 
1863—was to “criminalise” breaches of contract by Kachari workers. Again 
the so called coolie solution, namely the sourcing of long distance migrant 
workers, was underwritten by an active intervention of the colonial state. 
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The logic of colonial intervention and contract was premised on discourses of 
protection and exceptionality (situation of Assam) to reconcile the opposed 
interests of workers and planters. The plantations of the 1860s marked a break 
from the “settlement” strategies of the early plantation companies (Assam 
Company and Jorehaut Tea Company). This also set the stage for a massive 
expansion of planting activities, clearing of forests and digging of land, under 
demands of hard physical labour, poor infrastructure of life and low 
remunerations (tea mania). The work categories of plantation agriculture (like 
plucking and jungle clearing) which privileged prior initiation and familiarity 
became even more relevant for the newly hired workers labouring on tea 
gardens. The “discrepancy” in the individual performance, induced by the 
degrees of exposure to plantation work and by the specific location/condition 
of the site of plantation, was further complicated by the emergent practices of 
“task” assessment of the labour. There were several occasions of workers 
moving en masse out of these sites, making collective complaints to the 
magistrate stationed at the district headquarters for acts of violence, difficult 
nature of work, and non-payment of due wages. The project to render workers 
immobile was, most clearly, encapsulated in the formulation of the Assam 
contract enabling the planters to “legally” and privately arrest; which was 
already rampant in practice. 
 Contract on Assam tea plantations emerges in a history of contestation, 
struggles and failure in the mobilisation of workers and the implementation of 
work routines. Its specific manifestation—the presence of two contracts—tried 
to intervene and reconstitute the frame in which work and life was to be 
conducted. This was, curiously and meticulously, premised on a discourse of 
protection for the contracting parties (read planter) in an exceptional context 
(like Assam of the 1860s). Neither the premise of exceptionality (of Assam), 
nor the necessity of “protection” (through private arrest) would lose much 
sway during the course of the nineteenth century. Private arresting was 
particularly unleashed by planters to immobilize workers and also gave enough 
leverage to force work. The self-assumption of magisterial authority meant 
that, apart from the authorized powers to privately track the “runaways”, the 
managers felt generally empowered to privately punish the ‘offenders’.  The 
collapsing of the roles of policeman and judge in the person of the planter 
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critically conditioned the developing authority structure and work relations on 
Assam plantations. 
The premises of protection, theoretically, opened a space for guaranteeing 
‘worker rights’ with some intention to regulate wages, working hours and 
living standards. But the protection of coolie was often seen by the planters to 
be violating their protection. While the planter had to be protected by legal 
enactments (like the private arrest rights) and several exceptions, the coolie 
was to be protected by logic (as economic investments of planters) and good 
intentions (of planters). The assumption of magisterial authority in the person 
of the planter, further meant that the question of worker protection was no 
longer a matter of state jurisdiction but strictly a private affair. This protection 
was most explicitly compromised on the question of the continued 
applicability of a general master and servant Act—Act XIII. The Act XIII, 
initially employed by Assam planters to curb the bargaining instincts of local 
workers, came to be used at least from the 1870s to reengage the swelling 
numbers of workers having served their contracts (so called time-expired 
workers). The loss of hold from the Assam contract was to be restored by the 
Act XIII contract.   
The broadening of the notion of contract was also occasioned by the 
broadening of the identity of the recruiter (arkatti and sardar). The growing 
focus on sardars as cheaper and qualitatively better recruiter (bringing in 
families and friends), did not make the arkattis redundant. This was again tied 
to differentiated nature of plantation landscape in Assam with differing 
objectives and capabilities of mobilizing workers and organizing work. 
This formalizing relationship (of contract and contractors) was attempted to be 
reconstituted by the discourse of freedom (from 1870s) and most specifically 
by the 1882 Act. Like protection, freedom had a partial nature and purpose. 
This changed the nature of contracts (longer harsher contracts) and deregulated 
the recruitment (easier to recruit to the extent that to be able to abduct). The 
withering away of state in recruitment (celebrated as freedom) blurred the lines 
between the sardar and contractor and institutionalized abuses in labour 
recruitment—now bordering on human trafficking.  
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Alterations in the nature of contracts and deregulation of labour recruiting 
stimulated large scale migration to Assam. This demographic shift was also 
occasioned by a greater systematisation of plantations and new modes of work 
intensification. The technological innovations and mechanisation, which 
enhanced the nature and capability of tea manufacturing, did not 
comprehensively affect the cultivation methods. The field work and plucking 
of leaves were carried out manually and even required a greater human input to 
keep pace with the mechanising and quickening production process. 
Specialization and intensification of work became an integral feature of this 
routinising plantation regime. This ‘industrial’ organisation of work on 
plantations is not to imply a historical conflict between the rhythms of 
‘modern’ civilized industry (plantation) and the ‘primitive’ ways of 
tribal/peasant life (of the coolies). Yet, the excessiveness of such strategies was 
also becoming increasingly evident.  
The anxieties of unpopularity of Assam in the regions of recruitment and the 
“question” of drink on the plantations were rooted in these interconnected and 
overlapping processes. An unpacking of the overarching category of unpopular 
Assam ranged from it being perceived as a place of no return, the fear of 
labour recruiters, difficulties of earnings, to the grave threats to social life on 
plantations. In the same framework, the practices of worker drinking did not 
remain confined to the “concerns” of plantation capitalism relentlessly in 
search for greater efficiency, productivity or emerge as new “modes” of 
control for planters; but also revealed how working lives and cultures were 
taking shape on the plantations. The interest here was to stress on how such 
cultures were informing and informed by the developing routines on the 
plantations. 
This line of reasoning was furthered by exploring a notion of customary 
(Dustoor)—a new form of “contract”—emerging between the managers and 
workers in the context of a stabilising and routinising plantations. Dustoor was 
not understood as an unchanging custom, but rather an “acceptable conduct” of 
the garden. This qualifies a strong tendency in literature to characterize the 
nature of labour regime to be exclusively defined by the rules (of the contract) 
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and unilateral excesses of the planter and therefore closed to any bargaining 
(with the coolies).   
The shifting nature of managerial authority alluded to the fact that an 
exclusively violent strategy of control was no longer sustainable, and it had to 
be informed by elements of “reciprocity” and “approval”.  The contingencies 
when dustoors were perceived to be gravely violated and “collectivities” 
forged to address such violations, were not exclusive from the “solidarities” 
produced and reproduced during the process of migration, life and work on 
plantations. Such an understanding allowed us to place these fragmentary 
“episodes” in the plantation practices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  The anxieties informing collective action ranged from rice, tasks and 
earnings to issues of discipline, social life and honour. These expressions  were 
conditioning and was conditioned  by the nature of workplace organisation, 
remuneration practices, patterns of residence and garden “occasions” like pay 
day, weekend drinking and rice distribution day. The practice of collective 
withdrawal drew from a longer tradition initiated by local Kachari labour in 
early plantations, but such actions assumed new meanings and significance and 
performed new roles in the changed plantation structures of the late nineteenth 
century.  
The exodus in Chargola was not a historically unprecedented or “unique” event 
in the sense of an emergence of an entirely new form of collective 
consciousness among workers. However, in terms of scope, scale and numbers 
involved and the impact it produced, it marked a certain departure from the 
past.  It showed certain features, like in terms of its scope and numbers 
involved, that needed to be explained. This we argued, had to be located in the 
specific history of plantation in the region. The nature and modes of 
recruitment of the coolies was showing changes happening in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. The war and the fillip that it gave to the tea 
industry meant a new recruitment drive in the industry. The coolies now 
recruited by the Labour Board came from a different social/regional 
background in the Valley.  
A closer look into the valley and the plantations gave us critical insights into 
how the networks of communications were forged and information circulated. 
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Rumours in circulation revealed a deep sense of anxiety and crisis among the 
workers. These anxieties were informed by the context showing a sense of 
change for the worse. The crisis could not have been better represented: with 
managers failing to hike wages, medicines failing to protect lives and the 
British Raj failing to the onslaught of the imminent Gandhi Raj. The perfect 
makings of a “world turned upside down”. Gandhi ka Hookum, in turn, defined 
that new authority and the legitimacy the act—in this case of moving out of the 
plantations and attempting to go back home.  
The coolies bounded by contracts were imagined to be immobilised in the 
routines of work and discipline by the planters. Such immobilisation and 
routines could not be entirely established nor be completely appropriated for 
the interests of planters. The plantation labour regime showed inventiveness 
and flexibility in developing modes of control beyond the contract. The Assam 
tea gardens perdured the end of contracts and so did the coolies. But now with 
different meanings and significance. But that is another story. 
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